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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chapters that make up this dissertation largely stand on their own as 
independent pieces of scholarship. However, the reader will nevertheless detect a 
hidden leitmotiv that runs throughout these chapters—one that concerns our own time 
and social situation as much as that of the philosophers who created them:  what is the 
relation between pain and culture?  How does pain shape and determine mental 
phenomenon?  And how does our capacity for pain determine our capacity for 
creativity?   
Rather than merely summarizing the conclusions of my dissertation, this 
introduction will instead put these concepts to work in a creative effort to understand 
something of the contemporary zeitgeist.  That is, before placing the ideas of these 
thinkers under the synthetic light of the scholar’s reading lamp, I will bring them out 
into the natural light of our own situation.  This exercise will lend the more properly 
scholarly discussions that are to be found in the body of this dissertation an air of 
contemporary relevance that they would have otherwise lacked.  I also hope that it will 
release some of the latent disruptive power of the philosophical concepts that are 
examined there, revealing these concepts as useful tools of social critique.   
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* * * 
 
It is generally held that our time is one that is wanting for a unifying image of 
culture.  But perhaps, in the narrower sense of the term, we are not ‘wanting’ for such 
an image at all.  If we lack such a unifying image, it may be that this is precisely because 
we no longer desire it.  Rather than unifying images, our time is above all characterized 
merely by an ever-shifting dispersion of problems-to-be-solved. These problems appear 
to circle restlessly around an insatiable desire for making life pass more effortlessly, 
more painlessly.  
Understood in this way, a problem is always the sign of a tension to be released, 
an obstacle to be overcome, or a wound to be healed. It finds its place in an already-
constituted historical or natural constellation.  The terms ‘inefficiency,’ ‘imbalance,’ and 
‘dysfunction’—whether we find them in economics, social theory, or psychology—are 
always the watchwords for some wasteful excess of effort that itself obstructs the easy 
path to fulfillment and enjoyment.   
Whereas the pre-Modern era turned to the priest or the philosopher for 
guidance, beginning with the period of Modernity, we in the West have found ourselves 
turning increasingly to technicians, experts and scientists for answers to our problems.  
If we now discover that ours is an inescapably technocratic society, this is no doubt 
because we always seem to enter the scene after these problems have articulated 
themselves as problems.  We are like schoolchildren who arrive in the classroom after 
the schoolteacher has written the day’s exercises on the chalkboard.  Now we are 
consigned to the task of simply solving these problems, and are never allowed the 
opportunity either to choose our own problems or to articulate them ourselves.1 
And just as the problems are always already articulated for us, so also does it 
seem that the answers to these problems are merely waiting to be discovered by means 
of already existing methodologies.  In this sense, we appear to be condemned to suffer 
the solutions as much as the problems themselves.  There is little room in the process 
for a genuine contribution of one’s own. 
If man has in this sense himself become little more than this shifting 
constellation of problems, then what would remain of him if the totality of these 
problems were finally to be solved?  Would he find himself transfigured into an 
                                                
1 Deleuze, G. (1991). Bergsonism. (H. Tomlinson, & B. Habberjam, Trans.) New York City: 
Zone Books. 
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overman or would he rather become a kind of a pure monstrosity?  Or, if every 
disturbance to which man is subject were eliminated, would he simply disappear from 
the surface of the earth? 
 
* * * 
 
This question of what would remain of man if he were relieved of these 
problems finds its first thoroughly Modern articulation in Descartes (Chapter 1).  In 
The Passions of the Soul, he seeks to render clear the difference in kind between the 
actions of the soul and those of the body.  His aim is first of all to distinguish between 
the movements that have their cause in the mechanisms of the body and those that are 
freely caused by the will.  In his view, the actions of the body upon the soul must be 
clearly and distinctly understood, and this understanding will not only yield a sense of 
the real limits of the body’s actions upon the soul, but also techniques for controlling 
these actions, which will serve to give consciousness back to itself and liberate it for its 
own aims.  With this, the problem of the passions will find its solution.   
What precisely the aims of the soul are beyond that of understanding and 
mastering nature, Descartes rarely says.  Notwithstanding his assertion that the soul is a 
substance, it remains nevertheless unclear what positive determinations we might 
attribute to it other than the freedom of the will.  In Passions, when speaking about the 
two principle kinds of will, active and passive, he proffers the following remark:  “Our 
volitions in their turn divide into two sorts: actions of the soul that aim only at 
something in the soul itself, as when we will to love God or in any way to apply our 
mind to some object that isn’t material; and actions of the soul that aim at some event 
in our body, as when we will to walk...” In these comments, though he does not 
positively indicate just what the freedom of the soul is, Descartes does give us some idea 
of just how we might apply the freedom that will be won by understanding the passions.  
Beyond the freedom that reveals itself as a power to understand and control the body, 
we are free to apply our will to loving God.   
However, it may be that “willing to love God” is ultimately indistinguishable 
from the effort to understand (and to control) His creations, as Spinoza would later 
assert.  As much importance as Descartes ascribed to the “true and sound judgments” 
pertaining to nature, there was nevertheless something in him that rebelled against the 
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reduction of man’s purpose merely to the scientific effort of tracing, understanding and 
mastering the mechanical movement of functions of the natural body.  Descartes 
understands the body by recourse to contemporaneous technologies, and so it should 
come as no surprise that the collapse of the cogito into the immanent bodily object 
would imply the reduction of the free subject to a kind of machine-object.  If, in 
Descartes’ final account, man is not merely a host of problems to be solved—that is, a 
kind of malfunctioning or poorly understood machine—then it is precisely because 
there is something in him that is irreducible both to the mechanisms of the natural 
world and the effort to understand them.    
Still, what stands out in The Passions is this effort to understand that part of 
man that is a movement of material functions, if only to put it in its proper place under 
the dominion of the soul.  The promise of understanding the body is that of rendering 
it over more fully to the field of functionality and placing it more fully in the service of 
our will.  As the body is understood and mastered, so also will the disturbing 
externalities of the soul diminish.  And so, however much Descartes argues that man is 
more than a machine, it is clear that the understanding of nature that he seeks 
nevertheless possesses a vital importance for caring for and extending the life of the 
bodily machine. Insofar as this machine is the vehicle of consciousness, it is also a 
matter of great importance to the soul.  In his Description of the Human Body and all 
of its Functions, he asserts that the benefits of understanding the difference in kind 
between the actions of the mind and those of the body do exceed those of ethics—they 
can also be seen to have a special importance for circumscribing the domain of 
medicine, which aims at “curing illness and for preventing it, and even for slowing down 
the ageing process.”2  
Could it be that Descartes viewed the substantialization of the soul as a last 
resort for maintaining the soul’s separation from immanence?  Such a move would 
preserve the soul for a future and a purpose that transcends that of merely following 
with the mind the immanent contours of the natural world and mastering its 
determinations.  As we will see in Chapter 1, Descartes’ preoccupation with defining 
perception as a moment of thought rather than as yet another mechanism of nature 
reflects this concern for maintaining the transcendental character of the soul.  If 
perception were viewed merely as a natural mechanism, then the whole movement of 
                                                
2 Descartes, R. (1985). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Vol. I). (J. Cottingham, R. 
Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch, Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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understanding, because it relies on the faculty of perception, could be reduced to that 
of a machine that seeks only to know itself as a machine, and the effort to understand 
the true cause of the passions could serve no purpose beyond that of making the 
machine function more smoothly and extending its durability. 
The increasing currency of neuroscientific explanations of man together with 
the decisive shift away from humanism would seem to testify to the fact that as a society 
we have largely abandoned the Cartesian idea of the irreducibility of the soul.3   With it, 
we appear not only to have given up on discovering an essential difference between 
man and nature, but because nature is understood as a purely mechanistic movement 
of functions, we have also abandoned ourselves to understanding man as nothing more 
than a sophisticated, if problematic, mechanism.    
If our time appears to have relinquished its efforts to discover ‘the ghost in the 
machine,’ then perhaps this is because late capitalist, Western man is now content to 
find his reflection in the glossy surfaces of his technologies, and we may even wonder 
whether what Lacan has called the ‘mirror stage’ doesn’t in our time really commence 
with the first sight of oneself reflected back from these surfaces.  Strangely enough, it is 
probably this reflection that has once again inspired the Transhumanists to imagine that 
someday they might peer out upon the world from inside of these machines.  They 
hold to the conviction that inhabiting the perfect machine would reveal the free subject 
in its absolute purity, and so the next step for them is to develop technologies into 
which their consciousness could be ‘uploaded,’ and whose parts could simply be 
replaced with the first signs of wear.  In this way, by creating the perfect pleasure-
machine, they would realize for themselves a kind of painless, effortless immortality.  
Insofar as all of their efforts have until now been entirely oriented toward 
finding a solution to the problem of pain and mortality, we are left with the question of 
how such a being would occupy itself.  Would it turn its attention to the creation of art 
or music?  Could it have a sense of humor?  Or perhaps, in a delicious bit of historical 
irony, would it ultimately ‘shut itself down’ out of pure boredom? 
 
                                                
3 Of course there are many who continue to believe in the irreducibility of the soul to the body, 
but this belief appears to be a kind of afterthought that aims at supplementing the techno-
scientific approach to life at the level of meaning and purpose.  What is really striking is the 
rarity with which contemporary man becomes captivated by existential questions in such a way 
that they turn to religion, art or philosophy for answers.  
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* * * 
 
If, as Francis Fukuyama argued in 1992, the collapse of Soviet opposition to 
liberal democracy has brought about the end of history, then today we may safely 
venture the assessment that this end, rather than marking the final sublation (aufheben) 
of the object by the subject as Hegel imagined, instead appears to be characterized by a 
final reduction of the subject to the object.  Likewise, historical progress (to the degree 
that it ever existed) has largely given over to techno-scientific development that aims at 
the creation of pleasure-machines that further decrease the suffering of those who enjoy 
access to them.  Far from witnessing the diminishment of the mysterious power that the 
contingent object exerts over the subject and the concomitant discovery of the universal 
subject as pure desire, our time has seen the intensification of a desire for the 
absorption of the individual subject into the perfect technological object, which is, we 
might say, a desire for the end of desire.  In the realization of the ultimate solution to 
the problem of pain and death, the movement of techno-scientific development arrives 
at its ‘final synthesis.’4  
The ‘notion’ (Begriff) according to which contemporary Western man finds his 
sense of unity is thus not to be found on the side of the subject, but is rather to be 
found first of all on the side of the object.  But no later than when one first thinks of 
this objective unity has it already begun to decompose itself within the imagination into 
a ‘bad infinity’ of constitutive moving parts, and we find ourselves immediately 
occupied with the tedium of understanding the problematic relations between them.   
Nevertheless, in this notion of the perfect mechanism Western man comes as 
close as he can get to the unity of the subject. Despite the reduction of subject to object, 
it may be that we continue to nurture the hope that at the end of this long process of 
technological development the subject will be revealed in its absolute purity.  We 
                                                
4 Ayn Rand’s aptly-named philosophy of ‘Objectivism’ anticipates liberal transhumanism.  The 
following dialogue from Rand’s novel, The Fountainhead (2005, New York City: Penguin.) 
between Alvah, a lackey editor at a populist newspaper, and Dominique, the novel’s libertarian 
heroine, expresses very well the secret connection between liberalism and transhumanism: 
A: “What do you want? Perfection?” 
D: “[Yes, I want perfection] or nothing. So, you see, I take the nothing.” 
A: “That doesn’t make sense.” 
D: “I take the only desire one can really permit oneself. Freedom, Alvah, freedom.” 
A: “You call that freedom?”  
D: “To ask nothing. To expect nothing. To depend on nothing.”  
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suppose that whatever promise the future holds is to be discovered above all in the 
power of these mechanisms to further diminish our suffering.  
For the Transhumanists, this future should be restricted above all to the effort 
to develop systems and techniques that extend life, reduce its disturbances and provide 
for the pleasure of mastery. If they largely ignore the environmentalist’s demands for 
the care and preservation of nature, this is probably because the future that they 
envision for themselves is not dependent upon nature in any real sense, but rather 
makes the natural movement of functions dependent upon methods and technologies 
that operate according to his individual will.  Now, the term ‘nature’ represents little 
more than the obscene remainder that has yet to be brought under technological-
scientific control, and it is associated with that within human being and the wider world 
that resists being pressed into the service of the creation of the self-realized machine-
object. 
For a competing vision of the future, we have only look to those quarters of the 
population who have, because of their distance from the cutting edge of technological 
development, largely given up on the prospect of escaping from pain and death.  That 
is, the real resistance to the utopian vision of a perfectly ordered technological future 
shows itself among those for whom its realization appears to be most remote and 
inaccessible, namely, the poor and indigent of the Third World.   
These populations have been deprived of the technological means to realize 
bodily pleasure. They have found themselves unable to access the well-oiled machines 
that provide the wealthy Western man with his bodily pleasure. Unlike those 
unfortunates within the West who are likewise deprived of the means to these pleasures 
but who hold to the fantasy of someday gaining access them, the insurgents of the Third 
World are no longer captivated by this fantasy.  They have ceased to nurture the hope 
that they might someday be welcomed to the bosom of the pleasure machine.  Likewise, 
they have rejected the whole constellation of problems associated with its construction.   
As we will see in Chapter 5, Hegel tells us that it is necessary for man to 
relinquish his claim on the sensuous particularities of the body in order to realize 
himself as pure, infinite Desire, and this implies accepting pain and death as the 
unavoidable fate of all living beings.  The master appropriates life’s pleasures to himself.  
He flees from the restless infinity of desire into the finitude of sensuous pleasures, and 
attempts to find himself in these particularities.   
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In doing so, he imposes the negative on the slave, and because this involves 
depriving the slave of the possibility of mistaking himself for the pleasures of the finite 
body, he has unwittingly created the conditions for the slave to realize himself as pure 
self-consciousness, pure Desire for-itself.  Unfettered by the finite determinations of 
sensuous particularity, the slave is free to return to the unity of life with the clarity of 
recognition and the richness of self-consciousness.   
Now, all that remains for the slave to do is to produce in the master the same 
awakening.  To be recognized as a human being by the master, the slave must risk his 
body in rebellion against the order that has been imposed upon him by refusing to 
provide for the master’s pleasures.  What separates the human being from the mere 
animal is that the human being is willing to risk himself for something more than the 
finite particularities of bodily life, whether they promise pleasure or merely provide for 
survival. In rebellion, the slave not only reveals himself as pure Desire and as deserving 
of the recognition of the master, but he also deprives the master of the satisfactions that 
were available to the master because of the his submission.  In turn, the slave creates 
the conditions for the master to realize that he is, like the slave, pure Desire for the 
recognition of the other.  In Hegel’s view, what man suffers from first of all is his 
alienation from other men and nature broadly. The self-realization of spirit involves 
man finding himself at home with others and nature.   
In short, Hegel believes that without suffering, there can be no historical 
progress, meaning that both the master and the slave must endure this suffering.  The 
slave must suffer because of the master’s brutal imposition of his order on behalf of his 
pleasure and, in turn, the master must suffer because of the slave’s refusal to provide 
for his pleasures.   
But, as we have seen, Western man hopes to make his pleasure independent of 
the other’s labor through the construction of the perfect machine, thus rendering the 
other redundant to its production.  Instead of an opposition between masters and slaves, 
we increasingly have an opposition between those who enjoy access to these 
autonomous pleasure machines and those who do not.  Unlike the slaves of Hegel’s 
time whose labor was necessary for the production of the master’s pleasure, today’s 
representatives of the negative are increasingly deprived of whatever power he once 
possessed.  
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For those who are fortunate enough to have been granted access to these 
pleasure machines, what is demanded above all is that they fulfill their functions vis-à-vis 
these machines.  Primary among the requirements for access is that they perform 
maintenance on these machines, work to discover their weak points, harmonize their 
functions and search for ways to increase their productivity and efficiency—in short, to 
occupy themselves with the problems of the mechanism.   
The more that one demonstrates oneself to be capable of these functions, the 
more that one is permitted to enjoy the pleasures of the machine.  In this sense, the 
slave and the master no longer exist as separate individuals, but within this social system 
the opposition has been internalized in one and the same person. While at work, this 
individual is a slave/functionary.  Afterwards, with the money that he has earned while 
working, he becomes a master/pleasure-subject.   (However, as we have already 
discussed, it is hoped that this internal schism between reality and pleasure will 
someday be finally overcome by the creation of the perfect machine that will function as 
a sort of self-sustaining substrate for the pure pleasure-subject.)5  
Those who reject being reduced to these functions are deprived of the pleasures 
that are available by conformity to their demands. These individuals are simply driven 
out and compelled to exist among the other unfortunates of the obscene remainder.  
Because of the success of the mechanism in minimizing the requirements of slave labor, 
our social system has largely shifted away from the practices of compulsion vis-à-vis a 
slave class.  The direct domination that once characterized the relation between the 
master and the slave is no longer necessary.  Today, rather than being threatened or 
beaten, those who demonstrate their unwillingness or incapacity to fulfill their function 
are deprived of the pleasures of the machine and left to suffer on their own like animals 
in the wild.   
This picture of late capitalism creates new difficulties for understanding our 
contemporary situation through the lens of Hegel’s philosophy.  Many of those who in 
earlier times may have been forced to maintain the pleasures of the master have been 
                                                
5 For evidence of this, we may look no further than the efforts of Flemish industrialists during 
the general strikes of December 2014 to entice their employees to work with massages, food, 
and champagne.   The choice thus becomes one between the displeasures that are necessary to 
become a political subject (marching in the cold streets, possible confrontations with riot police, 
possibly losing one’s job, etc.) and the pleasures that are available through the relinquishment 
of this subjectivity. (http://www.demorgen.be/binnenland/frieten-massages-en-extra-loon-voor-
wie-maandag-wel-werkt-a2151584/) 
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accorded some share of these pleasures themselves, and because it is pleasure above all 
that sustains man’s investment in sensuous immediacy, they have become incapable of 
realizing themselves as pure desire or self-consciousness. As such, even if gross 
inequalities exist with regard to how the pleasures of the machine are distributed, they 
hold to the prevailing order and never find themselves in clear opposition to it. Where 
there were once dialectical oppositions now there are simply more problems-to-be-
solved.   
As for those who do find themselves relegated to the margins, because their 
labor has been rendered increasingly redundant by mechanization, they have nothing 
that they can withhold from the master. With nothing to withhold, there is no way for 
these representatives of the negative to initiate the process by which the master might be 
deprived of his pleasures long enough to realize himself as pure desire or to pass 
beyond the bad infinity of problems-to-be-solved toward pure self-consciousness.   The 
masters of today have apparently unhinged themselves from the dialectic movement of 
history, and as such have been allowed to develop themselves into monsters of 
consumption that live not only at the expense of their others, but also at the expense of 
the future itself.   
Perhaps this explains the feeling of futility that is so common among those who 
have made efforts to renegotiate the social order.  Having largely succeeded in 
hermetically fortifying themselves within their pleasure machines, these masters have 
managed to avoid the resolution of the very dialectical tensions that would have 
otherwise necessitated passing beyond their sensuous immediacy toward the recognition 
of their others. Technology has made it possible for the masters of the West to defer 
the neutralization of dialectical tensions that would have otherwise followed from the 
direct confrontation of the master by the slave.   Now that the master is increasingly 
relieved of the burden of directly compelling the slave to fulfill his pleasures, he can 
entirely absorb himself in the effort to realize his pleasure without risking himself in a 
confrontation with the slave.  And insofar as these dialectical tensions are not resolved 
in a direct confrontation, they have been exacerbated and are realizing themselves in 
extremis. 
Today, every attempt to change the social order ends with disappointment, and 
the subject, to the degree that it is allowed to exist at all, is condemned to exist only in 
the shadow of these pleasure machines.  Rather than an opposition between masters 
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and slaves, a new opposition emerges within our own society—namely, that between the 
pleasure machines and what for those who seek to create these machines appears as the 
obscene remainder.  This remainder is precisely that suffering that remains beyond the 
reach of the techno-scientific machine.   
To those who inhabit this machine, the evil of cancer, for example, is no 
different than that of Islamic State.  Just as the machine deploys the surgeon with his 
mastery of medical technology to cut out and eliminate the cancer, it also deploys the 
soldier to eliminate the malignancy of violent extremism.  This example nicely reflects 
the way in which the front between the machine and the obscene remainder is not 
limited to that between the individual and the external world. The opposition is first of 
all to be discovered within the individual’s own body, between those movements that 
cause pain and those that cause pleasure. 
For those who represent in our own times what the slave did to Hegel’s—namely, 
the contemporary ‘representatives of the negative’—because they have lost their power 
to directly obstruct the movement by which the master further invests himself in the 
sensuous immediacy of pleasure, the only remaining option is to destroy these pleasure 
machines.  The body itself is the primary site of deployment for these machines and, as 
such, it becomes the primary target for destruction.  Their social order is the inverted 
image of the West.  Rather than a cult of longevity and pleasure, they have embraced a 
cult of death and pain.   
In Hegel’s view, these oppositions are always only apparent.  Looking deeper, 
one can always discover a unifying idea that provides a framework for resolving their 
superficial opposition.  He found this ultimate unity in the desire for the recognition of 
the other.  What obstructed this desire from realizing itself is, as we have seen, the 
investment in the sensuous particularity of the body.   
While it may be true that there is some deep, underlying identity within the 
merely apparent oppositions between today’s representatives of the negative and those 
of the positive order, we will have to look beyond the purview of Hegel’s thought to 
find it.   To understand this identity, we have to return to our earlier remark that the 
shifts toward understanding man as a mechanical object, together with the possibilities 
that follow from it for diminishing his suffering through techno-scientific development, 
betray a desire to bring an end to desire itself. With the reduction of the subject to the 
object, desire is equally reduced to a deficiency at the level of bodily life.  Life in its 
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most immediate form is problematic, and the hope is that technological advances can 
solve this problem.   
Turning our attention now to the most obvious representative of today’s 
negative—namely, Islamic State—life is likewise problematic.  From their standpoint, the 
problems of life stem from the obscene surplus of pleasure. When they look to the 
West, they see nothing more than a frenzy of decadence, a mad race for pleasure and 
consumption—in short, a cult of the sensuous.  Their feeling that the supreme problem 
of life follows from too much pleasure is grounded in the intuition that from the 
abundance of pleasure follows the dissolution of the subject into the object, and the 
resulting loss of the subject as a substance and a source of meaning that transcends the 
immanent movement of functions.  
In this sense, even if it is different in nature, their vengefulness is also motivated 
by a kind of suffering—namely, that of being deprived of their very subjectivity.  They 
experience the West’s reduction of the subject into a kind of pleasure-object as a 
movement of the destruction of the meaning and purpose that is proper to the subject.  
And what is this if not a kind of suffering that follows first of all from the destruction of 
subjectivity by their others in the West? 
But, now, in their effort to save the subject from falling prey to the whirlwind of 
bodily pleasures of the West, they have gone too far in the direction of the transcendent.  
It is in God that they find the basis for the substantiality of the subject and, because of 
His remoteness from life, the subject can only really recover itself fully in death. And 
insofar as pain announces the imminence of death, this already marks a partial recovery 
of the subject’s true purpose.   
If the West views ISIS as a cult of death and destruction, this is because they do 
not share their interest in the diminishment of suffering within life, let alone that of 
extending the period of life indefinitely.  Rather, they seek to commence the problem 
of life as soon as possible to its solution, which is not to be found in the immanence of 
life, but in death.  In death, they believe, the subject is delivered back to its 
transcendent source, where it can experience the pure blissful pleasures of ّةنج.6  And 
what does this desire to destroy life reveal if not a desire to bring an end to desire 
itself—the very same that motivates the efforts to construct the pleasure machine?  
                                                
6 The Arabic word ‘Jannah’ signifies the raptures of heaven for the righteous.   
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We have arrived at the deep identity between today’s representatives of the 
positive and the negative.  Hegel believed that life is not an indifferent collection of 
things but a progressive process by which it returns to itself in the infinite fullness of 
self-consciousness.  Today, this progressive movement appears to have reached an 
impasse between the positive and the negative.   Strangely, it has not emerged because 
of a difference concerning the essence of their desire (which is in both cases a desire to 
end desire) but rather because of the route by which this desire is realized.  While those 
in the West aim to realize the aim of their desire through the creation of pleasure 
machines, the extremists of the Middle East aim at the realization of this desire by 
commencing life to the pleasure of death as quickly as possible.    
In the thought of Freud, we discover the basis for understanding this impasse on 
the path toward development and reconciliation in the notion of the death instinct, 
which both functions to limit human beings to experiencing the suffering of the world as 
nothing more than a problem-to-be-solved and fatally obstructs the movement toward 
the infinite self-consciousness that Hegel envisions history to be.   
 
* * * 
 
Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology, which we will examine in Chapter 2, 
owes a great deal to the legacy of Descartes.  Both this work and Descartes’ Passions 
represent attempts to determine what in mental life can be explained by recourse to the 
mechanical movements of nature to which man is subjected.  What sets Freud’s work 
apart is that he does not begin with a conviction in the metaphysical supremacy and 
priority of the clear-thinking cogito.  Rather, in the spirit of the stringent Positivism of 
his time, he sets aside all metaphysical presumptions regarding the nature of the soul, 
attempting instead to describe the developmental movement of the psychic life on a 
purely scientific basis.   
Whereas Descartes understands the body to be a machine that was designed by 
God for the purposes of the soul, Freud understands the body to be a natural 
mechanism that is the product of the natural movement of evolution.  And while it is 
clear that, because he remains within the strictest limits of scientific method, Freud 
rejects all finalism in favor of a Darwinian, mechanistic account of the body, neither is 
his focus one of describing the movement of evolution that has led to the appearance of 
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man.  Rather, his interest is morphological—that is, he is above all interested in the 
resulting neurological endowments of the process of evolution and how they change 
under the influence of natural forces.   
But what is Freud’s primary motivation for his scientific investigations of the 
neurological conditions of mental phenomena?   Unlike Descartes, whose interests in 
the passions are, as he says, first of all ethical and only secondarily pertain to medicine, 
Freud’s interests would at first sight appear to reside exclusively with the implications of 
these investigations for medicine.   
However, we may wonder about the degree to which the Freudian project is 
really devoid of an ethical or normative dimension, and whether it wasn’t just as much 
of a motivating factor for Freud as it was for Descartes.  The Cartesian irreducibility of 
the subject could be maintained only on the basis of what would appear to a more 
skeptical age as untenable metaphysical presuppositions. As the cogito lost the special 
dignity that followed from its essential irreducibility to the mechanisms of nature, ethical 
concerns could no longer be kept separate from those of medicine.  Freud and his 
contemporaries thoroughly naturalized the subject and, as a consequence of this, the 
concern for the good of the subject became immediately a concern for the subject’s 
body.  Likewise, the question of right appears to retreat in some measure behind the 
scientific problem of pleasure, and wrong behind that of displeasure. 
Indeed, the dominant ethical philosophy of Freud’s time already evinces this 
shift from the ethical questions of right and wrong to the problems of pleasure and 
displeasure.  The broad aims of J.S. Mill’s Utilitarian philosophy express very well the 
tendency for viewing life’s displeasures under the umbrella of problems-to-be-solved.  
And here we find the same displacement of normative questions concerning the 
purpose and value of the subject by what is really a technical problem; namely, that of 
how to fairly distribute the pleasures of life among the greatest number of people. Even 
if modern medicine doesn’t follow the letter of Utilitarian ethics, it is nevertheless clear 
that its task becomes first of all one of solving the ethical problem of displeasure for 
modern society.7   
                                                
7 On his deathbed, J.S. Mill kept a diary (1910, London: Longmans, Green and Co.) in which 
he made the following remark: “Surely one of the most certain of the fruits to be expected 
hereafter from the progress of knowledge and good sense will be that nobody, unless killed by 
accident, will quit life without having completed the allotted term of three-score and ten.”  
Because of the collapse of the question of value and purpose into that of the technical problem 
of displeasure, it is no longer clear whether Mill made this remark as an ethicist or as an 
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There is still another way in which Freud’s aims exhibit this broadly ethical 
dimension. Psychotherapeutic technique seeks above all to bring about the freedom of 
the patient from displeasures that issue from imbalances in the psychic apparatus.  And 
while it is clear that he seeks to win for the patient the freedom from these disturbances, 
what is missing in Freud’s thought as much as in Descartes is any consideration of just 
what this freedom might be for—other than reconciling oneself as much as possible to 
the demands of realities both social and natural.   
Though Freud’s thinking may also be broadly situated with those who carry the 
burdens of problems-to-be-solved, as we will see in Chapter 3 when we shift toward a 
discussion of his later psychoanalytical writings, he does think that among these 
problems there are inheritances of nature for which the psychoanalytical technician can 
find no perfect solution. Man’s fate is to be interminably neurotic. In this sense, man is 
not merely confused as Descartes imagines, but is always damaged in some 
fundamental way.   
Freud holds that human development really only commences because of an 
unavoidable encounter with some disturbing externality.  Reality demands the 
separation of the child from his original pleasurable situation vis-à-vis the mother, and 
this will always be received only at the cost of great affective upheaval.   
It is this upheaval that, to varying degrees, continues to disturb mental life 
throughout adulthood. In its worst cases, these disturbances become pathological.  The 
pathological forms of neuroses follow from an inability to accept the loss of the 
immediately pleasurable situation of early childhood.  Though the patient may be 
unaware of the true cause of his disturbances, something within his unconscious 
nevertheless continues to insist upon these early pleasures.   This has the consequence 
that the traumatic loss continues to haunt his consciousness and inhibits his efforts to 
attend to the demands of reality.  Psychoanalytical technique has as its main objective to 
diminish the symptoms of the neurosis as much as possible. 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud wonders why it is that his patients 
often have such a difficult time getting over the loss in spite of having every opportunity 
to pass beyond it.   His answer is that, against the Cartesian view that passions may 
                                                                                                                                      
advocate of science.  Techno-scientific man no longer acknowledges a difference.  And not 
only is suffering objectionable for him, but—insofar as it comes early—death itself becomes has 
become a target of reproach.  The good is thus identified not only with increasing pleasure, but 
also with extending life.  
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ultimately be brought into perfect harmony with good sense, there are dark instincts 
within man that resist rational development and can never be rendered entirely 
harmonious with reality—namely, the death drives. These drives maintain the original 
libidinal attachment to the early pleasures of childhood sexuality, thus anchoring the 
subject in the past and making it impossible for him to give himself entirely to the 
present.  They represent an insurmountable obstacle to the achievement of perfect 
psychological health.  
As much ink as has been spilled in the effort to clarify this difficult text, it has 
largely gone unnoticed that it is as much a meditation on the limits of scientific 
technique’s capacity for finally delivering man from his uncomfortable situation within 
life as an attempt to modify libido theory in view of the newly discovered idea of the 
death drive.  Regardless of how sophisticated his techniques become or how much he 
understands about the nature of the body, the existence of the death drive means that in 
the final account man cannot escape from the insoluble problem of neurosis.  
Indeed, the death drive is precisely that which has made of life’s displeasures a 
problem for man from the start.  And because it is responsible for the resistance to 
development beyond the primitive state of infantile sexuality, it also produces what we 
have referred to as ‘the desire to end desire itself.’  Thus, more than making life into a 
problem, it is also that which demands the ultimate solution for the problem of life, 
which is to be found ultimately in death.   
The death drive at once problematizes life and makes it impossible to find an 
ultimate solution within it.  
In Freud’s thinking, the durable tension between extension and intensity within 
organic life is the result of some accidental deviation from the perfect equilibrium of 
inorganic materiality. Freud refuses to speculate on the question of how this deviation 
of life from inorganic materiality originates.  Nevertheless, because it aims to restore the 
living organism to the state of equilibrium that is to be found in inorganic matter, the 
death drive functions as a corrective for this accident.  
However, we may wonder whether Freud isn’t confusing a condition of 
possibility for understanding life with the definitive feature of life itself—namely, that it 
tends toward the perfect stability of matter. It may be that all mechanistic accounts of 
life are susceptible to this misunderstanding. The concept of the death drive is entirely 
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consistent with the theory of biological mechanism, which always begins with the model 
of inorganic movement in order to understand the movement and development of life.  
To the degree that life can be clearly understood at all, it is perhaps true that 
this understanding must always look first of all to that of inorganic materiality for its 
schema. After all, the movements of inert matter exemplify the lawful relationships (i.e. 
regularity of changes, predictability of effects) that are the primary condition for 
scientific knowledge. An instinct such as the death drive, which bends the spontaneity 
of life back toward inorganic matter, restores to the movement of life the regularity and 
predictability that is necessary for scientific understanding. But in doing so, it also 
deforms life into an inorganic mechanism, and ultimately destroys it.  
Recall the problem that provides the initial impetus for Freud’s investigations—
that of (psychic) displeasure within life.  We must also remind ourselves of our 
conclusions from the discussions in the last section; namely, that whereas finalism is the 
primary theoretical or theological framework for solving the problem of life itself, 
mechanism supplies the primary theoretical framework that provides for the solving of 
problems within it.  
With this in mind, we arrive at the following question:  Could it be that 
whenever one takes as his starting point a problem within life in this way—perhaps 
especially when it is life’s greatest problem-to-be-solved—one is always already 
unwittingly inclined toward mechanism and thus, in Freud’s case, toward discovering an 
instinct that perfectly abides its principles?  If biological mechanism always takes as its 
model the relationships which can be observed in inert materiality, then perhaps it is 
the case that the inclination for seeing life through the lens of mechanism already 
disposes Freud to find death at the core of life.  And when this framework is applied to 
the supreme problem that set in motion the whole tendency for embracing mechanism, 
life itself dissolves within it.  In the case of Freud, life itself becomes a deviation from 
the natural order that needs a corrective.   
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* * * 
 
What stands out about the thinkers that we have discussed thus far is that they 
all carry the burden of problems-to-be-solved.  Supreme among these problems are 
those of pain, passion and death.8  If there is one still deeper similarity between these 
problem-solving thinkers it is the following:  whether it is the created order of nature in 
Descartes, the absolute being of the subject in Hegel, or the living existent that is the 
product of the mechanisms of evolution in Freud—in each case they are accorded a 
truth and a priority that removes them from the creative act that constitutes them.  For 
each of these thinkers, the task becomes one of tracing the movement by which this 
spiritual, historical, or natural being is deprived of itself (the problem).  With this in 
view, one can then discover the path to recovery, which means relieving it as much as 
possible of its disturbances (the solution).  In each case this is a process of self-discovery, 
which implies that there is some already-constituted being that merely waits to be 
mediated or revealed through proper practice, technique or method.   
The philosophy of Bergson represents a decisive shift away from this process of 
self-discovery toward a project of self-creation.  But we also find a renewal of Descartes’ 
concerns about the reduction of the subject to the object.   No less than Descartes, 
Bergson also revolted against the notion that man is nothing more than a material being.  
Particularly in the early work Time and Free Will, Bergson demonstrates his zeal for 
maintaining the subject’s radical independence from the objective movements of the 
extended world. Perhaps he could detect in his own time the realization of the same 
fear that motivated Descartes to substantialize the cogito: at the cost of his subjectivity, 
man was becoming little more than kind of a techno-scientific machine.   
However much Bergson’s later thought would reflect this shift toward The 
Project  of self-creation, his early thought nevertheless remains oriented in its own way 
toward self-discovery.  Like Descartes, he proposes that the path to discovering the 
                                                
8 Hegel, though he is somewhat more ambiguous on this point, must also be included in this 
group. Even if suffering represents the impetus of historical spirit toward self-realization, spirit 
nevertheless seeks after the moment in which the negativity of suffering comes to an end.  Thus, 
suffering for him still represents the supreme problem to be solved—in this case, by history 
itself.  For Hegel, this corresponds with the moment at which spirit discovers itself in nature, 
the master in the slave, and the subject in the object.  And so the suffering to which Hegel 
refers is not limited to that of the body, but reveals itself as a kind of suffering that follows 
above all from alienation.  Still, it remains unclear how this final liberation from the suffering of 
alienation would express itself other than in the creation of a society within which a long, 
pleasant and undisturbed life becomes nothing less than an absolute right.    
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freedom of the subject must pass through an examination of the disturbances of 
affective life.  Whereas Descartes suggests that these disturbances can be understood by 
recourse to the real mechanisms of the body (“the passions of the soul”), the Bergson 
of Time and Free Will holds that one interprets certain affective changes as 
problematic ‘disturbances’ only to the degree that one has already mistaken oneself for 
a bodily mechanism—which is to say, a ready-made object that merely gives and receives 
extended movement in the manner of a machine.  
In Bergson’s view, that part of the self that is most real is no mechanism, cannot 
be understood by recourse to quantities of force, and is not extended in any way. At the 
heart of what he calls ‘the fundamental self’ one finds duration alone, which is the flow 
of unextended qualitative difference from the past toward the future.  Intuition provides 
us each with a direct and immediate access to this synthetic flow of qualitative 
multiplicity in the depths of the self, and thus with the capacity to apprehend the very 
essence of our own reality without the mediation of symbols, linguistic conventions or 
the forms that we use to understand the external world.   
When one looks more closely at affective changes, one can see that, rather than 
registering degrees of physical force, they merely exhibit qualitative differences.  With 
this, life is understood to be something more than a problematic mechanism.  Indeed, 
in this account, insofar as life is itself nothing more than the durational movement from 
definite past to indefinite future, it begins to resemble a kind of pure desire.     
Nevertheless, Bergson also suggests that there are good reasons for the human 
being to treat his body and those of the wider world as mechanisms.  In doing so, these 
bodies are transformed by perception into beings that can be controlled and 
manipulated according to the needs of life.  That is, if we have a natural inclination for 
understanding ourselves as mechanisms, this is not necessarily because we are 
mechanisms, but because it is useful to view ourselves in this way.  As we will see in 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9, this utility reveals itself first of all as an ability to manage the affects, 
but it also reveals itself as that which makes it possible for us to use symbols, represent 
reality, and construct technologies that provide us with even greater mastery over 
ourselves and the external world.   
With this, Bergson has revealed the hidden instinctive aim behind all 
mechanistic accounts of the body.  The instinct effectively transforms the living flow of 
quantitative multiplicity into a collection of ready-made beings for the purposes of 
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action. In this sense, human intelligence, rather than opposing itself to this instinct, 
emerges instead as its further articulation.   
We should be wary of allowing this instinct to dictate the truth of life.  In order 
to make life manageable, the instinct for action (and by implication the intelligence, 
which works in the service of this instinct) effectively abstracts away from the living 
being exactly that which distinguishes it as living.  Life is more motion than a static form, 
more duration than a durable being, more a flow of time than an object within space, 
more desire than thing.  That is, it expresses itself above all as an indivisible act and a 
movement of duration.  But when in the thralls of this instinct for controlling the 
direction of life and for eliminating what are perceived to be its problems and 
disturbances, we cannot avoid overlooking what separates life from dead matter, namely 
its spontaneity, novelty and unpredictability.  
There is much of Bergson’s early thinking that remains in the later works, 
Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution.  However, because in Time and Free Will 
he accords to the fundamental self an ontological priority that does not extend to the 
embodied self, the very reality of the body is effectively diminished.  This is reflected 
most clearly in the early conception of sensation.  Sensation, like all modes of 
consciousness, is entirely unextended in this early account.  If it seems to register the 
forces and perturbations of the material world, this is really because durational 
consciousness has become buried beneath habitual mechanisms and representations 
that facilitate action.   That is, the forms of intelligence and the habitual contrivances 
that we use to manage the external world have effectively encroached upon the 
fundamental self, and now we understand the self through the mediation of these forms. 
Desire gives over to bodily need.   
Psychophysics has it that when a sensation passes a certain quantitative 
threshold it necessarily becomes painful. For this theory, it is in the moment that the 
organism arrives at this objective threshold that the problem of pain first emerges as a 
problem that necessarily demands a solution.  The body, insofar as it is unavoidably 
exposed to the dangers of the external world, arrives on the scene as a problematic 
mechanism from the outset.  This problem is immediately one of defense.  
But how do matters change if sensation cannot be quantified except by 
distorting its true nature?  Bergson’s method of intuition suggests a way to reveal the 
real differences of quality in a sensation behind the merely apparent quantities of force.  
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If affective differences are always really qualitative in nature, then what does it mean to 
say that something is more or less painful?  Bergson asserts that this can only be a 
symbolic manner of speaking which introduces the quantity of the cause into the quality 
of the effect.  But from this mere manner of speaking issue fundamental errors with 
regard to the nature of sensation. In fact, to identify something as merely ‘unpleasant’ 
rather than ‘displeasurable’ or ‘painful’—insofar as each of these corresponds with 
increasing degrees of affective disturbance—this not only amounts to fundamentally 
misunderstanding the nature of a sensation but even to feeling it wrongly.  Thus, the 
feeling itself no less than the understanding of the feeling becomes contaminated with 
the image of the quantifiable cause.  
Unlike Descartes, whose methodology aims at solving the problem of the pain 
and passion through understanding and technique, Bergson’s early method would seem 
to reveal the problem of pain and passion to be an entirely false problem from the start.  
However, extricating ourselves from the problem of pain may not be as simple as 
merely learning how to find differences of quality where before we mistakenly found 
only differences of quantity.  From the early account of sensation there arise a number 
of fatal difficulties. The most notable among these difficulties is that, because sensations 
are understood to be entirely unextended, it becomes impossible to account for those 
sorts of sensations that seem to be characterized primarily by their externality; namely, 
those that make it clear to consciousness that one is contending with some vital threat to 
the real body that is precisely localized within extension.  Excruciating pain cannot 
simply be brushed off as yet another difference of quality to which the self, because it is 
habituated to certain sensations over other others, is merely unaccustomed.  Not only is 
a life-threatening wound felt in the exact place where it happens, its differences from the 
preferred sensations of normal, everyday life would seem to go well beyond a simple 
deviation from our habitual inclinations.   
Matter and Memory addresses these issues directly. In this work Bergson 
realizes that it is necessary to restore to matter an ontological status that is equal to that 
of mind.  Likewise, the conception of duration changes—whereas before it was 
identified with the ‘fundamental self,’ now it stretches between the depths of the self, 
which are characterized by unextended memory alone, to the superficial surface of the 
self, which exists as a moment of the extended material present.  And with the 
restoration of an ontological status proper to the material present also arise all of the 
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very real problems that go together with this materiality.  In this way, Bergson describes 
the extent to which man really is a host of problems to be solved.   
As the condition for the insertion of memory into the present, duration 
provides the basis for man’s freedom within the world.  Though this notion that 
duration represents the basis of man’s freedom within the world remains the same 
between Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory, it nevertheless undergoes the 
critical modifications necessary to accommodate for the restoration of the unique 
ontological status of matter.  And now Bergson must show just how duration reveals 
itself at the level of bodily life--that is, he must show how in the present movement of 
bodily reality memory may insert itself.   There must be an occasion for the insertion of 
memory into the present movements of matter, but what is this occasion?   
To answer this question, Bergson turns to a consideration of the nature of 
perception (Chapter 8).   Normal or ‘concrete’ perception is far from a contemplative 
faculty.  It does not view its objects impassively, but rather as objects of vital concern—
that is, it views its objects in terms of the way that they represent promises or threats for 
generating affection for the organism.  Furthermore, the distances between oneself and 
the objects of perception are not measured according to expanses of absolute space but 
rather according to intervals of duration within which one has the opportunity to choose 
between alternatives for action.  Bergson is like Descartes in this regard: he holds that 
perception itself is more than the sum of perceptual mechanisms of the nervous system. 
As the nervous system functions as an instrument of perception, so does perception 
function as the mode of consciousness that concerns itself first of all with present action.   
Thus, at the level of present perception, there is already always this interval 
within which memory images may insert themselves.  But in addition to the distances 
between self and object that characterize normal perception, there is still another way in 
which the interval reveals itself.  It is also revealed in the imminence of contact between 
the self and object—namely, in the ‘specialized perception’ that is affection.  Whether 
this affection is pleasurable or painful, to varying degrees every person possesses a 
capacity to resist reacting to the stimuli. 
This is of course quite different from reducing pain to an illusion that follows 
more from habit and representation than from some essential feature of the organism’s 
vital relation with reality.  Nevertheless, the basic insight of the earlier work, though 
modified, remains in the later work: in the power to resist immediate reaction to stimuli, 
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in the ability to endure pain, one experiences oneself as something more than a natural 
mechanism.  And while Bergson never uses this term, it seems clear that we may 
understand this resistance to be the condition of kind of desire that aims at passing 
beyond the present toward a future of its own. With this resistance, one also proves 
one’s capacity for holding out against the whole constellation of problems to be solved 
that go together with the mechanism.  As one arrives at the limit of the capacity for 
resistance, one also discovers the threshold at which a sensation becomes a genuine 
problem.  This is also the threshold at which an affective difference becomes an 
affective disturbance, or pain.   
 Duration no longer manifests itself only at the level of the fundamental self as it 
did in the early thinking.  Since the power to resist stimuli is to be found in the body 
itself, we already discover at the level of organic materiality the condition for the 
insertion of memory images into the present.  That is, the nervous system provides for 
a ‘cerebral delay’ that transforms the body into something more than a reflexive 
mechanism.  And so even if Bergson must concede that there is a threshold at which 
sensation becomes entirely embodied, man is still more than the sum of his bodily 
endowments.  The delay makes it possible for duration to manifest itself even within 
matter.  More importantly, this delay makes it possible for creativity even in distressing 
situations. 
 
* * * 
 
 This raises new questions that Bergson does not really address:  perhaps some 
are better endowed than others for finding opportunities for creativity even in 
distressing experiences, and thus for passing over the horizon of problems-to-be-solved.  
Or, by contrast, it may be that some arrive at the threshold at which affective difference 
becomes affective disturbance much more quickly than others.  If it is the nervous 
system’s capacity for delay that provides for one’s creative response to the world, and if 
some have a greater capacity for this delay than others, then possessing a superior 
nervous system would appear to imply a heightened power for creativity.  Certainly, the 
most creative among us are capable of repeatedly visiting in our own thought the very 
sorts of affective differences that are by others considered too painful to endure.   
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 This relation between the strong nervous system and the capacity for the 
creation of the superior work of art or philosophy did not go unnoticed by Nietzsche. 
The following is a passage from a letter that he wrote to his mother in July, 1881, after 
the completion of The Dawn:   
 
My nervous system is splendid in view of the immense work it has to do; 
it is quite sensitive but very strong, a source of astonishment to me. Even 
the long and severe maladies, an occupation which did not suit me, and 
a dead wrong treatment have not harmed it basically. Indeed, within the 
past year it has become stronger and owing to it I have produced one of 
the most daring, the sublimest and deepest of books ever spawned by a 
human brain and heart. (Sils-Maria)9 
 
The ‘splendid’ nervous system opens up the hidden differences in every experience 
without reacting against them.  However much they might suggest a kind of distress for 
the organism, it is capable of enduring these differences long enough to find within 
them the contours of a new, more vital image for life (Chapter 4).   
To think (affective) difference, one must first be able to endure it.  Whereas the 
superior nervous system is capable of enduring affective difference without opposition, 
the inferior nervous system behaves as a mechanism that immediately opposes itself to 
these differences, treating them as disturbing stimuli that are to be avoided at all costs.  
The stability of personhood emerges as the nervous system embraces the peaceful side 
of this opposition, and the organism identifies itself exclusively with the détente of 
nervous forces.  Henceforth, this person behaves as if his purpose and his destiny were 
to be realized only in the ultimate elimination of this tension, and he occupies himself 
with the effort to finally eradicate whatever antagonizes its identity. 
  In the character of Dr. Schafer from William Burroughs’ surrealist classic 
Naked Lunch—a scientist who is modeled after the real-life bio-control advocate, 
Curtiss R. Schafer—we find an articulation of this attitude that the body must be purged 
of everything that maintains it in a state of tension.  For Dr. Schafer, “the human body 
is scandalously inefficient.” To remedy this inefficiency, Dr. Schafer creates his 
“masterwork” which he calls “The Complete All American Deanxietized Man.”  This 
                                                
9 Letter to Franziska Nietzsche, mid-July 1881. Schlechta, Vol. 111, p. 1170 = Leidecker, Letter 
29, p. 81-82. 
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masterwork is an individual whose nervous system has been “reduced” and expunged 
of everything that produces feelings of anxiety.10  
In our own times, there appears to be nothing very remarkable about such an 
endeavor.  The massive, globalized industrial-pharmaceutical complex aims at precisely 
this goal.  But however normal and commonplace this effort might seem to our society, 
in the imagination of Burroughs, the ultimate realization of the effort would be anything 
but commonplace. When in the novel Dr. Schafer finally unveils his masterwork to his 
curious colleagues at the “International Conference of Technological Psychiatry,” to 
their horror what they see is “a monster black centipede”—that is, an insect-like 
monstrosity of a living spinal chord without skeletal structure, motor apparatus or 
organs.  Schafer believes that, because nutrients and narcotics can be injected directly 
into it for sustenance and pleasure, the need for motor mechanisms that function to 
maintain the organism within its environment may be entirely eliminated. When 
stripped of its need for action, the motor apparatus represents yet another useless 
encumbrance.  Indeed, the nervous tension necessary for motor movement was 
probably among the main sources of trouble at the start.  And now the nervous system 
can be preserved in a state of pure passivity.  The elimination of the pressures of the 
motor apparatus amounts to relieving the body of its need and its capacity to act.   
Nietzsche suggests an elegant metaphor for the bodily conditions of a superior 
creativity with his image of the bow, which first appears in Beyond Good and Evil but 
recurs throughout the remainder of his writings.  The death of God has had the 
consequence of creating a “magnificent tension of the spirit in Europe, the likes of 
which the earth has never known.”11  With the decline of Christianity, the body—now 
bereft of the sense of purpose that formerly oriented it—becomes an overfull reservoir 
of aimless energy, a kind of useless passion without meaning or design.  Though 
Western man “experiences this tension as a crisis or a state of need,” in Nietzsche’s 
view it is actually a great opportunity for the playful re-creation of mankind (my 
emphasis).   
Burroughs image of the spinal chord stripped of organs and motor mechanisms 
is nothing other than that of a bow that has been deprived of the bowstring.  Just as the 
spinal chord goes essentially together with the motor apparatus, so also does the bow go 
                                                
10 Burroughs, W. S. (1966). Naked Lunch. New York City: Grove Press. 
11 Nietzsche, F. (2002). Beyond Good and Evil. (R.-P. Horstmann, J. Norman, Eds., & J. 
Norman, Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 4 
 32 
essentially together with the bowstring.12  What sort of goal might an organism that has 
been “reduced” in this way achieve, other than that of merely beings sustained in a 
painless, effortless existence?  Is this even worthy of being called a ‘goal?’  Is it not 
rather an anti-goal—that is, is it not the result of an anti-productive instinct, or what 
Freud has called the ‘death drive?’   
As man becomes captivated by what he interprets as a need to reduce the 
tension of life, every genuine goal must be suspended until this need is satisfied.  
However, as we can see with Dr. Schaffer’s masterwork, at just the moment in which 
this “need” is satisfied, man will have lost precisely his capacity for realizing the superior 
goal.  The bow will have lost its tension, and its power for shooting arrows at higher 
targets will be lost forever.    
 As atrocious as Dr. Schafer’s solution may be, it is nevertheless a highly creative 
technical answer to the problem of nervous tension.   But when we examine such a 
technical creativity more deeply, we can see that it begins not with a creative act that 
involves an elemental affirmation of life in all of its affective modes, whether troubling 
or tranquil, but rather with a reaction against what it immediately perceives as some 
disturbing externality. And regardless of whether this disturbing externality is localized 
with the somatic element itself or is to be found on the ‘outside,’ somewhere abroad 
within nature, it is in any case this aversion to disturbances that provides the original 
impetus for technical rationality.13   
Even if the form of this reaction remains somewhat indeterminate and reveals 
itself as a diversity of possible ‘solutions,’ the fact that this reaction must happen 
represents for the inferior nervous system a pure necessity that follows from its 
mechanistic nature.  But this properly scientific reaction is not the only possibility.  In 
the construction of the democratic institutions of the Enlightenment, Nietzsche finds yet 
                                                
12 An interesting point of fact is that, until modern times, the bowstring was made from the 
muscle sinew of large mammals, such as elk or deer.   
13  Among Zarathustra’s companions in Book Four of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is ‘the 
conscientious one,’ who represents the spirit of modern science.  The conscientious one claims 
that it is “fear, after all…that is human being's original and basic feeling; from fear everything 
can be explained, original sin and original virtue. From fear my virtue also grew, it is called: 
science. For the fear of wild animals - it was bred longest in human beings, including the animal 
that he conceals within himself and fears - Zarathustra calls it 'the inner beast.'  Such a long old 
fear, refined at last, made spiritual, intellectual - today, it seems to me, it is called: science."  
Zarathustra repudiates this notion that fear represents the basic feeling of humanity, asserting 
instead that it is ‘courage [that is] man’s whole prehistory.” Nietzsche, F. (2006). Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. (A. D. Caro, Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 245.  
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another effort to mitigate the disturbing tensions of life.  Whereas the basis for the 
scientific reaction is the theory of mechanism (a theory that, as we have seen, is 
probably correct from the perspective of those who conceived it), the basis for the 
democratic reaction is the theory of finalism.  As distinct as these two answers may be at 
the level of abstraction, they nevertheless share the essential similarity that they both 
seek to “unbend the bow” of nature.14   
And, once again, what is this if not the desire to end desire? Nietzsche identifies 
this with the rise of nihilism and what he calls “the last human being,” who appears in 
the period of history in which men “no longer launch the arrow of their longing beyond 
the human, and the string of their bow will have forgotten how to whir!”15  Rather than 
availing himself of the vital ‘tension of the spirit’ that has been liberated in the death of 
god in order to shoot his arrow over the horizon of contemporary problems, the last 
human being instead interprets this tension to be the sign of an inherent deficiency in 
the body.  In doing so, he effectively transforms precisely that which provides the living 
body with its creative power into a technical or political problem-to-be-solved.   
Nietzsche opposes to this image of the last human being the image of the 
creative master, who recognizes that, not only would life not endure without this tension, 
it would also lose its capacity to surpass itself toward higher goals.  The desire for the 
realization of the overman is a desire for a being who, because he loves life, also loves 
the endless wheel of desire. This is the man with “the most encompassing soul, which 
can run and stray and roam farthest within itself; the most necessary soul, which out of 
joy plunges itself into chance - the soul that loves being, but submerges into becoming; 
the having soul that wants to rise to willing and desiring.”16  
 
 
                                                
14 Nietzsche, F. (2002). Beyond Good and Evil. (R.-P. Horstmann, J. Norman, Eds., & J. 
Norman, Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 4.   
15 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 2006, p. 9 
16 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 2006, p. 167. 
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1  
 
Cartesian Science and  
the Instrumentalization of the Body 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Cartesian image of the body as both object of and instrument for 
consciousness will profoundly influence the direction of modern science, predictably 
finding its way into the area of psychiatric research.  Descartes’ attitude toward the 
passions expresses very well the broad aims and objectives of psychiatric science and 
technique. Though today’s psychiatrists may venture positions that appear to go beyond 
the dualism of Descartes, those theories and treatments that carry the most social and 
scientific currency invariably have one objective above all: preventing the body from 
disturbing the cognitive activity of consciousness and securing judgment from the 
accidental vicissitudes of the body, whether these disturbances come from the external 
world, as in the case of pain, or from the inner-movements of the organism itself, as 
with mood.  These psychiatrists, whether knowingly or not, aim primarily at maintaining 
the functional equilibrium of the body for consciousness and judgment.  If only in this 
regard they are late avatars of the same Cartesian problematic. Like Descartes, they 
conceive of the human body as a mechanism, and yet somewhere within this 
mechanism they also find the conditions for man’s wholeness and responsibility.  In 
what follows, we will examine in greater detail the way that the mechanisms of the body 
are understood to condition good judgment and, more importantly, the way that the 
passions can undermine it.  
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1. The Passions and Perception 
 
[E]veryone feels passions in himself and so has no need to look 
elsewhere for observations to establish their nature.  (Passions of the 
Soul)
 
There is no more fruitful exercise than attempting to know ourselves.  
The benefits we may expect from such knowledge not only relate to 
ethics, as many would initially suppose, but also have a special 
importance for medicine.  I believe that we would have been able to find 
many vary reliable rules, both for curing illness and for preventing it, 
and even for slowing down the ageing process, if only we had spent 
enough effort on getting to know the nature of our body, instead of 
attributing to the soul functions which depend solely on the body and on 
the disposition of its organs.1 (Description of the Human Body and all 
of its Functions, 
 
When he says, “What is a passion in the soul is an action in the body” 
Descartes refers to the essential difference that is supposed to lie at the core of man’s 
existence.  This statement, and the duality between mind and body that it implies, 
directs us straightaway to the theoretical basis of his philosophy: cogito ergo sum.  The 
cogito indicates the substantial unity of all thought.  Thought, in Descartes view, is the 
exclusive office of the soul, and the latter’s essential function is judgment alone.  For all 
other functions one must look to the body, which is, by exclusion, essentially lacking in 
the capacity for judgment.  Descartes posits two kinds of thought—active thoughts and 
passive thoughts: the former are those of the will, and can either be directed toward the 
body (“as when…we will to take a walk [and our] legs move”) or pertain exclusively to 
the soul (“as when we will to love God”); the latter, being passive unlike the will, are not 
made to be what they are by the soul.  These are “perceptions or knowledge” regarding 
the body, and are the chief modes of the passions.  The same duality that we find in 
thinking and willing also exhibits itself in perception.   Some perceptions—which can 
also be understood by the terms feelings or sensations—have the soul as cause, and 
others the body.  Not only do I perceive the outside world, but I also feel the effects of 
the will in my own body.  I will that my arm move and, in turn, I feel that it moves 
                                                
1 The Adam and Tannery volumes, Oeuvres De Descartes, (11 volumes) are cited along side 
the English translation of Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdochand and Kenny. The Adam and 
Tannery volumes are abbreviated as AT, followed by the appropriate volume and page 
numbers. The Cottingham translation, The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes (3 volumes), 
has been abbreviated as CSMK, followed by the appropriate volume and page numbers.  AT 
XI 327; CSMK I 328, AT XI 224; CSMK I 314 
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according to my will.  Thus, feeling and sensation are themselves nothing more than 
specific modes of perception vis-à-vis extension.  All perception is oriented toward 
extension in this way; whether toward external objects, or toward the way that these 
external objects affect my own body or, finally, toward the movements of the body that 
come from the will itself.   
Descartes also distinguishes between those perceptions that follow from real 
motions in or around the periphery of the body and those that do not—namely, 
“imaginations that have the body only as cause.”  This kind of imagination, though not 
caused by immediate contact with the external world or an active stimulation of the 
nerves, does not rank among the actions of the soul.  Rather, it is explained as 
“preceding only from the fact that when the [bodily] spirits are agitated in different ways 
and meet with traces of different preceding impressions that have been effected in the 
brain, they happen to take their course through certain pores rather than through 
others.”  Dreams, fantasy and the aimless wanderings (free play) of thought are 
understood in this way.  What initially seems to be a moment of perception, in which 
the nerves are stimulated by the motion of real, extended things, turns out to be only 
mere appearance.  
Now some of these imaginings are passions of the soul, taking the word 
‘passion’ in its proper and exact sense, and all may be regarded as such  
if the word is understood in a more general sense. Nonetheless, their 
cause is not so conspicuous and determinate as that of the perceptions 
which the soul receives by means of the nerves, and they seem to be 
mere shadows and pictures of these perceptions.2 (Passions) 
 
In this explanation of the difference between genuine perception and mere imagination 
as it relates to the stimulation of the nervous system, we detect an attempt to discover 
the psychophysical conditions for Cartesian epistemology.  By virtue of the way that 
they are caused by the mediation of the nerves, genuine perceptions have a “notable 
and determinate” cause, and thus lend themselves to clear and distinct description.  
The only clarification to which imaginations that have only the body as their cause lend 
themselves is negative:  the recognition that they are “shadows” and illusions and, as 
such, are not proper candidates for knowledge.  
Irrespective of whether their cause is the will or external objects, only those 
perceptions that come to the soul by mediation of the nerves provides the adequate 
                                                
2 AT XI 345; CSMK I 336 
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basis upon which a scientific knowledge of the body can be constructed.   In article 19, 
Descartes claims that not only can we perceive the movements of the body, but also that 
we can directly perceive acts of our will: 
Our perceptions are likewise of two sorts: some have the soul as their 
cause, others the body. Those having the soul as their cause are the 
perceptions of our volitions, and of all the imaginings or other thoughts 
which depend upon them.  For it is certain that we cannot will anything 
without thereby perceiving that we are willing it.3 (Passions) 
 
This brings us before an important question: Is perception a mechanism of the body of 
which the mind is merely aware, or is it a moment of thought itself? If I will that I move 
my arm and my arm moves, have I directly perceived my will, or have I merely 
perceived the effect of my will in the body?  That is, have I perceived a real synthesis of 
my intention to move my arm and its actual movement, or have I merely perceived the 
movement of the arm irrespective of its cause, which I then reckon with my judgment 
to accord with my intention?  The answer to this question is central for determining 
whether it is possible to directly "perceive’ acts of the soul, as Descartes has suggested.  
In other moments, perception appears to be characterized as a mechanical function of 
the body itself that, because it has no immanent means of discernment, only perceives 
the movements of extension.4  In this account, it is merely because these movements 
are judged by the mind to accord with its own purposes that they can be designated as 
extensions of the will.   
 
2. Are Perceptions Mechanisms or Thoughts? 
 
In his accounts of the difference between animal and man, we find the same 
tension between perception as nervous mechanism and perception as moment of 
thought. Though animals are, in Descartes view, mere mechanisms devoid of thought, 
they apparently exhibit a capacity akin to what Descartes classifies as perception in 
humans.  They have an ability to localize and react to threats—that is, they possess a 
kind of awareness.     
                                                
3 AT XI 343; CSMK I 335 
4 “All our perceptions, both those we refer to objects outside us and those that we refer to the 
various states of our body, are indeed passions with respect to our soul.” AT XI 348; CSMK I 
337 
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[Animals] imitate or surpass us [in their cunning and strength] only in 
those of our actions which are not guided by our thought. It often 
happens that we walk or eat without thinking at all about what we are 
doing; and similarly, without using our reason, we reject things which are 
harmful for us, and parry the blows aimed at us. […]As for the 
movements of our passions, even though in us they are accompanied by 
thought because we have the faculty of thinking, it is nevertheless very 
clear that they do not depend on thought, because they often occur in 
spite of us. Consequently they can also occur in animals, even more 
violently than they do in human beings, without our being able to 
conclude from that animals have thoughts. In fact, none of our external 
actions can show anyone who examines them that our body is not just a 
self-moving machine but contains a soul with thoughts, with the 
exception of spoken words, or other signs that have reference to 
particular topics without expressing any passion.5  (Letter to Marquis of 
Newcastle) 
 
The body is a machine that is devised for the purposes of the will.   But it is also more 
than this.  Because the body possesses within itself the means of its own preservation, in 
its normal functioning it exhibits a certain independence from the soul and its purposes.  
The human body displays the same autonomic functions as the animal body—
respiration, digestion, blood pressure—all of which “may occur in us without our 
thinking of them,” 6  and occur without thought or judgment. 7   While these self-
preservative movements of the body generate passions and can, for a being with the 
capacity of thought, become objects for reflection, those that exclusively serve this 
function are irreducible to thought and will.  Life does not depend upon thought.  And 
all life, including that of the human, can be explained by recourse to physical laws alone.  
To the impartial observer, there are none of our bodily movements that provide 
sufficient basis for the claim that our body is anything more than a machine that moves 
itself. Only the way that man avails himself of representation distinguishes him from the 
rest of nature as a thoughtful being.  
Descartes embraces the Aristotelian view that man is the rational animal.  In his 
view, man is a composite of rational mind and mechanical body, and there is nothing in 
                                                
5 AT IV 573-4; CSMK III 302-3 
6 AT VI 46; CSMK I 134 
7 “Every movement we make without any contribution from our will - as often happens when 
we breathe, walk, eat and, indeed, when we perform any action which is common to us and the 
beasts -depends solely on the arrangement of our limbs and on the route which the spirits, 
produced by the heat of the heart, follow naturally in the brain, nerves and muscles. This 
occurs in the same way as the movement of a watch is produced merely by the strength of its 
spring and the configuration of its wheels.” (AT XI 342; CSMK I 335)  
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principle that distinguishes the body of man from that of the animal. Both are machines, 
exhibit high degrees of organizational complexity, and have similar physiological 
features—a view that Descartes articulates in a letter to Mersenne in 1637:  
[T]he diagram of the brain given in the Optics was faithfully drawn after 
the model of a sheep’s brain, the ventricles and internal parts of which 
are, I know, much larger in relation to the brain as a whole than they are 
in the human brain [because of all the mass]. But for this reason I 
thought the sheep's brain was more suitable for making clear what I had 
to say, which applies both to animals and to human beings. And that 
cannot be held against me; for I made no assumption in anatomy which 
is novel or in any way disputed by those who write on that subject.8 
 
In the Optics, Descartes attempts to describe the mechanisms of the body upon which 
thought relies in its engagements with external objects.  The drawing of the sheep brain 
to which he refers in this passage served as his model for discussing the physiology of 
the visual system of the human body.9  These physiological features are “common to 
beasts and men,” and between the sheep brain and the human brain we can discover no 
difference of kind.  Certainly the body of man exhibits more organizational complexity 
than, for instance, the sponge, but there is scarcely any discernable difference in 
complexity between the body of the human and that of the sheep, each of which is, 
when taken by itself, apparently lacking in rationality and thought.  Every movement 
can be explained as if it were the result of mechanical principles alone.  Moreover, the 
human and the sheep body share many of the same features—the very same instruments 
of perception that we find in human bodies are also found in sheep; namely, a complex 
nervous system, eyes, ears, nose, etc.  For this reason, the principle according to which 
the distinction between a rational power of thought and a pure mechanism can be made 
is not immanent to the body or to the plane of extension.  Even if it is the case that a 
higher order of complexity is necessary for subtle or sophisticated rational engagement 
with external objects, the presence of complexity is, in his view, never sufficient to 
account for the difference between an organism that exhibits a capacity for rationality 
and the one that does not.  Likewise, the power of rationality cannot be explained by 
recourse to the presence of specific physiological mechanisms that are found both in 
                                                
8 AT I 378; CSMK III 59 
9 “We all know that the body is comprised of a very large number of bones, muscles, nerves, 
veins and arteries, together with a heart, a brain, a liver, lungs and a stomach.  Indeed, we have 
all at some time or other seen various animals cut open, and been able to look at the shape and 
arrangement of their insides, which very much resemble our own. “  (AT XI 226; CSMK I 315) 
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animals and man.  
But our question remains, if now in slightly better relief:  Do the physical 
movements that are found in animal and man alike, that appear to involve an awareness 
of specific threats or promises in the external world, already amount to a kind of 
perception, or is perception exclusively on the side of thought?  Is the presence of these 
mechanisms sufficient as a definition of perception or is perception more than the sum 
of these mechanisms?  Descartes believes that, though they are moved by passions the 
same as humans and possess perceptual organs, because animals lack the power of 
representation, we have no reason to believe that they are thinking beings.  Nonetheless, 
if animals do not have perception itself, then at least they share the same instruments of 
perception with human beings.  They receive impressions from the external objects and 
the body itself by means of these instruments and, if by perception we mean a simple 
seeing, feeling, hearing, tasting, and smelling, they react to them as though they 
perceived them.   
In fact, Descartes is very clear on the question of whether perception should be 
classified as a mode of thought:   
I recognize only two ultimate classes of things: first, intellectual or 
thinking things, i.e. those which pertain to mind or thinking substance; 
and secondly, material things, i.e. those which pertain to extended 
substance or body. Perception, volition and all the modes both of 
perceiving and of willing are referred to thinking substance; while to 
extended substance belong size (that is, extension in length, breadth and 
depth), shape, motion, position, divisibility of component parts and the 
like.10  (Principles) 
 
In our attempt to grasp Descartes’ notion of perception, we have deliberately withheld 
these comments and others like them.  We have done this in order to establish that, 
regardless of Descartes’ views on this question, it is clear that the power of perception in 
humans is in many ways indistinguishable from whatever its counterpart in animals is.  
Given that the same outward features of perception can be found in animals, both with 
regard to their organic instruments and external movements that suggest awareness, we 
can forgive those who stumble over this question.   The confusion follows from the 
close and intimate union between the mind and the body—so close, in fact, that we are 
inclined to confuse one for the other.   And if our attempt to understand the relation 
between the mechanisms of perception and perception itself has landed us in confusion, 
                                                
10 AT VIIIA 23; CSMK I 208-9 
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it should not surprise us—these confusions parallel those of the passions themselves.   
Descartes imagines that the body is a machine that is wholly suited for the 
purposes of the soul.  The bodily machine, though immanently devoid of purpose, 
functions as an instrument for these purposes. If one mistakes perception for a natural 
phenomenon it is because of the seemingly perfect fitness between the instruments and 
mechanisms of nature and thought.  The very passions that happen blindly in animals 
also happen in humans, but can uniquely become objects of perception for them.   
Perception, then, is the mode of thought that pertains to the body.  Because these 
passions can be understood by the mind that suffers them in terms of their efficient 
causes, they are candidates for knowledge, and are thus honored with the term 
perception. Every bodily mechanism that is present to the mind as passion can itself 
become an object of methodical investigation for the understanding, and it is only 
through such a process that the causes of the body are rendered increasingly more 
distinct from those of the mind.  As such, the mechanisms that generate passion can be 
situated more clearly and distinctly among the proper conditions for mental activity.  
And since this amounts to an overcoming of the immediate confusion of the passions, 
the mind can then be given more fully to its own purposes.   
 
3. Prejudices and Confusion  
 
There is thus a very specific reason why Descartes needs perception to be a 
moment of the substantial unity of thought rather than a mechanism of the body: it 
serves as intermediary between the body and the mind, and this for the purposes of the 
will.  The drive to understand the body through perception derives from what 
Descartes understands to be the mind’s rightful supremacy, and it marks an effort to 
bring the body’s powers into perfect alignment with the rational will.  The sovereignty of 
mind over body is our dowry from a higher order of things.  While the mind is in 
principle independent of extension, as long as it is joined to the body in “close and 
intimate union,” it has dominion over it.  Life may indeed persist without the mind, but 
as long as the mind is present to the body, it is within the mind’s rights and 
responsibilities to assert itself over it, and to pursue the establishment of the real order 
that is concealed beneath a merely apparent disorder.  This order is already intuited in 
the mind itself as general principles or eternal truths, which have their seat in the mind.  
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When they appear in concreto as objects of perception, Descartes says, “Eternal truths 
are clearly perceived; but, because of preconceived opinions, not all of them are clearly 
perceived by everyone. […]because the common notions are in conflict with the 
preconceived opinions of some people who, as a result, cannot easily grasp them. But 
the selfsame notions are perceived with the utmost clarity by other people who are free 
from such preconceived opinions.”11  
From the close and intimate union between mind and body there also issue 
prejudices that inhibit one from perceiving general principles, thus maintaining the 
mind in confusion.  When the body moves according to its own internal mechanisms, 
the mind is thrown back on itself.  It loses its grip on the body and finds itself 
confronted only with a chaos of sensations, feelings and impulses that it does not 
understand.  The bodily machine has pulled blindly in its own directions, and 
apparently without rhyme or reason. Thought responds to these physical disturbances 
with confused judgments about the causes of the sensations that follow from these 
movements.  And because the judgments are based purely on the movements within 
the body itself, they do not correspond with true causes.  This is exemplified perfectly 
in the confusion of childhood experience: 
In our early childhood the mind was so closely tied to the body that it 
had no leisure for any thoughts except those by means of which it had 
sensory awareness of what was happening to the body. It did not refer 
these thoughts to anything outside itself, but merely felt pain when 
something harmful was happening to the body and felt pleasure when 
something beneficial occurred. And when nothing very beneficial or 
harmful was happening to the body, the mind had various sensations 
corresponding to the different areas where, and ways i n which, the body 
was being stimulated, namely what we call the sensations of tastes, smells, 
sounds, heat, cold, light, colors and so on - sensations which do not 
represent anything located outside our thought. 1 At the same time the 
mind perceived sizes, shapes, motions and so on, which were presented 
to it not as sensations but as things, or modes of things, existing (or at 
least capable of existing) outside thought, although it was not yet aware 
of the difference between things and sensations.12 (Principles) 
 
What Descartes calls ‘the prejudices of childhood’ follow chiefly from the total 
immersion of the mind in the instinctual reflex movements by which the mind suffers 
from, and confuses itself with, the sensations of the body.  However clear and vivid the 
sensations of the child might be, they lack distinctness as long as the mind has not 
                                                
11 AT XX 24; CSMK I 209 
12 AT VIIIA 35; CSMK I 218-9 
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apprehended their genuine efficient causes.  Thought has lost itself in the body, and is 
for the moment incapable of distinguishing between its own sensations and the physical 
movements outside of itself that have caused these sensations.   This confusion will 
persist until the mind develops its innate capacity for reflecting on the difference 
between itself and whatever has affected it.  Only once it has developed this capacity 
can it get a grip on the bodily machine and press it into the service of the will. The 
infant, for example, is not able to separate in his mind the bodily cause of his hunger 
from its sensation.  As such, he suffers from this sensation until one who possesses an 
understanding of what the child needs arrives to satisfy it.  The infant’s sensation indeed 
follows from an urgency to eat within the bodily mechanism itself.  But the infant’s 
capacity for relating his unpleasant sensation to a means for overcoming it remains 
undeveloped.  Not only is he unable to relate the specific feeling to the specific bodily 
need, he is also lacking in both the understanding of what might serve as an appropriate 
source of sustenance and the motor control facility for procuring it.  Slowly, with the 
help of his parents, the infant begins to relate his sensation to a bodily need, and to this 
corresponds the development of the motor facility necessary to fulfill it.  Together with 
this process the child has learned to distinguish between different shades of sensation 
within himself, and likewise to associate with them a motor action that is either 
adequate for their relief, as in the case of displeasurable sensations, or to their 
attainment, as in the case of pleasurable ones.  And if the infant’s needs are not 
regularly attended to by one who knows how to satisfy them, this entire process of the 
development of knowledge is retarded.  The child is left to his own devices.  He is not 
provided with the appropriate methods by those who already understand them.  What 
we have described are the first, fledgling moments of the development of knowledge, 
and science is little more than a methodological refinement and extension of this 
process.13  
Thus, while the passions immediately issue in confusion for the mind, they do 
however serve a very important role for the body itself; namely, to “pursue the 
beneficial and avoid the harmful,” and thus to preserve the organism from what assails 
                                                
13 “[A]ll human knowledge1 consists solely in clearly distinguishing these notions and attaching 
each of them only to the things to which it pertains.”  “All human science consists simply in 
distinguishing these notions [with regard to extension and thought], and in attributing each of 
them only to those things to which they pertain.” AT III 666; CSMK III 218  
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it in nature.14 (Principles, §71) What prevents the mind from immediately coming into 
its rightful possession of the body is an instinct within it that aims primarily at self-
preservation.  In this regard, the mind can be said to suffer from the needs of the body.  
But there is more.  The instinct for self-preservation, though it initially generates 
confusion for the mind, also functions to create the conditions for the ascension of the 
mind to its rightful place as sovereign. As long as the nervous mechanisms of 
perception are occupied with self-preservation, as long as they are stirred by excessive 
stimuli, they cannot be taken over as an instrument of understanding and will:  
When some part of our body is harmed, for example when a nerve is 
irritated, the result is that the part in question ceases to obey our will as 
it normally does, and sometimes is subject to convulsive movements 
despite our wishes.  This shows that the soul cannot produce any 
movement in the body without the appropriate disposition of the bodily 
organs which are required for making the movement. […] Even the 
movements we call ‘voluntary’ occur principally as a result of this 
disposition of the organs, since, although it is the soul that determines 
the movements, they cannot be produced without the requisite 
disposition of the organs, no matter how much we may will this to 
happen.15 (Description of the Human Body and of All of its Functions) 
 
The body must withdraw itself from threats and distractions as much as possible in 
order allow reason to come into its own.  If the eye is ceaselessly parrying blows from 
the external world, because it is always compelled to function only as reflex mechanism, 
it is disallowed from functioning as perceptual instrument of the will.  The instinct for 
self-preservation drives the organism away from violence, and thereby assures that the 
eye will be available for the uses of the mind.  To the actions of this instinct we can 
trace the incipience of the conditions for meditation with regard to the good. Though 
the instinct for defense is itself entirely devoid of thought, inasmuch as respite from 
violence and a kind of affective regularity is necessary for the development of thought, 
the mind could never be liberated for its own purposes if it weren’t for this unthinking 
instinct.  In one moment the eye functions as a part of the mechanism of defense, in 
the next, once defense is assured, it can be taken over by the will as a perceptual 
instruments of understanding and reason.  With regard to understanding, the eye 
provides information that can be synthesized with general principles; and with regard to 
reason broadly, it provides knowledge that increases the minds dominion over the body 
                                                
14 AT VIIIA 35; CSMK I 219 
15 AT XI 226; CSMK I 315 
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for its own purposes.  But because these instruments of perception don’t think, though 
they can be taken over by perception, they are not themselves already perceptual in 
character. If the inborn defensive instinct of the body continues to make its demands of 
the eye and it functions only as reflex mechanism for this purpose, the eye, having been 
held back from perception, is thus riveted to the body and scarcely becomes available 
to the mind.  Reason and understanding cannot make their advance.  Science does not 
progress, and the good is lost among a chaos of passions. 
 
4. Descartes Image of Matter and the Body 
 
By way of his attempt to prove that animals are nothing more than machines, 
Descartes undertakes in Treatise on Light to construct in our imagination a “new world.”  
In this world, he assumes “a nature in which there is absolutely nothing that everyone 
cannot know as perfectly as possible.”16  This perfect knowledge amounts to an ability 
to create “out of chaos” all of the forms of the old world, whether inanimate or animate, 
inorganic or organic.  Only he who understands the principles of mechanics could 
reconstruct the human body out of chaos, along with all of the other organisms that 
populate our world.  While other accounts of nature, such as those that derive from 
Aristotelian vitalism, may not appeal to supernatural causes, these theories do 
nevertheless suffer from a lack of transparency.  They attempt to explain organisms by 
recourse to invisible souls that mysteriously guide them from potentiality toward 
actuality.17   In Descartes’ view, the clarity and distinctness that is lacking in finalism can 
be found in that image of nature in which both inorganic and organic beings alike are 
held to “always act in strict accordance with the exact laws of mechanics,” and in which 
their movements of can be explained precisely according to these laws in terms of 
matter in motion. Clarity and distinctness represent for Descartes the regulative ideals 
of knowledge, and in his view the mechanistic model promises to realize this ideal far 
better than finalism.   The latter’s appeal to purposes—whether as the immanent 
potentialities of Aristotle or as the transcendent forms of Plato—at once introduces 
unnecessary speculative obscurities and renders impossible a knowledge of nature that 
is validated and confirmed through scientific observation and experiment.   
                                                
16 AT XI 33; CSMK I 90 
17 According to this Aristotelian understanding, nature is thought to be comprised of three 
kinds of souls: vegetable, sensitive and rational, and animation is attributed to a prime mover.   
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Descartes’ ‘new world’ is one that is immanently devoid of purposes but for 
which real material order can be imagined.  Unlike the prime matter of the 
Aristotelians’, matter is conceived as divided into “parts” and these parts are nothing 
more than extended solid bodies that abut one another with no “void” between 
them.  Each of these parts can “receive motions”, generating movement between them, 
which occurs according to the form and configuration of these bodies. “From the first 
instant of their creation, he causes some to start moving in one direction and others in 
another, some faster and others slower (or even, if you wish, not at all); and he causes 
them to continue moving thereafter in accordance with the ordinary laws of nature.”18   
The movements of these parts are measurable displacements that can in 
principle be abstracted into mathematical theorems.  As theorems, the ideal interplay of 
parts can be clearly imagined independently of considerations with regard to the actual 
physical characteristics of the material substrate out of which the assemblage of parts is 
constructed.  But while the primary qualities of matter can in principle be 
mathematically abstracted from one another by the mind, the concrete qualities of 
solidity, motion, position, size and shape are inextricable bound to one another as 
essential aspects of extension, and together these primary qualities form the substantial 
unity that is nature itself.  
All material bodies—inanimate or animate, inorganic or organic, man-made or 
‘natural’—are parts of this substantial unity of nature.  This means that even the bodily 
action of human beings takes place without mental guidance or motive, and can be 
explained as mechanical movements of pure extension alone: 
This will not seem at all strange to those who know how many kinds of 
automatons, or moving machines, the skill of man can construct with the 
use of very few parts, comparison with the great multitude of bones, 
muscles, nerves, arteries, veins and all the other parts that are in the 
body of any animal. For they will regard this body as a machine which, 
having been made by the hands of God, is incomparably better ordered 
than any machine that can be devised by man.19   
 
Formerly thought to be the offices of the soul, Descartes renders memory, instinct, and 
the passions over to definite mechanistic causes, all of which can in principle be 
observed, measured, calculated and, by availing oneself of the knowledge derived from 
                                                
18 AT XI 34; CSMK I 91 
19 AT VI 55-6; CSMK I 139 
 48 
these efforts, even recreated.20  As such, Descartes “recognize[s] no difference between 
the machines made by craftsman and the various bodies that nature alone composes… 
Everything artificial is also natural.”21  
 
5. Body and Soul, Clock and Clockmaker 
 
In existing technologies Descartes finds the models according to which one 
might understand the principles of mechanics that operate in organic bodies, and it is 
by analogy with these technologies that our understanding of nature advances step by 
step.  “The proper use of models is the basis of scientific thinking…our lack of 
knowledge of the real mechanisms at work in nature is supplemented by our imagining 
something analogous to mechanisms which we know, which could perhaps exist in 
nature and be responsible for the phenomenon that we observe.”22  (Principles, VIII) 
To illustrate the fundamental laws of motion, for example, he refers to the transmission 
of movement in a vat of pressed grapes, the juice of which moves like an ether, or the 
bouncing of a tennis ball to illustrate the phenomenon of refraction, or the sling to 
illustrate that of what physicists would later call potential and kinetic energy.   As a 
model for the functioning of the organism, Descartes turns to clocks, pipe organs and 
water mills, all of which operate according to these same laws of motion, but which also 
exhibit a higher degree of configuration, assemblage and order than the simple 
mechanisms that he uses to illustrate fundamental principles.   
Taking the original organisms of the old world as the models for the human 
machines of his new world, the perfect knower would discover within the chaos of the 
new world all of the necessary building blocks, and through a process of reverse 
engineering, he could manufacture these mechanism so perfectly that they would be 
materially identical to those of our world.   
                                                
20 “I should like you to consider that all these functions follow naturally in this machine simply 
from the arrangement of its organs, no more or less than the movements of a clock or other 
automaton follow from that of its counterweights and wheels, so that it is not at all necessary for 
their explanation to conceive in it any other soul, vegetative or sensitive, or any other principle 
of motion and life other than its blood and its spirits, set in motion by the heat of the fire that 
burns continually in its heart, and which is of a nature no different from all fires in inanimate 
bodies.” AT XI 202; CSMK I 108 
21 AT VIII(a) 326; CSMK I 288 
22 AT X 395; CSMK I 29 
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These men will be composed, as we are, of a soul and a body. First I 
must describe the body on its own; then the soul, again on its own; and 
finally I must show how these two natures would have to be joined and 
united in order to constitute men who resemble us.  I suppose the body 
to be nothing but a statue or machine made of earth, which God forms 
with the explicit intention of making it as much as possible like us. Thus 
God not only gives it externally the colors and shapes of all the parts of 
our bodies, but also places inside it all the parts required to make it walk, 
eat, breathe, and indeed to imitate all those of our functions which can 
be imagined to proceed from matter and to depend solely on the 
disposition of our organs. We see clocks, artificial fountains, mills, and 
other such machines which, although only man-made, have the power to 
move of their own accord in many different ways. But I am supposing 
this machine to be made by the hands of God, and so I think you may 
reasonably think it capable of a greater variety of movements than I 
could possibly imagine in it, and of exhibiting more artistry than I could 
possibly ascribe to it. 23 (Treatise on Man) 
 
Just as our existing technologies are thought to be the concrete expression of theorems 
that are clearly understood, organisms are also held to be only the concrete expressions 
of theorems that are, at least for the moment, poorly understood.  Descartes has 
projected into the heart of nature the logical and chronological priority of techno-
scientific understanding in order to circumvent the obscurities of finalism.  Rather than 
being endowed with mysterious faculties, Descartes’ perfect knower is nothing more 
than a great engineer who, because He initially created the universe, must first perfectly 
understand its laws.  After the once-and-for-all establishment of these laws, what 
distinguishes man from God is not the insuperable finitude of human understanding so 
much as a kind of techno-scientific ignorance.  If there is nothing, ab initio, that 
separates the mind of God from that of man but the latter’s current state of practical 
ignorance, this is not only because the causes that hold in this new world are in 
principle entirely comprehensible by man, but also because, using the same materials, 
they could in principle be duplicated, providing only that man possesses the sufficiently 
clear and distinct understanding of the laws of nature to accomplish it. Given the means 
and the time, man could overcome this rift by his industry and resolve alone, and as 
man’s knowledge advances, the cleavage between god and man progressively narrows.  
Thus does man approach perfection.   
 
 
                                                
23 AT XI 119-120; CSMK I 99 
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6. Finalism under the Cloak of Mechanism—The Proliferation of Purposes 
 
We can see that Descartes envisions the organism to be more than a mere 
mechanical relation of parts that can be explained entirely in terms of blind causal 
relations.  The analogy with the technologies of man-made machines must be extended 
further. While these products of human ingenuity have certainly not emerged according 
to purposes that are immanent to the extended substance out of which they are made, 
they do nevertheless serve a purpose for those that create and use them.  It is with a 
view to the purpose of milling wheat that the water mill was invented, as a means of 
making the process more efficient and reducing the amount of human labor involved.  
As long as man-made machines represent the model according to which the organism is 
understood, the order that we find in the organism cannot be comprehended except by 
reference to its prior conception in the mind of a designer. The same can be said of the 
clock, or any other man-made machine for that matter. Just as the order and function 
of the clock is understood by reference to the idea in the mind of the clockmaker, so 
also will we understand the order and function of the organism according to an idea of 
its creator.  It is no doubt true that Descartes has driven purpose from the internal 
workings of the organism-machine, but only in such a way that they reappear in the 
mind of the engineer who first imagines and then fashions it.  As Canguilhem points 
out:  
With the Cartesian explanation, in spite of appearances, we have not 
taken a single step outside finalism.  The reason is that mechanism can 
explain everything so long as we take machines as already granted, but it 
cannot account for the construction of machines.  No machine builds 
machines.24    
 
Though Descartes’ new world is one in which matter possesses no immanent finalities, 
it is not for this reason devoid of sense.  Where, other than from purposes conceived 
by their maker, can the machines of this world derive their meaning and function?  
Purpose has merely been transformed into functionality, and in this way finalism is 
surreptitiously reinserted into nature under the cloak of mechanism.    
In Descartes’ view, the clock, along with all man-made machines, operates 
according to the exact same natural laws as the movement of the heavens. And like the 
                                                
24  Canguilhhem, G. (2008). Knowledge of Life. (S. Geroulanos, & D. Ginsburg, Trans.) 
Fordham: Fordham University Press. p. 87 
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clock, the astronomer can also use the movement of the heavenly bodies to track time. 
In an analogy such as this we discover another key to understanding what is problematic 
about Descartes mechanical image of the universe: the machine is distinct from the 
heavenly bodies in the way that it serves exclusively as a means—in our example of the 
clock, as a means for keeping time for humans.  While the observation of heavenly 
bodies can also be used to track time, who would be foolish enough to propose a total 
reduction of these movements to this function?  We can put to Descartes this same 
question regarding the relationship between the movements of the body and the 
function of providing the conditions for consciousness and judgment: is it not just as 
foolish to claim that the latter is the body’s ultimate function as it is to claim that 
keeping time is the ultimate function of the movement of the heavenly bodies?   
The answer to the question of why Descartes views the body in terms of this 
univocal functionality rests with the cogito.  Because he believes that he has established 
the priority and supremacy of consciousness, he searches retrogressively for the 
conditions of this supremacy, and finds them straightaway in a body that, because it is 
other to consciousness, already presents itself as an instrument and a means for it.  Just 
as the mind exists originally as a unified soul, the body exists originally as an instrument 
for the mind.   This duality between the means on one side and the end on the other is 
not understood to be the product of a movement of becoming or a dynamic 
development.  The body does not become an instrument any more than the soul 
becomes a mind—having been created by God, each is what it is essentially.  As such, 
the body can never be interpreted or understood except as a mode of functionality and 
a means for carrying out the directives of judgment. 
Descartes’ functionalist view of the organism has important implications for how 
we understand health: fitness, strength and good health are conceived by analogy to the 
well-designed, well-oiled machine. Descartes was not unaware of the implication of his 
mechanistic image of nature for sickness and health:  “My thought compares a sick man 
and an ill-made clock with my idea of a healthy man and a well-made clock,” adding 
that, this is “only a simple denomination,” entirely “external.” 25  This qualification 
regarding the externality of the judgment that the machine functions incorrectly refers 
us once again to Descartes’ dualist cosmology.  Because both the broken clock and the 
working clock follow the same natural laws, only a consciousness that exists beyond 
                                                
25 AT VII 85; CSMK II 59 
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these laws in a sort of God-like remove could make such a judgment regarding whether 
the machine functions as it should.  Whether we refer to the clock or the organism-
machine, it falls to the one for whom the mechanism is supposed to function to judge 
that it is broken and what is wrong with it.  As for fixing it, only the one who 
understands the design and method of the machine’s construction will possess the 
wherewithal and the knowhow to be effective in this effort.  Because this method finds 
its basis in the principles according to which the entire universe operates, the repairman 
needn’t be initiated to some obscure or arcane art.  He has only to understand these 
general principles clearly and distinctly enough to be capable of their methodic 
application.   
From these observations we can conclude that, for Descartes, an important 
criterion for determining the difference between the healthy and the sick, the well-made 
and the ill-made, relates to whether or not the machine fulfills the function assigned to it 
by its’ user or designer.  But this is not all.  In our example of the clock, for example, 
that it works correctly for the moment is not sufficient as a standard by which to judge 
functionality.  If the lock keeps the time perfectly for a few days and then stops working, 
this suggests that it was poorly made, and on this basis we may raise questions about the 
care or the expertise with which it was manufactured.  Another important factor by 
which we assess the functionality of the mechanism is durability. The good clock 
functions regularly for many years before it must be replaced.  Likewise, the well-made 
organism-machine must fulfill this criterion of durability.   
 
7. Conclusion:  Cartesian Science and the Instrumentalization of the Body 
 
A very specific notion of chaos emerges from this.  If the one who perfectly 
understands the principles of mechanics can reconstruct the human body out of chaos, 
along with all of the other organisms that populate our world, then chaos, here, means 
nothing more than disorder or disarray among material beings.  It denotes a sort of 
cosmic untidiness, and it falls to the perfect knower/engineer to bring to this messy 
universe a real and proper order.  Chaos, in this sense, only marks the moment before 
order is brought to disorder.  This is a disorder that lends itself to order—one must 
simply know its principles, and on this basis one can construct the method to bring it 
about.  In this sense, matter goes naturally together with the only order there is; namely, 
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that which derives from images, ideas or concepts. Without the essential order of the 
mind, the contingent disarray of material being could not appear as such, and it is for 
this that reason matter cannot be reduced to mind or mind to matter.  While body and 
mind, flesh and spirit, chaos and order are substantially different, each goes together 
with the other as night goes together with day.   
The cogito, in Descartes’ view, provides the indubitable foundation of all 
scientific understanding.  The image of the body emerges together with the broad 
orientation of scientific investigation.  This is because the body represents both the 
instrument and object of scientific research.  If it seems that the essential structure of 
the bodily instrument by which scientific research is executed delimits and structures 
the content of scientific concepts, this is only because this instrument, like all extended 
objects, is imagined to emerge as the hypostatization of innate mathematical and 
geometrical knowledge.  As instrument, the body provides the necessary conditions for 
conscious engagement with the extended world.  As object, it realizes in concrete form 
the principles of geometry that first intensionally present themselves as ideas within 
consciousness.  The body as object validates and demonstrates the priority of these 
principles, while the body as instrument serves as a vehicle for this effort.  
Just as the clockmaker methodically investigates the broken clock for the cause 
of its malfunction, the psychiatrist methodically investigates the sick body for whatever 
undermines judgment or disturbs consciousness.  He takes the body as the object of his 
investigations, but only so that it can be ultimately restored to its normal functionality 
and in turn reinserted into the instrumental complex over which judgment and 
consciousness exert their authority.   
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2  
 
An Introduction to Freud’s Early Attempt at an 
Eliminative Materialist Psychology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The careful reader of Sigmund Freud’s early pre-psychoanalytical monograph, 
The Project for a Scientific Psychology (henceforth The Project) finds in this text the 
first formulation of ideas that would become central to his later psychoanalytical 
understanding of mental phenomena. 1  Nevertheless, throughout his life, Freud 
continued to maintain that a purely literal, scientific account of mental phenomenon 
would be superior to the largely figurative accounts that he offers in the psychoanalytical 
works for which he is most famous.  In this regard, Freud is an early pioneer of what 
Patricia Churchland has called “eliminative materialism,” which strives to realize the 
regulative ideal of a cognitive theory based entirely upon a physiological account of 
mental phenomenon and to eliminate every vestige of “folk psychology.”2  
Due to the crudeness of his era’s scientific understanding of the structure and 
functions of the nervous system, Freud would later abandon this early attempt to 
ground psychological theory in a purely physiological account of the body. An analysis 
of the neurological mechanisms of the human mind such as that of The Project—while 
both interesting as hypothesis and suggestive of a direction for medical and 
psychopharmacological experimentation—proved inadequate both from a clinical and a 
theoretical standpoint.  
Even if Freud’s discoveries in The Project were true, given the primitiveness of 
                                                
1 Freud, S. (2001). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud (Vol. 1). New York City, NY: Viking. 
2 Churchland, P. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. 
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the surgical methods and psychopharmacological drugs of the time, it would have been 
difficult to alter the mechanisms of the pathological nervous system for the better 
through these techniques alone.3  To be sure, such a purely physiological approach to 
the pathologies of mental phenomenon as that of The Project continues to this day to 
be inadequate.  Nonetheless, in its discussion of the biological function of thought, 
speech, and dreams, The Project does begin to open the door to another avenue for 
therapeutic intervention: the ‘talking cure.’  And some variety of this technique remains 
an important aspect of any effective psychological treatment to this day.  
But ours is not a clinical interest, and so the inefficacy of this work from a 
clinical standpoint should not detour us.  Rather, what interests us is the way that Freud 
found himself on the outer frontiers of physical science, compelled by the demands of 
his project to venture what can only be called philosophical conceits regarding the 
mechanisms of mental phenomena.  In one of his letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud 
expressed his frustration with finding himself on these frontiers:  he complained that he 
was led from an explanation of mechanisms that seemed at the outset to be within the 
purview of positive science toward, as he put it, “an explanation of something from the 
very center of nature.”4  Though it draws on the cutting edge of contemporaneous 
neurology, The Project is nonetheless a highly theoretical attempt to articulate many of 
his earliest, most original insights—the very same that would continue to figure largely in 
the construction of psychological theories for the remainder of his life: the unconscious, 
perception, consciousness, the ego, the function of dreams and of language.  
Still, this is not our sole interest in this essay.  Freud’s text interests us because 
of the rather powerful account of pain that he offers there.  From the beginning, 
Freud’s main goal in The Project was to offer a compelling account of defense.  We 
learn that pain is not simply a pathological phenomenon, but something that, through 
its reverberations in memory, plays an essential role in determining the normal 
functioning of the human organism.  Pain represents a shock to the nervous system and 
involves an afflux of violent energies that break through the protective barriers of the 
                                                
3 In an 1884 Viennese medical journal, Freud enthusiastically endorsed experimentation with 
cocaine for its psychopharmacological applications.  Not long after this, convinced of its almost 
miraculous curative powers, he prescribed it to his friend and collegue Fleischl-Marxow to help 
remedy his morphine addiction.  Fleischl-Marxow would later die a slow and painful death.  
This episode probably made Freud more cautious of the pitfalls of pharmacological 
experimentation. 
4 Freud, S. (2001). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud (Vol. 1). New York City, NY: Viking. p. 248 
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ego, destabilizing and, in some measure, forever altering it.  In short, it marks the 
moment of the failure of the defenses that the organism has established against the 
external world.  This failure, we will soon see, implies the disruption to the very 
structures that assure a balanced economy of forces within the nervous system.  When 
the homeostasis of the neurological substructure of psychic phenomena is established, a 
sense of meaning and value can emerge. And to the degree that this this balance of 
forces within the nervous system represents a condition for the sustainment of our 
sense of meaning and value, any disruptions to this balance threaten to throw the 
psyche into chaos, thus undermining one’s sense of value and meaning.  Pain is 
explained as the sensation of this disruption.  
 
1. The Organism vis-à-vis its Environment, Itself 
 
Every flow of energy—psychic and physical alike—must be accounted for in a 
way that can in principle be translated into the terms of physics.  Freud states thatit is 
only if we “represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of 
specifiable material particles” that we might “render those processes perspicuous and 
free from contradiction.”5  Indeed, there is nothing in nature, including man, which 
does not act in accordance with definite natural laws.  Freud’s universe is a purely 
mechanistic one, and securing the freedom of the human organism from these 
mechanisms is as remote from his concerns as is providing it with a normative 
framework for action.  If such a thing as freedom exists (the term does not appear once 
in The Project), it is restricted to a choice of where to direct these energies, whether to 
store them up or to release them in reflex action. Thus, between the organism and its 
inert material environment there is not a difference of kind, but solely one of 
organizational complexity.   
Rather than endeavoring to explain the evolutionary process by which the 
human organism has distinguished itself from other organisms and, more broadly, from 
the general mechanisms of the material world, Freud’s approach is morphological—that 
is, he sets out to explain the economy of forces that operate within the neurological 
structures with which human beings have already by evolution been endowed.  Mainly, 
this will involve explaining how the organism establishes and maintains a restricted 
                                                
5 Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 297 
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economy of forces vis-à-vis the external world.  We can formulate the driving questions 
of The Project in this way: how does the human organism endure as an integral being 
and a system unto itself?  What mechanisms must be in place for this organism to 
protect itself against disintegration in the face of the overwhelming forces of the external 
world?  What is the normal functioning of this organism in view of this drive to endure 
and to protect itself against destruction?   
In order to answer these questions, Freud proposes that there are two main 
functions—one “mechanical” and one “biological”—according to which the neurological 
system operates, and defines the basic neurological substance over which these 
functions hold sway.  “Neurones” represent the organic material particles that comprise 
the nervous system.  And, as indicated above, Freud thinks that the neurological 
systems can be explained by exclusive recourse to quantities of force, or what he calls Q.  
Excitations in the neurones are caused by Q in flow.  Both functions determine how the 
organism react against and manage these flows of quantity.  The first function unfolds 
according to what Freud calls, the principle of neuronal inertia.  Quite simply, it states 
that neurones tend to divest themselves of Q.6  Freud likely has a variation on the first 
law of thermodynamics in mind here.  Just like any closed physical system, a 
neurological system is characterized by an optimal constancy of energy.  While it does 
store a quantity of potential energy that can be expended in action (we will speak of this 
in terms of the biological function in a moment), this internal quantity, or Qn, is 
relatively low by comparison with the Q of the external world.  When excessive 
quantities of energy are exerted on the neurological system from the outside, these 
quantities must be divested in order to preserve its integrity.  
It should be clear that the mechanical principle according to which the primary 
function of the organism works is one that not only characterizes organisms, but also 
applies more broadly to inert matter.  Just as the cue ball’s impact upon another billiard 
ball immediately causes it to move, so too does the impact of something that is external 
to the neurological system cause immediate and proportionate changes to it.   Provided 
that the external aggression is not too great, resulting in the destruction of the integrity 
of the organism, these immediate reactions express themselves as reflex movements.  
The physical laws according to which these movements take place are not in principle 
dissimilar to those of inert material objects. Reflex movement, like the reaction of the 
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billiard ball, is a simple giving-off of energy that maintains an optimal constancy of 
energy within the nervous system.  In both the case of the billiard ball and that of the 
organism there is a direct proportionality between the force of the cause and that of the 
effect, only in the case of the organism this proportionality is internalized as a relation 
between the intensity of the excitation (cause) and the effort necessary for flight from 
this excitation (effect).  Thus, in truth there are two levels at which the external 
aggression can effect the organism; one which is perfectly analogous to that of the cue 
ball and the billiard ball, in which there is a simple and violent impact upon the 
periphery and another which, while much more complex, likewise involves a 
proportionate transference of Q from the excitation to the reaction.  That the reaction 
of an organism appears spontaneous and unpredictable has more to do with the 
immense internal complexity of these mechanisms than with any fundamental 
difference between organisms and inert material objects.  When this complexity breaks 
down because of a violent impact the apparent unpredictability disappears, the vital 
differential between the periphery and the center is collapsed, and the organism is 
reduced to inert matter—all of which marks a failure of the primary function.   
This keeping-off of external Q is the primary function of the nervous system, 
and as we have seen this involves a complex operation whereby it translates Q into 
reflex movement.  But this is not all.  Though the external world is the ultimate origin 
of all quantities, as long as the organism is alive there are internal quantities, or Qn, at 
work as well.  Freud is succinct on this point:  
The nervous system receives stimuli from the somatic element itself—
endogenous stimuli—which have equally to be discharged.   These have 
their origin in the cells of the body and give rise to the major needs: 
hunger, respiration, sexuality.  From these the organism cannot 
withdraw as it does from external stimuli; it cannot employ their Q for 
flight from the stimulus.  They only cease subject to particular 
conditions, which must be realized in the external world.7  
 
These internal, endogenous stimuli demand that the organism go beyond its 
primary function.  The exigencies of life transcend the simple keeping-off of Q.  While 
the primary function is one of reaction against the external world, the secondary 
function involves the management of a Qn sufficient to sustain the organism as a 
complex system unto itself. Since the organism is dependent upon the external world 
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for this sustainment, it must actively go forth into this world in order to secure its needs.  
It risks itself in this going forth, thus subjecting itself to forces that could overwhelm it, 
from which it must in turn withdraw in order to preserve itself.  In extreme cases, 
nothing less than its very survival is at stake.  Thus, the organism is characterized by 
relentless vacillations between a defensive withdrawal from the overwhelming powers of 
the external world and the necessary risk of self-assertion within it.  It is clear that, for 
Freud, the key to normalcy lies in precisely a balance between these two functions. If 
one overpowers the other, what occurs is a pathological aberration from the natural and 
normal functioning of the organism that threatens its integrity.   
 
2. Memory 
  
But how do these processes play out within the cells of the nervous system?  
What structures must be in place in order for the organism to fulfill its primary and 
secondary functions?  Freud proposes a theory that is remarkable in its similarities with 
our contemporary understanding of how the nerve cells work.  The neuronal networks 
“have contact with one another through the medium of a foreign substance, which 
terminate upon one another as they do upon portions of foreign tissue, and in which 
certain lines of conduction are laid down in so far as [the neurones] receive [excitations] 
through cell-processes [dendrites] and [give them off] through an axis-cylinder [axon].”8   
According to the demands of the primary and secondary functions outlined above, not 
only must the nervous system be capable of the transmission of Qn along certain lines 
of conduction, but it must also be capable of the retainment of a Qn that can function 
as a reserve for action.  This means that, internal to the cell, between the movement 
from dendrite to axon there must be a sort of trough or container that is capable of 
retaining a measure of Qn.  It is here that we find the origins of the concept of cathexis.  
Later, Freud will transplant this concept into the domain of psychoanalysis, but in this 
context it is merely a further development of his understanding of the neurone itself.  A 
further feature of the neuronal theory concerns the transmission of these energies 
between the cells.  For this, Freud suggests that the neurones are divided from one 
another by “contact barriers.” 9   These contact barriers are at once viscous and 
                                                
8 Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 298 
9 Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 300 
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permeable, capable of both containing small measures of Qn through resistance and 
giving way to measures that are strong enough to break through these resistances.  
These ruptures leave in their wake traces in the contact barriers, and act as grooves or 
“facilitations” for the direction of subsequent flows.   
It is in this way that Freud accounts for memory.  Though it might be tempting 
to assert that the nervous tissue is merely the material substrate of memory, this would 
be incorrect. The facilitations in the contact barriers between abutting neurones are the 
very substance of memory.  Thus, as traces of the physical pressures exerted upon the 
organism from without (Q) and the vital strivings to survive that arise from within (Qn), 
memory is not an epiphenomenon of brain activity but its very material essence.  
Furthermore, insofar as facilitation represents the essence of memory, we can say that 
we do not remember forces as such any more than the bed of the stream ‘remembers’ 
the flows of freshwater that carved it out.  We merely retain a permanent impression of 
the impact that these exciting forces had upon us, without ever knowing these forces in 
and of themselves.  “The memory of an experience (that is, its continuing operative 
power),” Freud declares, “depends on a factor which is called the magnitude of the 
impression and the frequency with which the same impression is repeated.” (p. 300)  
Just as the quantity of freshwater determines the depth and contours of the streambed, 
so too does the magnitude of Qn determine the degree to which the contact barriers 
are facilitated.  Furthermore, the frequency with which Qn breaks through the cell walls 
increases the ease with which it passes.  If small magnitudes of Qn regularly pass 
through the facilitation, this will have the same effect as comparatively larger magnitudes 
passing through with less frequency.   
 
3. Perception 
 
Within this description of the role that the frequency and magnitude of Qn play 
in determining facilitation, a difference between two types of neurones emerges—
namely, the difference between perceptual and mnemic cells.  The organism must be 
adaptable to changing external conditions, and in order to account for the readiness that 
the organism exhibits for fresh and new excitations, there must be cells that are 
unalterable and exhibit no traces of the forces that were acting upon the organism from 
one moment to the next.   
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There are two classes of neurones: (1) those which allow Q through as 
though they had no contact barriers and which, accordingly, after each 
passage of excitation are in the same state as before, and (2) those whose 
contact barriers make themselves felt, so that they only allow Qn to pass 
through with difficult or partially.  The latter class may, after each 
excitation, be in a different state from before and they thus afford the 
possibility of representing memory.10  
 
But how does this distinction relate to the frequency and magnitude with which 
the neurone undergoes quantities of force?  While it is possible that these two classes of 
neurones develop genetically in the womb as a pure endowment of evolution, we 
should also consider another possibility; namely, that memory and perceptual neurones 
were at one time—perhaps in the womb, perhaps in the earliest moments of the 
separation from the mother—structurally identical, and that it is their exposure to Q that 
modified them such that they ultimately developed into their own respective systems.  
In order to understand why this hypothesis is justified, we will need to take a closer 
look at the distinction between perceptual neurones, which together form the system φ, 
and memory neurones, which together form the system ψ.  
We noted above that memory is a function of facilitations that originate in the 
rupture of the contact barriers, and that these ruptures occur as a result of the pressures 
that are exerted upon them from either side.  Recall that the nervous system has two 
functions, one biological, which involves the retainment of a store of Qn sufficient to act 
upon the exigencies of life, and one mechanical, which involves keeping off Q.  The 
former, involving the reception of endogenous stimuli, is oriented internally, toward the 
organic systems themselves.  The latter operates at the periphery of the organism and 
takes its orientation from the external world, from which the most powerful forces are 
exerted.11  This system φ  that keeps off Q at the periphery of the organism is identified 
with the spinal column and the networks of nerve endings that extend to the extremities 
of the body.  The system ψ, which is responsible for managing internal Qn, consists of 
nerve cells that extend directly to the interior of the body from the sympathetic ganglion 
of the brain itself.  Thus, insofar as endogenous stimuli are much less intense than 
exogenous stimuli, the magnitudes to which the memory cells are subjected are 
                                                
10 Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 299 
11 “There is no question but that the external world is the origin of all major quantities of 
energy since,” Freud asserts, “according to the discoveries of physics, it consists of powerful 
masses which are in violent motion and which transmit their motion.”  Project for a Scientific 
Psychology, p. 304 
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comparatively lower than those of the perceptual cells.   This means that the contact 
barriers of the nerve cells that extend to the interior of the body are not subject to the 
same magnitudes as those of the ones that extend to the periphery.  Not only are the 
magnitudes to which the latter are subjected greater, but the frequency with which they 
are bombarded with external Q is greater as well.  The contact barriers of system 
φ have been all but washed away.  From this, it can be concluded that perceptual 
neurones are nothing more than memory neurones that are highly facilitated, such that 
they no longer show subtle traces.  Rather, they have been flattened out by the Q of the 
impressions of the external world.  Because of the relentlessness of external forces and 
the irreversibility of the total facilitations that result from them, these perceptual cells 
are now unalterable—their capacity to record traces of Q has been totally effaced, and it 
is this that makes possible the readiness of the organism to constantly receive fresh 
impressions from one moment to the next that characterizes perception.   
Now that we have seen what separates memory neurones from perceptual 
neurones, it should be clear that they represent the two extremes of a spectrum.  On 
one side of the spectrum we have memory neurones, the facilitations of which involve a 
lower proportions of frequency and magnitude, and on the other side, we have 
perceptual neurones, whose facilitations involve comparably higher proportions.  One 
is oriented outward, is characterized by receptivity, and involves the automatic reactions 
to the external world.  The other is oriented inward, is characterized by a purely vital 
activity, and is occupied with the sustainment of the biological operations of the 
organism itself.  And it is clear that these observations match with our experiences as 
well.  As a pure form of receptivity to the movements of the external world, perception 
requires no active effort on our behalf.  Perception never stops, except of course when 
the organism restores itself in the internal mechanisms of sleep according to the 
biological function.  Remembering or relearning, on the other hand, often requires a 
kind of probing effort, and on the basis of the above description, this can be explained 
as an effort to discover and retrace low intensity facilitations.   
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4. Frequency—Habit 
 
But what about rote memory and habit?  Though Freud makes no explicit 
remarks on this matter in The Project, we can extrapolate how this question might be 
answered within the schema developed there. Let us make a few general observations 
upon habit and see what can be understood on this basis.  The first thing that strikes us 
about habits is the way that they are characterized by a certain insistence and lack of 
flexibility.  Once established, the habit reasserts itself somewhat forcefully, and becomes 
a kind of structure within which we operate in our daily lives.  If it is my habit to rise in 
the morning at a certain hour, then this will at least to some degree determine the 
rhythm of my life and configure my days from without.  By this we simply mean that 
habit is, from the standpoint of experience, marked by a certain monotony and 
externality.  It is something that quietly endures as a compulsion or internal rhythm.  
From this standpoint, the habit appears to be automatic.   That is, when we are seized 
with this compulsion, the habit seems timeless, necessary and unalterable.  
Furthermore, because an act is habitual, we often do not remember doing it.  Why, if 
not because habitual acts have the character of automatic mechanisms, do we forget 
whether we locked the door to our house, only to find upon returning that our anxieties 
were unfounded?  But with some effort, our habits can be changed.  If I want to alter 
my sleeping schedule, for instance, this will require the effort not only to set an alarm, 
but also to resist the powerful impulse to turn it off when it goes off in the morning.  
Only in this way can the habit be reconfigured.  From this standpoint, the habit always 
exhibits a certain changeability, however difficult it might be to initiate.   
Let us now attempt to understand these observations within the schema 
outlined above.  Where on the neurological spectrum would habitual memory lie?   It 
is our hypothesis that habitual memory can be situated somewhere in the middle of this 
spectrum, intermediate between memory neurones and perceptual neurones.  Like 
perception, the specific habitual act is mechanical and often not remembered within 
experience.  Like remembering, the initiation of the habit often (though not in every 
case) requires deliberate and specific effort.  It is as if, after creating the initial 
facilitations, the organism must attentively retrace them until the contact barriers have 
reached a degree of permeability at which the Qn flows with ease through them, and 
deliberate effort is no longer necessary.  Furthermore, it is repetition, or the high 
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frequency of facilitation that ensures that the habit will endure.  Thus, habits are not 
quite mechanical reflexes—they are memories that have become automatic.  What is 
more, when we account for the way in which the system φ unfolds according to the 
defensive, mechanical (primary) function of the organism and system ψ the active, 
biological (secondary) function, we can also conclude that this middle ground between 
them marks a point of convergence at which these two functions meet, whether in 
concert or conflict.   
Before returning to our exposition of the concepts that Freud explicitly 
develops within The Project, let us follow this line of questioning concerning habit a bit 
further.  From where does the initial impetus for the cultivation of habitual repetition 
come?  From the external world, according to the mechanical function?  Or from the 
depths of the organism itself, according to the biological function?  Can these questions 
even be answered by simple recourse to one or the other of these functions?  Clearly 
we cannot offer a single, definitive answer to these questions for all habits.  Some 
appear to arise through the biological function in accordance with the exigencies of life, 
and still others through the mechanical function, as a way of keeping off external Q.  
One thing that we can say with some certitude regarding habits is this: irrespective of 
their impetus, they concern the outward relation of the organism to its environment.  
This indicates that, at least from the standpoint of their efficient cause, habits are 
essentially mechanical.  Indeed, a habit such as that of eating at a specific hour lends 
rhythm and regularity to the biological drives.  One adopts a habit such as this in order 
to keep the pressures of hunger at manageable levels and to impose regularity. This 
cannot be separated from the whole ensemble of biological demands, on the one side, 
and mechanical ones, on the other.  If one’s responsibilities—that is, demands coming 
from the external world—are great, one will feel a greater compulsion to impose this 
habitual rhythm and regularity on these biological needs.  If one is relatively free from 
external compulsions, one can get away with eating simply when one is hungry—that is, 
according to the vagaries of the will.  The same holds for the sultan who, because he 
has a harem of women at his disposal, can freely follow the ebbs and flows of his sexual 
desire.  In principle, the biological function could place the somatic element almost 
entirely at its disposal, thereby gaining nearly total reign over it.  Eat when you want, 
have sex when you want, and sleep when you want—exist, in short, at the summit of a 
primordial freedom from the demands of the external world, luxuriating in the 
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impulses.  
Now consider the example of military discipline.  This is a case in which the 
impetus clearly comes from the outside.  By compelling the army trainee to a seemingly 
endless repetition of drills, the sergeant conditions him to act according to the specific 
protocols of military practice.  Eventually, these protocols should become like second 
nature and, one can hope, the soldier’s habits will endure even the extreme duress of 
battle, making his behavior in these situations almost entirely predictable.  The 
responsibilities of the army private are enormous, not only in terms of the demands 
that come from his superiors, but also the forces from which he must protect himself 
on the battlefield.  He is assailed on all sides by these forces, and can barely find respite 
to attend to his own biological needs.  For this reason, a time in which to meet these 
needs is meticulously circumscribed, whether it is eating in the mess hall at a specific 
hour, or the weekend of rest and relaxation away from the battlefront.  Everything is 
carefully calculated to maintain the optimal balance and rhythm of forces so that the 
soldier remains battle-ready.   
Until now, we have defined system ψ as existing on the biological side of the 
organism.  Its facilitations were said to arise through the endogenous lines of 
conduction that connect with the internal organs of the body.  As the mainspring of the 
psychical mechanism, this system provides the motive to the somatic element toward 
fulfillment of the exigencies of life.  But our discussion of military discipline has 
revealed an important feature of mnemic cells. While memory cells are impacted by 
Qn coming from endogenous lines of conduction, they also record traces coming from 
exogenous stimuli. In order to establish the original facilitations between memory 
neurones, the imposition of a habit always requires an initial, moderate violence to the 
nervous system—and this violence most often comes as a demand upon the organism 
from the outside.  (The first weeks of military boot camp exemplify this initial violence.) 
Thus, because of their specificity and relentlessness, external motives can press the 
mechanical function toward further development, which involves the penetration of 
moderate Q deeper into the neurological system and a corresponding development of 
higher complexity according to which the organism is able to defend itself more fully 
against external Q.  After the facilitations between the mnemic image of the situation 
that calls for specific action and the motor image of this action are established, then it is 
simply a matter of retracing these facilitation with great frequency in order to transform 
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what is initially a simple memory into an automatic reaction.  As the frequency 
increases, so too does the mechanization of memory, until at some point, the 
composite of the situation and the act demanded by it appear to be irreversibly joined, 
and the specific habitual behavior becomes ‘second nature.’   
It should be clear from our discussion that the somatic element can be 
understood as the primordial field of conflict between the two functions.  Habits serve 
to impose rhythm and regularity on the pressures—external and internal—by which the 
nervous system is beset, thus tipping the scales in this conflict toward defense.  Insofar 
as a specific habit concerns the regulation of internal, endogenous stimuli, it represents 
a repetitional movement of subordination by which these biological demands are made 
to wait until (1) preservation is assured and (2) an appropriate object for the fulfillment 
of biological needs is present. Insofar as a specific habit concerns the manner in which I 
respond to the violent forces of the external world (of battle, for instance), it represents 
a repetitional movement in which the primary demand of defense is situationally 
structured and reinforced.  Now we can understand the order that Freud attributes to 
the functions.  If the organism fails to keep off external Q through the mechanical or 
primary function, then this compromises the integrity of the entire organism, and 
destroys the possibility of meeting the exigencies of life according to the secondary 
function.  
 
5. Magnitude—Pain 
  
It is true that the building-up of a second nature can be seen as a restriction on 
the development of further complexity, if only because this movement involves a 
routinization of specific reactions vis-à-vis the external world.  The repetitious retracing 
of facilitations between the same mnemic and motor images makes it possible for the 
organism to act identically under similar circumstances throughout time. Because an 
established habit retards the development of new facilitations, this would seem to 
inhibit the organism from learning new ways of reacting to its environment.  But as long 
as the environment continues to present no extreme challenges to the integrity of the 
organism, the plateauing of the developmental movement can be seen as a mark of the 
success of the habit for keeping off pressures.  It suggests that the organism is somewhat 
well adapted to its environment, existing in relative symbiosis. The active building-up of 
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habit serves as a means of binding the organism against the pressures with which it must 
contend in its regular environment and of managing those that arise from endogenous 
stimuli.  It endures these external pressures unscathed both because of its habitual 
facility for the mechanized transversal of external forces that exhibit figurational 
similarities and the finalization of an internal negotiation between primary and 
secondary functions, thus ensuring not only its own immediate survival, but also its 
longevity.  
If because of an increase in violence within this environment there is a partial 
failure of habitual contrivances to keep off external Q, an immediate reduction in the 
capacities of the organism vis-à-vis its environment will ensue.  As we will see later, this 
is most apparent in the diminished ability of consciousness for qualitative 
discrimination, but this represents only the first, inwardly evident stage in such a 
movement of reduced complexity.  How shall we understand this momentary 
degeneration of complexity?  The key lies in an understanding of pain.  Freud writes:  
We have found that the major external Qs are kept off from φ and still 
more from ψ by the nerve-ending screens [of the epidermis, for 
example], and by the merely indirect connection between ψ and the 
external world.  Is there a phenomenon which can be brought to 
coincide with the failure of these contrivances?  Such, I think, is 
pain…The nervous system has the most decided inclination to a flight 
from pain.  We see in this a manifestation of the primary trend against a 
raising of Qn tension, and we infer that pain consists in the irruption of 
large Qs into ψ.12   
 
Because of their strength, external quantities of high magnitude press the mechanical 
function beyond its capabilities, and these forces penetrate into the depths of memory.  
However, up to a certain point, the organism has ways of protecting itself from large 
quantities that encroach upon it by way of φ . Firstly, the body is equipped by evolution 
with the nerve-ending coverings of the epidermis, which act in the manner of a sieve.  
In this way, low Qs from the external world are neutralized, and objectively, in terms of 
the naked forces as they are measured by physics, the nervous system is subject only to 
medium or high quantities—that is, to quantities that are powerful enough to penetrate 
these sieves.  Those medium quantities that do penetrate these coverings enter the 
nervous system through φ and are released in a proportionate reflex action, whether as 
a function of evolutionary endowment or, as we discussed above, as habitual memories 
                                                
12 Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 305 
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that are built up through deliberate effort.  Depending upon their strength, higher 
quantities will not only provoke reflex action but, insofar as there is a disproportion 
between the external aggression and the reflex, these quantities will make their way into 
the depths of the nervous system.  But rather than succumbing to the direct impact of 
external Q of high magnitudes, the nervous system reacts by breaking these forces up 
into smaller Qs and distributing them as smaller facilitations throughout ψ.  The higher 
the quantity in φ, the more facilitations in system ψ that it will leave in its wake.  This 
means that quantity expresses itself as complication in ψ.  
 In this manner, whenever the external world exerts enough force to reduce the 
organism to the simplicity of brute matter, the organism reacts with an effort to 
compensate for this immediate reduction in complexity through further 
complexification in ψ, thus distributing the impact throughout an entire region of the 
memory neurones.   By analogy, one can think of the impact of a stone upon an 
automobile’s windshield.  Only because the force of the impact is distributed 
throughout the windshield as a web of cracks does it retain its overall integrity.  Just as 
the force of the impact corresponds with the range of distribution of cracks in the 
window, so too do the specific magnitudes with which the organism is assailed 
correspond with the range of facilitations. The greater the magnitude coming from the 
world, the more the organism will stress itself in building up complexity within 
ψ, frantically dividing these quantities up and distributing them along a multiplicity of 
lines.  Thus, this complication has the effect of immediately dampening the impact of 
Q.  When the organism reaches the limit of its facility for handling these forces through 
complication, then these Qs will no longer distribute, and will leave heavy facilitations 
behind in ψ , “as though there had been a stroke of lightning.”  These traces are 
precisely the neurological marks of a damaging trauma. Going forward, they cannot but 
remain extremely sensitive.  And as mutilations in the nervous tissue that refuse to heal, 
they will be forever associated with the object that excited the pain.  Freud even goes so 
far as to suggest that it could be that these facilitations “do away with the resistance of 
the contact barriers entirely and establish pathways of conduction as there are in φ.”13  
 
                                                
13 Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 307 
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6. Period—Quality 
 
Of course this conflict between internal and external forces is not necessarily 
one that is conscious as such. And it is entirely necessary to go beyond the purview of 
consciousness to explain the complex relations of the organism both to itself and to 
the external world. Freud writes:  
We are prepared to find that some of our assumptions are not 
confirmed through consciousness.  If we do not let ourselves be 
confused on that account, it follows, from the postulate of consciousness 
providing neither complete nor trustworthy knowledge of the neuronal 
processes, that these are in the first instance to be regarded to their 
whole extent as unconscious and are to be inferred like other natural 
things.14 
 
Nonetheless, any account of mental phenomenon must attend to this question of 
conscious awareness, if only as one among the many functions of the organism.  
What makes this question so difficult to answer is the fact that, contrary to Freud’s 
fundamental presupposition that all mental phenomena—indeed all phenomena 
whatsoever—can be explained by recourse to quantities of force, consciousness does 
not register quantities of force at all.   Rather, it is comprised of a flow of qualitative 
multiplicity that expresses itself as sensation.  Thus, the nervous system must 
somehow translate or transform quantity into quality.   
Whereas science has set about the task of tracing all the qualities of our 
sensations back to external quantities, it is to be expected from the 
structure of our nervous system that it consists of contrivances for 
transforming external quantity into quality; and here the original trend of 
keeping off quantity seems to triumph once more.15 
 
But how and where does this transformation occur?  The question of where this 
transformation occurs will perhaps offer us some insight into the question of how.  It 
is clear that consciousness neurones, which together form their own system ω, are not 
identical to perception neurones.  The latter, as we have seen, are distinguished by 
their reception of external Q, which are then transmitted by way of the center back to 
the motor contrivances of the periphery for reflex action.  And as we saw above, the 
quantities with which system φ is assailed by the external world are of a comparatively 
                                                
14 Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 308 
15 Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 309 
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higher magnitude.  This would seem to render the apprehension of qualities within 
this system impossible, insofar as these magnitudes would overpower consciousness. 
Thus, the neurones that condition consciousness must involve relatively low Qn.  As 
such, they must be buried deep within system ψ, where Qn feature much lower 
magnitudes, and this accords with everything that suggests that consciousness is 
generated in or near the uppermost part of the nervous system; namely, that of 
memory. 
 This creates a problem.  If the Qn associated with system ω is of such a low 
order of magnitude, it follows that its contact barriers would remain relatively 
impermeable like those of the memory neurones.  This would seem to conflict with 
the essentially transitory nature of consciousness and its seemingly spontaneous 
synthesis of qualities into an ever-changing organic flow. In this regard, consciousness 
exhibits a resemblance to perception in terms of its mutability.  Both are 
characterized precisely by the changeability of its content from moment to moment.  
But, for perceptual neurones, this changeability was explained in terms of the way that, 
because of the high magnitudes with which they have been bombarded, they are 
rendered incapable of retaining new traces.  And this clearly contradicts what has 
been postulated regarding the relative absence of magnitudes associated with system ω.  
If not in terms of a high degree of facilitation from Q, then how explain this 
changeability of consciousness? 
 With some reluctance, Freud suggests that there is perhaps yet another way 
that the contact barriers can achieve the degree of facilitation necessary for the 
ceaseless and total restitutio ad integrum that is an essential feature of consciousness.  
He tells us that the contact barriers may be permeated by something other than Qn, 
but this will require a slight revision of the hypothesis concerning the ways in which 
forces may pass between the cells.  Freud writes: 
So far as I have regarded it only as the transference of Qn from one 
neurone to another.  But it must have still another characteristic, of a 
temporal nature; for the mechanics of the physicists have allowed this 
temporal characteristic to the other motions of masses in the external 
world as well.  I speak of this as period for short.  Thus I shall assume 
that all the resistance of the contact barriers applies only to the 
transference of Q, but that the period of the neuronal motion is 
transmitted without inhibition in all directions, as though through a 
process of induction.16   
                                                
16 Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 310 
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We can understand period to be a measure of the changes in the rhythm and 
frequency that comes to the organism, through the sensory contrivances, from the 
external world.  What separates ω neurones from ψ neurones is not that the latter 
have no period, but that their period is monotonous, and thus they do not generate 
enough difference in cadence or frequency for the emergence of the variations within 
the qualitative multiplicity.  Furthermore, the dominant feature of system ψ is the 
retainment of traces, while that of system ω is the translation of this rhythm into the 
sensation of quality. System ψ joins directly to the internal organs, and the pressures 
exerted there ebb and flow according to somewhat regular rhythms.  Whereas the ψ 
neurones’ period is relatively invariant, the ω neurones exhibit broad variances in 
period. Outer qualities are nothing more than sensations whose differences arise 
according to an instantaneous, inner translation of these variances in period by the ω 
neurones.  These variances appear as the myriad textures of the external world.    
Consciousness, then, is the field within which sensations express themselves, 
and we have just spoken of the qualitative differences that come from the external 
world by way of the sense organs.  But what about the sensations that we have of 
ourselves?  All sensations, whether of the external world or of ourselves, are the result 
of a translation by the nervous system of what is essentially quantitative into something 
quantitative.  The universe is fundamentally a movement of forces and, just as the 
external world is in itself totally devoid of quality, so too is the organism lacking 
substantially in anything qualitative.   This means that, insofar as we have sensations of 
our own bodies, they too represent qualitative translations of something that is in itself 
devoid of quality.   Because the real is in substance nothing but quantitative 
magnitudes, consciousness can never deliver anything but unfaithful translations.  In 
its essence, consciousness is the result of a movement of distortion of quantity into 
quality by system ω. 
But again, consciousness is only possible when the quantities in question are 
(1) of extremely low magnitudes and (2) feature some variation in frequency and 
rhythm. We said that the period of system ψ is monotonous and regular. This means 
that, as far as consciousness is concerned, its changes in rhythm are not as 
instantaneous as those of the external world.  Rather than exhibiting its rhythmic 
differentials instantaneously in the manner of outer sensation, inner sensation gets 
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louder or softer/slower or faster over a protracted period according to the organism’s 
management of the accumulation of Qn in endogenous lines of conduction, and for 
this reason, it can be compared to ambient, white noise.  It is only recognizable when 
there is variation. 
This may offer insight into the dual function of consciousness regarding, on 
the one side, the attribution of differences to the external world and, on the other, the 
sensing internal changes within the organism itself.  The vividness of our sensations of 
the external world can be explained by the wealth of variances in rhythms that are to 
be found there.  Because they appear as the very texture of the extended world, these 
shining differences instantaneously stand in broad contrast with one another.  The 
summer sky at sunset shows depths of flaming reds that stand in stark opposition to 
the lush, attenuated greens of the foliage—each feature with its own distinct quality.  In 
spite of these differences and contrasts, the entire vista immediately hangs together in 
synthetic unity within consciousness.  In comparison to such sensations of the 
external world, inner sensation strikes us as dull and indistinct.  Think of the rather 
nagging discomfort that comes with having a mild cold, or the equally vague feeling of 
contentment that comes from eating and resting well, each representing normal 
variations of inner sensation. As shades of vague feelings of comfort to discomfort, 
just like outer sensation, these differences also hang together in synthetic unity, 
though in this case this unity is not apprehended instantaneously, but extended over a 
protracted period.   
If consciousness is characterized by its mutability and its capacity for restitutio 
ad integrum, how then do we account for this protraction?  Though Freud does not 
venture into this territory, the key to this problem probably lies in its location in the 
upper stories of the nervous system, where ω neurones exist in close proximity with ψ 
neurones and Qn is extremely small.  By way of contrast, perception exists on the 
other side of the neurological spectrum.  As such, insofar as it is not accompanied by 
consciousness, perception does not feature this protraction.   And, from this 
standpoint, perception itself can be said to have no period or duration.  Neither does 
it exhibit the synthetic unity of consciousness.  As a purely mechanical and automatic 
relation to the externality of the organism, it is timeless and devoid of shades or subtle 
differences.  Consciousness, on the other hand, is a sort of diaphanous ephemera that 
arises due to changes in the period of the movement of Q through ψ.  Here matters 
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become rather opaque, but we might venture that consciousness is itself the interval in 
which the organism waits for satisfaction of the exigencies of life—that is, 
consciousness is the apex of the arc toward homeostasis, which of course happens 
through the satisfaction of biological drives resulting from discharge in ψ.   
Let us return to what we identified as the dullness and indistinctness of inner 
sensation for a moment.  Recall that, according to Freud, inner sensation can be 
understood as a translation of quantitative magnitudes within the organism as 
qualitative differences within consciousness.  That is, inner sensations represent the 
inner, quantitative states of the organism as quality.  We said that, though 
monotonous and in themselves devoid of quality, the neurones of system ψ also have 
their period.  How does this “psychical period” come to be experienced within 
consciousness?  Freud tells us that it is through their deviations from monotony.  And, 
as we said above, we can think of these deviations as expressing themselves in terms 
of slight changes in tempo and volume.  And though this reference to volume would 
seem to refer back to quantitative magnitude, as translations sensations never increase 
or decrease. Consciousness is itself already the product of a translation that has been 
performed by the ω neurones of miniscule vibrational quantities into qualities.   The 
increases in the tempo and volume of psychical period are marked by their own 
qualitative shades of sensation, which is identified as pleasurable or unpleasurable 
according to the organism’s natural inclination for homeostasis.   
We can see how, through frequencies that reach them by way of the sensory 
organs, ω neurones would be in a position to translate the ensemble of vibrant 
textures of the external world into sensation but, insofar as it has no sensory 
contrivances that open onto the internal organs, how does it accomplish the same vis-
à-vis the internal workings of the organism itself? We said that the rhythms of the 
external world stand in instantaneous variance, and these are immediately translated 
by ω neurones into quality.  Contrarily, the rhythms of the organism itself are largely 
monotonous, and they gradually increase in rhythm and frequency according to the 
pressures that are exerted through the accumulation of Qn in endogenous lines of 
conduction leading to the sympathetic ganglion, exerting their pressures on that 
system that most closely neighbors that of consciousness; namely the system of 
memory neurones.  In order to understand how system ω picks up on the psychical 
period, let us propose an analogy.  Isn’t the relationship between consciousness and 
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system ψ similar to that of having raucous neighbors who, because they live on the 
other side of a posterior wall, we have never seen? These neighbors are rather quiet 
during the day, and cause us little disturbance.  We can study, attend to the day’s 
business, care for our family—all in relative peace. In the evening, as the depths of 
night approach, relentless rhythms can be heard emanating from behind the wall, at 
first quietly, then increasingly more loudly, but always dully and indistinctly due to the 
attenuating effect of the wall.  Because we do not know these neighbors and have 
never participated in their parties, we can only interpret what is going on there.  
Images of revelries come to mind; undulating bodies and orgiastic dancing. Or if, 
because of a sheltered upbringing, we have never been exposed to such images, these 
sounds will descend upon our ears as distraction upon the mind.  Likewise, 
consciousness registers variances in the psychical period of unconscious memories as 
if through a posterior wall—never directly, and only as a vague uneasiness or 
displeasure that disrupts the preferred shades of sensation within consciousness.  
What resides on the other side of this wall is nothing less than a part of myself that is 
more essential to what I am than anything I’ve ever known, or ever could know, 
within consciousness.   
Our analogy is imperfect in this regard: it would have us believe not only that 
consciousness is characterized mainly by its isolation within the upper stories of the 
nervous system, but also that, because it endures both what comes to it through this 
‘posterior wall' and through the sensory organs, it is merely passive, possessing no 
agency or active dimension.  On the contrary, just like memory neurones, those of 
system ω are indeed charged with a minimal quantity of Qn, which indicates that they 
too are in need of discharge.  And since discharge always unfolds in the direction of 
motility, consciousness represents yet another active player in the battle over the body.  
If human beings are capable of acting freely, this apparently marks the locus of that 
freedom.  Nonetheless, it would seem that such a freedom could merely concern 
itself with its qualitative situation--this, inasmuch as consciousness is a field that is 
consigned exclusively to the expression of qualities.  And because the natural 
tendency toward homeostasis that characterizes the organism as a whole also 
manifests itself through consciousness, the latter will always bend toward the 
somewhat kitschy superficialities of domestication—that is, with situating itself in a 
pleasing environment in which to dwell.  As such, it is likely that any Qn discharged 
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by system ω in the direction of motility will do so in the interest of domestic 
satisfaction of some order.   
Given what we now understand regarding system ω, we can makes some 
claims about the conditions that must be in place in order for it to function properly.  
Not only is the success of the mechanical function of keeping off external Q a 
primary condition for the proper functioning of system ω, but the Qn coming from 
endogenous stimuli into the memory neurones must also be kept at bay.  Any influx 
of powerful Q coming from the external world that penetrates into deeply into ψ, thus 
sending its reverberations into ω, can only but disrupt consciousness, either by 
engendering displeasure or by undermining it completely.  Likewise, on the other 
side, when Qn behind the ‘posterior wall’ accumulate too much, they neutralize what 
little power system ω has, thus temporarily nullifying the delicate adornments of 
quality and negating its ability to maintain its fragile equilibrium by thwarting its access 
to the motor contrivances.  In this case, the increased pressures exerted upon 
memory neurones from the accumulation of Qn in endogenous lines of conduction 
avail themselves of direct routes to release, unmediated by qualitative concerns.  
Consciousness is a passion in this movement toward biological release, 
initially registering the displeasure of broad variations in period then later the pleasure 
of a return to a normalization of period.  Or, because consciousness is subject to 
extreme deviations in period, its conditions are momentarily undermined altogether 
and quality is neutralized.  Consider the following example:  Under normal 
circumstances, our hunger ebbs and flows somewhat gently.  Because of the gradual 
variation in psychic period that corresponds with these changes, we remain attuned to 
the intricacies of our sense of flavor, and our choices are made with subtle qualitative 
discrimination. However, when because of deprivation we are seized with a ravenous 
hunger, our sensitivity to the taste of our food diminishes dramatically. In rare cases 
such as those of starvation, the qualitative discrimination of consciousness is 
neutralized altogether or, if it endures at all, consciousness becomes a pure passion.  
Rodent meat, shoe leather, even human flesh—all of these become possible sources of 
sustenance.   
What have we just described if not an effective and immediate reduction in 
the complexity of the organism vis-à-vis its environment?  In our example, this is most 
apparent in the diminished capacity of consciousness for qualitative discrimination, 
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but this represents only the first, inwardly evident stage in such a movement of 
reduced complexity. If the body does not receive the sustenance necessary for the 
maintenance of normal cell processes, the latter begin the entropic process of 
breaking down.   
 
7. Conclusion: The Ego 
 
Let us now turn more directly to the ego itself.  Indeed, we have already been 
engaged with this discussion of the ego, insofar as this ‘negotiation’ between the 
functions is the ego’s most fundamental role.  This discussion provides us with an 
opportunity to bring our examination of The Project for a Scientific Psychology to a 
close.  If the following comments seem insufficient to us, then it must be remembered 
that Freud abandoned The Project before its completion—even, indeed, entirely 
aborting the effort to explain mental phenomenon on a purely psychophysical basis.  
While elements of the early scientific psychophysicalism remain in his later work, 
they are supplemented with the dynamic, economic, topographical and structural 
accounts which, using metaphorical descriptions, sought to augment the deficiencies 
that are evident in the effort to base psychology on purely physiological terrain.  And 
for those of us who are familiar with the work of the later Freud, these concluding 
remarks will no doubt leave us wanting for a more thoroughgoing explanation of the 
implications of these concepts for therapeutic technique.   
The scholar of Freud may be tempted to avail himself of the conceptual 
richness of the later work to clarify the obscurities evident in The Project.  We shall 
resist this impulse, and simply bring our discussion to a close with these few 
comments about the ego, which represents the point of integration of the ensemble of 
mechanisms of the psychic apparatus hitherto examined.   
The ego represents the avatar of the larger unity that is the nervous system as 
a whole, both exhibiting its dominant trends and mediating between its functions.  
Nonetheless, as “an organization that has been formed in ψ whose presence interferes 
with passages of quantity which on the first occasion occurred in a particular way [i.e 
accompanied by satisfaction or pain],” it also represents a distinct development within 
this system.17   What is this first occasion of the passage of quantity?  Freud no doubt 
                                                
17 Project for a Scientific Psychology, p. 323 
 78 
means to refer us to the most original moments in life—the very first enjoyment, the 
very first trauma of the infant child (or even the fetus).  In these initial moments, 
satisfaction and pain happen straightforwardly, without complication, hindrance or 
inhibition.  Insofar as the infant is protected by his parents from external aggressions, 
his body remains oriented exclusively toward satisfaction of the instincts, and in this 
way the infant embodies pure, unadulterated will.  Qn flow without interruption in the 
direction of satisfaction, as the river toward the sea. But eventually the child is assailed 
with pressures that beset it from the outside, and this is a normal and necessary 
moment of development. Inasmuch as the mother cannot protect him from these 
pressures forever, he must be gradually prepared to react with his own devices to the 
external world.  While these initial pressures often come from the father who 
imposes his own regime and demands that the child make advances toward bearing 
his own weight, they take myriad forms.  Wherever these pressures issue from, this 
interruption of the primary narcissistic unidirectionality of Qn toward immediate and 
uninhibited release gives rise to the first complications in ψ.   
Involving a partial suspension of the movement of release, these 
complications result in an accumulation of Qn that, because it has been inhibited in 
its flow, has been rendered partially quiescent by the mental apparatus (cathexis), and 
this Qn can later be deployed in view of satisfaction or defense of the structures of the 
ego.  What was firstly an external inhibitor of satisfaction (such as, for instance, the 
father’s interference in the relation between the boy and his mother) is straightaway 
internalized as complexification within ψ.  Now the organism begins to evince not 
only a shield in the direction of external Q, but also a kind of internal detention 
mechanism that suspends release in the direction of satisfaction, resulting in 
increasing summation of internal Qn.   
At the level of consciousness, this internalization manifests as the vague 
anticipation of an unpleasant encounter if the movement of satisfaction is allowed to 
proceed (such as, for instance, the strong rebuke from the father), and secondly, in 
accordance with the mechanism of summation, as a feeling of displeasure that 
corresponds to the postponement of satisfaction.  In the future, the release of 
pressures should not occur under circumstances that have proven to be even more 
disagreeable to the organism than the postponement of satisfaction.  Thus, it would 
not be incorrect to say that this uneasy anticipation, or anxiety, is one of the outward 
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features of the developed ego. It is in this way that the organism can begin to become 
more preoccupied with avoiding displeasure than with finding occasions for 
satisfaction, and this can ultimately take the form of a paralyzing anxiety that further 
frustrates the release of pressures.  But this pathological form of anxiety arises only 
through the exaggeration of a normal tendency for watchful vigilance and readiness to 
react. And it is rather likely that this exaggerated form of anxiety follows from a 
measure of unpredictability in how the specific regime of order has been enforced.  If 
the sovereign is intemperate and immoderate in his impositions of order, life under 
his gaze will seem exceedingly erratic and dangerous.   
From the standpoint of the quantity of force that is applied under normal 
conditions, the punitive measures of the father are moderate relative to those of the 
instantaneous traumatic impact that generates extreme pain.  Furthermore, they 
exhibit a certain consistency and regularity in their deployment.  Facilitation is 
achieved through external repetition—that is, through conditioning, and there is no 
primary or original event of painful impact. As such, in accordance with Freud’s 
theory that quantity expresses itself as complication in system ψ, as long as they are 
applied, these measures precipitate a prolonged building up of complication, and it is 
just this complication that is the essence of the ego.   
However, we also found that this breaking up of quantities along a multiplicity 
of lines is only possible only when these quantities are not too powerful. If the violent 
impact exceeds the nervous system’s capacity for complication, it will cause a “stroke 
of lightning” that penetrates deeply into ψ, leaving in its wake facilitations that are 
probably of the same order as those of system φ. Recall that, as a moment in the 
mechanical function of the organism, the facilitations of the latter system are not 
capable of the retainment of quantities (cathexis), but rather function simply to 
immediately keep off external Q.  Likewise, facilitations of this order that are located 
in system ψ will exhibit this feature, only now they have emerged in a system that is 
supposed to be protected from extreme external forces.  Because these facilitations 
function in the same way as those of system φ, that they are located deep within ψ 
where cathexis is high means that they will function as a point of leakage within the 
ego.  System φ never waits, and facilitations of the same kind as those of this system 
do not wait either, if only because they are incapable of it—their facilitations are total, 
and they retain no quotient of Q.  System ψ, on the other hand, is the seat of 
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consciousness, and we ventured earlier that consciousness is the interval in which the 
organism waits for satisfaction of the exigencies of life.  As such, we have every reason 
to believe that a total facilitation within this system, if it isn’t sidestepped, will function 
to interrupt this arc toward of satisfaction, thereby triggering a defensive reaction in 
moments when, under normal conditions, the organism would simply endure a delay 
in the partial release of its cathexis.  Thus, in terms of the impact upon consciousness, 
when internal Qn flow into these leaks, duration contracts, and even stops altogether.   
By now it should be clear that the defensive repetitions of the ego can arise 
either as a result of deliberate conditioning of moderate intensity by an external 
power or as an internal reaction to a single painful trauma.  In other words, these 
structures of the ego can be cultivated progressively as a reaction to external 
conditions through the deliberate and repetitious retracing of facilitations (habit), or 
they can arise over a protracted period as internal reverberations of a single event that, 
due to its painful impact, continues to exert a powerful influence over the mental 
apparatus (trauma). What was initially a simple but profound laceration within ψ—the 
result of an impact upon the nervous system that was too powerful to be ‘complicated’ 
along a multiplicity of lines—becomes a painful scar in the nervous tissue that must be 
circumvented in the effort to achieve satisfaction. If this movement of circumvention 
is not successful, if vital Qn run up against this Q drain within ψ, it can only but short 
circuit the normal course of release and throw the organism into paroxysm. Because 
it consists chiefly of facilitations of the order of habit, the ego is always already wired 
in such a way that it inevitably runs up against these heavy facilitations.  In other 
words, it must break the intransigent patterns of habit in order to avoid the depletion 
of its cathexis.  The direct pathways of release through ψ in the direction of the 
somatic element and the external world now appear to be fraught with uncharted, 
hidden hazards, in addition to the overt ones that have already been mapped out 
within system ψ (i.e. those deliberately enforced by the father).  But routes of 
circumvention must nevertheless be learned and, unlike the lessons imparted by the 
father and by society through conditioning, this is a lesson that ψ must teach itself.   
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3  
 
The Libido, Trauma, and the Hidden Forces of the 
Death Drive in Freud’s Metapsychology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the First World War, Sigmund Freud saw a surge of interest in his 
version of depth psychology among representatives from the highest ranks of the 
Central European Powers.  What occasioned this interest was the eruption of neurotic 
disorders that were to be found among those returning from the front.1  Unsurprisingly, 
the violence of this war generated a powerful reaction among many of those who fought 
on its front lines.  This reaction was produced in no small measure by the deployment 
of sophisticated weapons that were capable of killing on a scale never before seen by 
man.   What was a tragedy for Europe represented an opportunity for the School of 
Psychoanalysis.  Freud and his community of researchers had already been occupying 
themselves with the effort to understand the way that certain powerful experiences in 
the course of human development exerted a determinatively negative influence over the 
mental apparatus and inhibited its normal functioning.  Because the habit of 
psychoanalytical science was to “consider first the extreme and unmistakably 
pathological form,” it was uniquely fitted to the task of offering an answer to the 
proliferation of extreme neurotic disturbances resulting from the war (Vol. 19, 
Economic Problem of Masochism, 282).  Now, because these unmistakably 
pathological forms were so prevalent that one could scarcely walk the streets of Europe 
                                                
1 All references to Freud can to be found in the volumes of The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Pscychological Works of Sigmund Freud.  Henceforth, only the volume, the title of 
the volume, the particular work and the page number will be referenced: Vol. 17, “War 
Neuroses,” p. 207 
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without encountering individuals upon whom the marks of distress from their time at 
the front could be clearly seen, there was no denying the need for an answer to these 
psychological pathologies.  Such a proliferation of this pathological form represented a 
threat not only to the continued war effort, but even, it could be argued, to the general 
stability of European society. Psychoanalysis thus proposed an answer to the question 
of how to manage this threat, and found in the war an opportunity to further prove the 
validity of its claims.   
Freud's concern with the impact of war on man was to be the specifically clinical 
problem of battle’s destructive effects upon the balance of the individual psyche and, 
more generally, with the way in which these disturbances represent limit cases that bring 
into sharper relief the essential features of the mental apparatus. For Freud the limit 
case that interests him most is the unmistakably pathological form.  Leaving the positive 
question of health entirely unasked, Freud prefers instead to focus on the most obvious 
deviations from health.  These deviations pertain as much to extreme “deficiencies in 
function” as to the patient’s own declarations that he is suffering.2  This is particularly 
clear in the case of the war neuroses. Primary among the reasons for the state’s interest 
in psychoanalysis during the war was the latter’s capacity for suggesting techniques 
which would preserve and restore readiness for battle.   
As the Great War came to end, the state’s interest in the establishment of 
centers for the treatment and examination of the features of shell shock give way to 
other concerns.  Given the persistence of PTSD among those returning from the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, we can be forgiven for believing that these neurotic 
disturbances that followed from the exposure to the violence of battle did not continue 
to assert themselves even in peacetime.  And yet Freud makes the striking observation 
that, as aggressions were brought to a close, the largest number of these neurotic 
disturbances vanished along with them.3 The fact that this disorder can disappear when 
peaceful conditions resume testifies to the subtle and intimate relation between an 
instance of disorder—related as it is to a specific type of suffering for the individual—and 
the pressing demands of functionality and propriety made upon the individual by 
society. However much it may appear that the deviation from health pertains first of all 
to the suffering of the individual, in the final account it would seem that these deviations 
                                                
2 Vol. 12, A Note on the Unconscious, p. 263 
3 Vol. 17, War Neurosis, p. 207 
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cannot be understood without reference to an inability or an unwillingness—whether 
conscious or unconscious—to carry the burdens which society or one of its 
representatives has imposed.  
There are several reasons why we have elected to begin our discussion with the 
subject of war neurosis; the most notable among them is the fact this disorder provides 
us with the opportunity to examine the role that libidinal forces play in every neurosis.  
At first sight, it may seem that the causes of war neuroses can be understood on 
grounds that have nothing to do with infantile sexuality.  However, we will see that, like 
all other forms of neuroses, even war neurosis is also traceable to what Freud has called 
“a weak point in the structure of the sexual function.”4   This weak point is the result of 
the failure of the original effort to securely bind and render quiescent the forces that 
emanate from the libido in the child’s movement beyond infantile sexuality, which is 
the essential moment in the development toward a mature relationship with reality.  In 
other words, the subject has failed to fully relinquish his attachment to some pleasure of 
infantile sexuality, and he revolts against the forces of reality that separate him from this 
pleasure. 
The process of binding involves a repetition of the trauma of separation from 
the object of libidinal cathexis.  Later in life, this repetition always manifests itself in 
relation to some representative of the object that for the unconscious represents the 
original object which deprived the subject of his pleasure. As long as the repetition of 
the trauma of separation continues, the pleasure principle—which is responsible for 
efficiently evacuating the psychic apparatus of its tensions in such a way that these 
tensions do not disturb the tranquility of consciousness—loses its dominion over the 
psychic apparatus.  A moment from the past continues to haunt the subject.  This 
moment is one in which some form of pleasure to which the young subject 
demonstrated a deep attachment was, under the compulsions of reality, forcibly given 
up.  In this way, the subject becomes anchored in the past, which both inhibits it from 
giving itself to new opportunities for pleasure within the present and also disturbs its 
efforts to competently manage the hostile forces of reality.   
Like all neurotic conditions, the war neurosis can reveal itself to be resistant to 
therapeutic technique, which aims at restoring the dominion of the pleasure principle 
and reconciling the patient to the present.  Though psychoanalysis saw some success in 
                                                
4 Vol. 11, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p. 46 
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its efforts to manage the pathologies of neuroses, it also saw its share of failures.  After 
an examination of libido theory’s explanation for neurosis, we will turn to the question 
of why it is that some subjects are incapable of giving up their symptoms.  Freud’s 
answer to this question is that there are drives other than those of the libidinal instincts; 
namely, the death drives.   
 
1. The Pleasure Principle and its Disruptions 
 
The pathological cases that psychoanalytical practice has been proven most 
effective in treating are the neurotic disorders.  These disorders, in Freud’s view, offer 
an indirect or substitutive gratification of instinctual sexual or ‘libidinal’ impulses that 
have been repressed.  The intensity of a neurotic symptom stems from the energy of a 
mental process which has been held back from consciousness and is thus prevented 
from being acted upon directly. Because this mental process has been disallowed from 
realizing its direct aim, which would involve passing from the unconscious through 
consciousness on the way to action, the energies that animate it invent for themselves a 
circuitous path to release. The unpleasurable innervations of the symptom amount to 
the roundabout release of those quantities of psychic energy of the repressed mental 
process.  
Regardless of whether the source of excitation for consciousness issues from the 
external world or from the unconscious libido, only physical forces in flow can trigger 
the sensations of pleasure or unpleasure for the organism. While the organism 
possesses from birth a kind of protective barrier against mild exogenous forces in the 
form of the epidermis, it is endowed with no such barrier for the protection from the 
movement of endogenous forces.  Thus the organism endeavors to construct for itself a 
kind of internal barrier or dam against these forces by which it renders them ‘quiescent’ 
or ‘bound’, effectively containing them in the form of cathexis.  Once libidinal forces 
have been rendered sufficiently quiescent, it is only when their accumulation exceeds a 
certain quantitative threshold that they overflow their bindings and generate affective 
disturbances that make their demands heard within consciousness as unpleasurable 
sensations. 
Freud designates the urgency for the release of psychic energies with the term 
pleasure principle. This principle is responsible for the regulation of the movement of 
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release of libidinal issuing from the unconscious.  “We believe that the course of 
[mental] events is invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension, and that it take a 
direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension—that is, 
with an avoidance of unpleasure and a production of pleasure.”5  But because external 
reality also makes demands upon the subject, this lowering of internal tensions must 
often be postponed or delayed until there is an appropriate time and opportunity for 
discharge. Thus, the pleasure principle must have a counterpart which, rather than 
aiming at immediate gratification, temporarily suspends the movement of discharge.  
The pleasure principle is allowed to gain dominion over the mental apparatus only to 
the degree that the principle that is responsible for the regulation of protective reflexes 
that are oriented outwards toward the external world has relaxed its hold on the 
organism.  This counterpart Freud designates as the ‘reality principle’, which vigilantly 
protects the somatic element from external aggressions, and is thus responsible for the 
task of self-preservation.   
Both of these principles are thus concerned with the regulation of the 
movement of physical forces.  Whereas the pleasure principle regulates the discharge 
of endogenous forces emanating from deep within the organism, the reality principle 
regulates the functions that deflect the physical forces proceeding from the external 
world.  As such, each may be understood as an expression of an essential necessity of 
life; namely, to keep the quantities of force to which the living organism is subject as low 
as possible, irrespective of whether they originate from the inside or from the outside. 
Neurotic symptoms are the mark of a breach in the pleasure principle.  
Whereas the reality principle merely regulates the temporary suspension of the 
pleasure of discharge which is itself overseen by the pleasure principle, the symptom 
marks a deeper disruption of the normal movement of discharge.  A breach of the 
pleasure principle thus involves a moment in which the libido has been ‘cut off’ from its 
normal path of release.   
Initially this obstruction always corresponds with an inhibition imposed from 
without by the external forces of reality, whether by the blind forces within the 
environment or the presence of an external agent that actively surveils the behavior of 
the subject, such as the paternal figure.  Insofar as the libido is able to freely resume its 
normal course of discharge when the external inhibiting power withdraws, no neurotic 
                                                
5 Vol. 18, Beyond The Pleasure Principle, p. 7 
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symptom will emerge.  In this case, the ego, whose function it is to mediate the flow of 
forces between unconscious and consciousness, simply adapts itself to the new 
conditions and awaits an appropriate moment for release.   
However, as the ego internalizes the opposition of the forces of reality in a more 
radical way, now holding itself to the standards which were formerly enforced by the 
external censor, it can itself become an obstacle to discharge. The ego is of course 
immanent to the mental apparatus and, as such, it is capable of a degree of surveillance 
over the unconscious’ efforts to find a path of discharge which greatly exceeds that of 
any external censor. With the neuroses, an agency within the ego itself inhibits the 
normal movement of release indefinitely, preventing the impulse that originates in the 
unconscious from entering into consciousness or from fulfilling its aim being directly 
acted out. What began as an external form of censorship has now become an extreme 
form of psychic repression.  And yet, in spite of this repressive activity, the unconscious 
persists in its effort to release its forces in accordance with the requirements of the 
pleasure principle.  
The disruptions of neurosis thus follow from an economic imbalance in the 
psychic complex whereby what by all rights should have been an opportunity for 
pleasure is transformed into an occasion of displeasure. 6  In hysteria for instance, 
instead of being acted out, the impulse is merely felt as an innervation the source and 
true nature of which is unconscious and thus incomprehensible for the subject.  Like all 
neurotic symptoms, the affections of conversion hysteria follow from a disjunction 
between reality and the libidinal energies of the unconscious.  And as the disjunction 
between libido and reality is internalized and radicalized, the former is accorded no 
opportunities to discharge its cathexis, and so it invents for itself a new avenue of 
release without the cooperation of the ego: 
Neurotic symptoms are the outcome of a conflict which arises over a 
new method of satisfying the libido. The two forces which have fallen 
out meet once again in the symptom and are reconciled, as it were, by 
the compromise of the symptom that has been constructed. It is for that 
reason, too, that the symptom is so resistant:  it is supported from both 
sides.  We also know that one of the partners in the conflict is the 
unsatisfied libido which has been repulsed by reality and must now seek 
for other paths to its satisfaction.7  
 
                                                
6 Vol. 18, Beyond The Pleasure Principle, p. 11 
7 Vol. 16, Paths to the Formation of Symptoms, 358 
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The neurotic symptom thus represents a new ‘compromise’ between the unconscious 
libido and reality according to which the pleasure principle maintains its sway over the 
mental apparatus.  This compromise has nevertheless been won at a high price.  While 
it is true that the organism still manages to expend the repressed libidinal energies 
through the symptom, it does so at precisely the price of the conscious pleasure which 
would naturally accompany this release if it were permitted to follow its normal path.   
 There is more.  As reality, together with the agency within the ego that acts on 
its behalf, thwarts the release of libidinal energies, the libido responds by cathecting 
earlier, now-repressed positions from earlier moments of development.  Just as the 
child once found moments in the course of his development to withdraw from the 
external censoring agent in order to find satisfaction (such as the child who sucks his 
thumb when he is sure that his father is not watching), so also does the libido of the 
neurotic adult withdraw from the internal censoring agency within the ego toward its 
earlier positions.  In this case, the libido may regressively reinvest these positions with 
the energy which now, because of the repressive effort of the ego, can find no 
immediate path of egress.  These positions are what Freud calls ‘fixations.’  The fixation 
consists of a complex of habitual repetitions that at an earlier moment along the path of 
development could be counted on to yield some measure of pleasure.  These are 
repetitions that originally unfolded under the sway of the pleasure principle, the source 
of which can be found in the “activities and experiences of infantile sexuality, in the 
abandoned component trends, in the objects of childhood which have been given up.”8  
Moreover, these experiences have continued to form the basis of dream formations of 
the order of wish fulfillments, to which the libido, insofar as it has been disappointed in 
its efforts to find satisfaction in reality, now reverts more fully.   
In adult life, this infantile fixation continues to represent a “weak point in the 
structure of the sexual function” around which the repressed libidinal energy gathers.9  
Even if the child outwardly displayed no excessive or pathological aversion at the 
moment of development when it was compelled by external forces to pass beyond the 
particular stage of libidinal organization, on the basis of the reemergence of the fixation 
in adult life it can be surmised that the young subject must have nevertheless inwardly 
felt the sacrifice of these pleasures on the altar of development to be an immense 
                                                
8 Vol. 16. Paths to the Formation of Symptoms, 361 
9 Vol. 11. Five Essays on Psychoanalysis, 46 
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affective disturbance.  The normal course of development requires that many of these 
pleasures be given up. If the pleasure principle is to operate normally, because it obeys 
strict physical laws and pertains to definite quantities of libidinal energy, at the moment 
that some pleasures are given up others must be strengthened.  This follows from the 
way in which the forces that formerly found release in the relinquished instinctual 
trends of infantile sexuality are canalized into the new, ‘normal’ organizations of adult 
sexuality.  But because the libido has instead receded to its earlier position, some 
critical agency within the ego raises objections to this regressive movement, engendering 
a new conflict within the psychic apparatus.  The symptom thus reflects a frustrated 
effort to secure a path back to the erotic pleasures that were available to the subject 
earlier in life, and the neuroses can be broadly defined as a rejection of the new 
organizational complexes that have been imposed on the subject on behalf of the earlier 
ones of childhood.   
When it operates correctly in accordance with the proper deployment of the 
pleasure principle, the ego maintains consciousness merely as an open site of passage 
and disallows it from being flooded with sensations arising erratically from the 
unconscious.  The pleasure principle thus unfolds according to a selection within the 
ego of certain acceptable forms of release.  Though it waits for this release according to 
the reality principle, it nevertheless succeeds in evacuating the pressures to which the 
mental apparatus is subjected.  As the secondary processes of the ego begin to mediate 
the primary processes operative in the unconscious, the ego determines which forms of 
release are appropriate and which are not.  The so-called ‘secondary processes’ actually 
begin as a form of censorship from without, and are slowly internalized within the 
mental apparatus.  This selection originally unfolds in view of memories in which forces 
have been released either at inappropriate times or in a manner that is itself considered 
to be inappropriate.  
  
2. The Sexual Origins of Neuroses and the Lost Purity of the Subject 
 
Before moving on to consider neurotic cases that are particularly resistant to 
treatment, let us briefly summarize the libido theory’s account of neuroses: Freud holds 
that neurotic disturbances follow chiefly from an inability or an unwillingness of the 
unconscious to give up the purity of the erotic pleasures of childhood in the face of the 
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forces of reality.  And yet, the libido is so insistent upon these pleasures that it revolts 
against the censorship of the ego by both inventing new paths of release in the form of 
the symptom and upsetting the tranquility of consciousness.  And because it is reality 
and its proxy within the ego which has thwarted his satisfaction, the subject may find in 
almost every encounter with the world a pretext for his own suffering, and through a 
process of projection he may come to blame others for a displeasure that really 
emerges from his own depths.10  Something within him has revolted against the world, 
and as long as this revolt continues he can find no peace.   
Influential contemporaries such as Alfred Adler, himself a member of the 
Vienna Circle until 1911, raised powerful objections to the specifically sexual origins of 
the neuroses. For those who are uninitiated to the subtleties of psychoanalytical theory, 
it is indeed difficult to understand how certain neuroses such as that of war might be 
traceable to problems in the evolution of infantile sexuality.  In lectures delivered in the 
United States in 1910, Freud attempted to put these doubts to rest. It is true, he 
concedes, that in some cases psychoanalytic investigation traces the symptoms back to 
traumas other than ones involving sexuality.   However, he claims,  
this distinction loses its significance owing to other circumstances.  For 
the work of analysis required for the thorough explanation and complete 
recovery of a case never comes to a stop at events that occurred at the 
time of the onset of the illness, but invariably goes back to the patients 
puberty and early childhood; and it is only there that it comes upon the 
impressions and events which determined the later onset of the illness.  
It is only experiences in childhood that explain susceptibility to later 
traumas and it is only by uncovering these almost invariably forgotten 
memory-traces and by making them conscious that we acquire the 
power to get rid of the symptoms….The repressed wishful impulses of 
childhood have alone provided the power for the construction of 
symptoms.11 
 
In our own discussions thus far, we have found the neurotic symptom to be a sign of an 
insurgency of forces within the unconscious against an order that has been imposed 
upon the subject from without—an order that stands in opposition to its most primordial 
desires.  In this quote, Freud is exceedingly clear about his belief that this revolt, if it is 
                                                
10 “A particular way is adopted of dealing with any internal excitations which produce too great 
an increase of unpleasure:  there is a tendency to treat them as though they were acting, not 
from the inside, but from the outside…This is the origin of projection, which is destined to play 
such a large part in the causation of pathological processes.” Vol. 18, Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, p. 29 
11 Vol. 11, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis: Fourth Lecture 1910, 41 
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to be traced back far enough, always unfolds on behalf of the pleasures of childhood 
sexuality, broadly understood.12  And in what behaviors do we find the essence of this 
pleasure, if not those of being loved, stroked, fed, watered and put to sleep?  What is 
desired above all is every solace that that the mother offered to the child.  Moreover, 
the subject seeks to be maintained in a passive position within which his satisfactions are 
provided for him by another.   
 With this in mind, we are better equipped to understand the relationship 
between the war neuroses and infantile sexuality.  Freud concedes that the link in 
indeed more remote than in the neuroses of peacetime, which psychoanalytical 
technique has successfully demonstrated to derive from a conflict between the ego and 
the sexual instincts which it represses.  Whatever their differences, there is little doubt 
that the neuroses of war issue from a conflict in the ego no less than those of peacetime.  
Now, however, “the conflict arises between the soldier’s old, peacetime ego and his new 
warlike one, and it becomes acute as soon as the peace-ego realizes what danger it runs 
of losing its life owing to the rashness of its newly formed, parasitic double.” 13   
Presuming that the peacetime ego was somewhat well-adjusted to the conditions within 
which it found itself, it must have found substitutive satisfactions for those given up in 
childhood. Though the subject was regularly compelled by this relatively peaceful 
reality to wait for the discharge of his libidinal forces, it nevertheless found 
opportunities for pleasure.   
By contrast, war drives the subject even further from these pleasures.  Under 
conditions of war, the opportunities for discharge prove to be even rarer, and the 
subject must consequently delay his satisfaction even longer, if he finds it at all.   And 
because under the conditions of war the subject’s ego is not only assailed by forces 
emanating from the libido but it is also exposed to intense dangers from the external 
world which are perceived directly through consciousness, these conditions reveal 
themselves to be even more unreceptive to the demands of his libido.  Where under 
such conditions can one find satisfaction?  When can one relax?   There seems to be 
nowhere to hide, nowhere to find a moment of repose.  Moreover, war conditions 
announce the immanent risk of death, and for the ego—insofar as it acts on behalf of 
                                                
12 “Sexuality in this context is to be understood in the extended sense in which it is used in 
psychoanalysis and is not to be confused with the narrower concept of ‘genitality’.”  (Vol. 17, 
War Neuroses, 208)   
13 Vol. 17. War Neuroses, 209 
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the libidinal instincts in an effort to negotiate a kind of compromise between the forces 
of reality and those of sexuality—these conditions suggest the risk that one may even 
lose the opportunity for the pleasures of satisfaction forever.  
The picture that we have drawn of the neurotic subject is that of one who above 
all desires the recovery of the lost purity of childhood sexuality.  “Neurotics are 
anchored somewhere in their past; we know now that it is a period of their past in 
which their libido did not lack satisfaction, in which they were happy.”14  We may even 
ask whether this purity of childhood sexuality that functions to anchor the neurotic in 
the past doesn’t also provide an image of the original purity of the subject itself—a purity 
that has irreversibly corrupted by the necessity of its dealings with reality.  
 
3. Trauma and the Arduous Path to Overcoming It 
 
The conditions of melancholia and war neuroses that persist long after the 
cessation of military operations evince an enduring disturbance in the pleasure 
principle’s regulatory role over the mental apparatus according to the power that this 
traumatic memory exerts.  In these conditions, some distressing memory of the past 
stubbornly exerts a negative influence over the mental apparatus—this, in spite of the 
fact that the subject appears to have every opportunity to move on from the painful 
experience.  And these conditions are not the only ones that reveal this fixation to the 
past.  All neurotic conditions can persist even after the disappearance of the conditions 
that have generated them.  Something within compels the subject to endlessly relive a 
past moment of loss within the present.   
In order to understand these disturbances, we must possess a more precise 
understanding of the nature of trauma.  We will find that—whether we speak of the 
trauma of war or that of the loss of infantile sexuality—all forms of trauma exhibit a 
fundamental likeness.  However, it is not only necessary to closely examine the nature 
of trauma itself but, in order to understand why this disturbance is so unremitting, an 
examination the path by which the trauma might be overcome is also indispensable.  It 
will be seen that, if the path of healing is not followed to its end, then the trauma will 
continue to disturb the ego indefinitely.  Navigating the path to health is not such an 
easy matter.  This is an uphill, laborious path, and along the way the subject may 
                                                
14 Vol. 16, Formation of Symptoms, 365 
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encounter formidable powers of resistance that sabotage it from the shadows.  That is, 
there may be invisible destructive forces awaiting the subject on this path that prevent it 
from reaching its destination, actively obstructing the effort to become healthy.   
 Though it may be difficult for us to imagine that the mere separation of the 
young child from his mother could be just as traumatic in nature as the horrors of war, 
psychoanalysis reveals that this difference is in a certain sense negligible.  However, we 
must be careful not to overlook the difference with regard the source of the traumatic 
excitation.   Whereas the child must deal with the flood of sensations coming from 
within, issuing from the libido itself, the soldier’s excitations assail him from without, 
issuing instead from the violence of battle. This might be enough to establish a 
difference in kind between them if it were not for the following detail:  in both cases, 
regardless of the source of excitation, the subject has found himself helpless in the face 
of overpowering forces.  In each instance, the event which has occasioned the influx of 
excitations is one for which the subject has no answer.  
  But there is perhaps yet another reason for establishing that there is no 
difference in kind between war trauma and that of the loss of infantile pleasure. It may 
be that the external excitations to which the soldier is subjected in the violence of battle 
represent only the condition for the reemergence of an original trauma.  The eruption 
of excitations originating from within the libido is merely occasioned by the violence of 
battle and really amounts to a repetition of the trauma of the child’s original separation 
from the pleasurable situation vis-à-vis his mother.  This explanation tallies well with the 
idea that the eruption of trauma can always be referred to a weak point in the structure 
of the sexual function.   
 Earlier in life, as the child was compelled to give up his immediately pleasurable 
relation with the mother, there also arose a powerful resistance to relinquishing these 
pleasures.  The weak point, then, has arisen due to the insufficiency of the adaptive 
mechanisms that have been charged with dealing with the forces of reality that run 
contrary to desire.  It is likely that these first adaptive mechanisms of childhood 
represent the foundation upon which all of the subsequently developed mechanisms 
will rest.  If these mechanisms are not sufficiently rooted in the psychic apparatus from 
the start—that is, if the child remains somehow deeply resistant to reconciling himself to 
reality—then the subject will remain vulnerable later in life to their collapse.   
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 By contrast, for the one in whom these defensive measures are more firmly 
established the susceptibility to psychic trauma later in life diminishes. Presumably, this 
is someone for whom the opposition between the early pleasures of life and those of 
later life is not so powerful.  For such a person, the transition from the immediate 
pleasures of infantile life to more advanced stages of development in which these 
infantile pleasures have been given up has, for whatever reason, proven to be less taxing 
for the ego.  It could be that this relates to the success of the mental apparatus of an 
effort to transfer larger quantities of libidinal cathexis over to this later iteration of ego, 
so that the subject learns to love himself and his new situation no less than his old.  The 
one who manages to convey a greater quantity of his libidinal energy over to these 
defensive composites that form the nucleus of the ego, who has to some extent learned 
to love even his dealings with reality, will probably exhibit stronger defenses in the face 
of powerful forces.   
 But for the one in whom this process has not been so successful, the balance 
between his original infantilism and the forces of reality is more tenuous.  As long as the 
realities of peacetime society have accommodated in some measure the insistence of 
this infantilism, the subject has managed only to accept the new arrangement 
begrudgingly.  The instinctual forces of the libido are under peacetime conditions 
allowed to flow more freely according to configurations which resemble in many ways 
the original infantile sexuality.   We have all seen such examples: the grown man who 
has found in his wife one who will fulfill the role of his mommy, and who only manages 
to muster the strength to go forth into the world in order to secure the means to 
perpetuate this vaguely infantile relationship with the mother-surrogate.   
 However, with the outbreak of war the accommodation of infantilism can 
scarcely be allowed, and the subject’s defensive measures—regulated as they are under 
the reality principle—are called upon to work at their highest capacity.  This means that 
instinctual libidinal forces and the drive for pleasure must be kept in check to a much 
greater degree than ever before.  Thus, enduring the new conditions of war requires 
that these instinctual forces must be even more securely ‘bound’ and rendered 
‘quiescent’.  It is only on the basis of these bindings of instinctual forces that the subject 
would find himself capable of dealing with the demands of battle under the regulation 
of the reality principle. 
A failure to effect this binding would provoke a disturbance analogous 
to a traumatic neurosis; and only after the binding has been 
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accomplished would it be possible for the dominance of the pleasure 
principle (and its modification, the reality principle) to proceed 
unhindered.  Till then the other task of the mental apparatus, the task of 
mastering or binding excitations, would have precedence—not, indeed, 
in opposition to the pleasure principle, but independently of it and to 
some extent in disregard of it.15   
 
If the anticathexis whose task it is to suppress the release of libidinal energies at 
appropriate times is not sufficiently secure or exhibits any ‘weak points’, then the 
external violence will occasion the flow of these forces into consciousness at the most 
inopportune of times; namely, at the first moment in which these defensive measures 
are really tested under the duress of battle.  The ego, sensing the danger that it is in, can 
only but react powerfully against this influx of libidinal energies.  In just the moment at 
which it senses that it should be concerned with the external forces to which it is subject 
in battle, it finds itself flooded with excitations issuing from its own depths that inhibit it 
from defending itself against external aggressions.  Now, the mental apparatus discovers 
that it has more work to do upon itself before it will be capable of dealing with the 
aggressions of battle. The mental apparatus must return to this unfinished binding 
activity in order to reestablish the dominion of the pleasure principle over mental life.   
 
4. Reactions to the Traumatic Loss of Pleasure  
  
 Bearing our more precise definition of trauma in mind, we may now turn to the 
question of why it is that this trauma continues to plague the subject.  In Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, the persistent war neuroses provides Freud the occasion for a 
reflection on the question of both the range and the primacy of the pleasure principle 
over mental life.  To this end, he examines other instances than those of the traumatic 
dreams of war neurotics in which the pleasure principle is apparently put out of play.  
His hope is that this will not only yield a further conceptual framework for 
understanding the war neuroses, but more profoundly that it will bring instincts other 
than those of the libido into the light, instincts which have until this point remained 
unexamined by psychoanalytical science.  It may be that these instincts also exert their 
force on the libido, which would imply that a revision of libido theory would also be in 
order.   
                                                
15 Vol. 18, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 35 
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 Among the instances in which the pleasure principle loses sway over the psychic 
apparatus are the moments through which every child must pass in the normal course 
of development.  These are moments in which the subject has yet to learn the necessity 
for the delay of pleasure, and in which the primary object of his libidinal cathexis, the 
mother, has rarely been absent.  More precisely, when the mother has been absent, this 
has lasted only as long as the subject experienced no significant affective tension.  
Whenever affective tension increased, the child had only to cry out and his mother 
would reappear to satisfy the need for the discharge of his libidinal energies, presenting 
her breast to the child for feeding and rocking him back to sleep.  However, insofar as 
the mother is herself subject to the demands of reality, the necessity arises for her 
separation from the child for increasingly longer periods.  This no doubt comes as a 
shock to the child.  Now, in his moment of need the mother is nowhere to be found.   
The child is left wanting for the very object that could be relied upon to provide relief 
in the past.   
 Every child must learn to accept this loss.  As such, it should be possible to 
identify some commonplace behaviors in the course of development according to 
which this is achieved.  We have all witnessed the occurrence of the behavior that 
Freud identifies as decisive in the child’s development toward adulthood, in which she 
learns to deal with the loss. It is that in which the child throws some beloved object 
away from herself, such as her bottle, stuffed animal or toy.  This activity is even made 
into a kind of game.  And even after the caretaker again presents this object to the child, 
the whole activity invariably recommences, and the child throws it away once more. 
Precisely because it is repeated ad nauseum, such behavior is likely to generate some 
degree of exasperation for the new parent or caretaker who has never witnessed the 
movement of childhood development.  Indeed, whenever an adult acts in a similar 
manner, fitfully throwing some valued object across the room in response to a jilting 
from one’s lover for instance, this is rightly viewed to be an example of regressive, 
infantile behavior.  Nevertheless, Freud actually sees in this activity a significant step 
toward adulthood.  How can this be?  
 Our answer to this question delivers us once again to the heart of Freud’s 
definition both of trauma and the process according to which it is overcome by the 
psychic apparatus. The fitful character of this behavior in the adult reflects the return of 
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the original traumatic loss.  Additionally, it features the same behavior that has helped 
the child to bind this trauma; namely, throwing of some valued item away from oneself.   
 With regard to this behavior in the child, we should take note of an essential 
aspect of this activity that we have yet to elaborate.  Despite the fact that it takes the 
form of a game, it is difficult to see how such a game could yield some measure of 
satisfaction or pleasure for the child.  The discarded objects are invariably ones to 
which the child has displayed some attachment in other moments.  If the libido theory 
is correct and what matters above all is the achievement of pleasure, then there remains 
something deeply mysterious about it.  
 Freud examines several possible solutions to this mystery. First of all, Freud 
sees in these activities the features of a transitional movement from a state of passivity to 
that of activity, which he identifies as an instinct for mastery.   Secondly, insofar as the 
beloved item represents a partial object of the absent mother, he suggests that the 
activity may also be interpreted to follow from a desire for revenge.  In this account, the 
bottle, for example, represents a surrogate for the breast; the soft toy, a surrogate for the 
feeling of the mother’s embrace, etc.  
At the outset [the child] was in a passive situation—he was overpowered 
by the experience [of his mother’s departure]; but, by repeating it, 
unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took on an active part. These 
efforts might be put down to an instinct for mastery that was acting 
independently of whether the memory was in itself pleasurable or not.  
But still another interpretation might be attempted. Throwing away the 
object so that it was ‘gone’ might satisfy an impulse of the child’s, which 
was suppressed in his actual life to revenge himself on his mother for 
going away from him. In that case, it would have a defiant meaning: ‘all 
right, then, go away! I don’t need you. I’m sending you away myself.’ 16  
 
These interpretations of the game are extremely insightful with regard to the 
development of the pleasure principle, the reality principle, and the ensemble of 
mechanisms that assure these principles’ supremacy; namely, the ego itself.  It is not 
difficult to understand why Freud asserts that repetitions of an unpleasurable 
experience such as those that are transformed into the child’s game can be said to be 
developmental precursors to the firm establishment of the dominion of the pleasure 
principle within the mental apparatus. Whether as a means of revenge or of the mastery 
of the excitation—in both accounts the game prepares the child to endure, and later 
even perhaps to enjoy these experiences that until now have issued only in displeasure.   
                                                
16 Vol. 18, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 16 
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 The child must learn to accept the limits imposed upon him by external 
conditions. Not only does the child, in passing over from the passivity of the experience 
to the activity of the game, become inured to the repetitions of the formerly 
unpleasurable experience, but by the assimilation of this activity to the preconscious ego 
they also function to generate a phantasm of control over the object.  He convinces 
himself that he is the one who chose to be rid of the mother.  Thus, beyond mastery 
and revenge, there is also an aspect of self-beguilement regarding the role the boy plays 
in the mother’s disappearance to be found here.  He persuades himself that he does 
not suffer the disappearance of the mother, but actively dismisses her according to his 
own will, and he imagines that this willful separation has the same distressful affect 
upon her as it has had upon him, thus revenging himself on the mother for going away 
from him.  
 The mastery of excitations is attended by a mastery of motor controls in which 
the child learns to grip the surrogate object more tightly in order to damage it or cast it 
away.  But while the game does indeed involve a kind of motor mastery over the 
surrogate object, it no doubt misses its mark with regard to the true object of this 
activity; namely, the mother.  However much the child may convince himself through 
this process that, because he can control the substitutive object, he also has the power to 
affect the original object of libidinal desire, the process really only pertains to the 
mastery of excitations issuing from his own libido.  It is nonetheless noteworthy that 
Freud seems to hint at the possibility that this process may also generate for the child 
the phantasm of a capacity for mastery over the original object of desire—phantasmal 
precisely because it is accomplished only on the basis of the repression of an impotent 
libidinal desire.   We must remember that the origin of this movement within the 
mental apparatus that culminates in a feeling of mastery was precisely the primordial 
helplessness of the child to satisfy himself.  It is the product of a kind of reflux within 
the organism that arises as a result of its disappointments vis-à-vis the external world.  In 
one sense, it does manage to make itself master of the excitations in this way—if only in 
the sense of accepting the departure of the mother—but, in still a deeper sense, it has 
merely driven these desires back into its own depths.  
 The original desire that the mother make herself available to the child remains, 
if now in a somewhat distorted form.  Because the boy has conditioned himself to relate 
to the mother differently in spite of this desire, this conditioning becomes the basis 
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upon which further interactions with her unfold. What was originally a direct and 
immediate libidinal connection is substituted for a phantasm of autonomy and mastery 
that is temporalized according to precisely the repressed desire upon which it rests.  
The child’s ego remains in a passive relation both with regard to the mother and to the 
unaltered desire for the pleasure that she once offered to him, and he has no real 
power to become active here.  Thus, this is a kind of performance of real mastery that 
is imaginatively extended to the mother.   
 Nevertheless, from an economic standpoint this is already enough, since the 
child’s efforts to adjust himself to external realities go only as far as the imperative for a 
reestablishment of stability within the mental apparatus demands according to the 
pleasure principle.  And the reality principle, because it is not an epistemological 
principle but a psychodynamical one, certainly doesn’t assure a correspondence 
between a belief or feeling of mastery over an external object and its actual mastery.  
 What was originally merely an exercise in acceptance may ultimately become a 
source of pleasure in itself.  It is in this way that the child looses touch with the original 
purity of pleasure issuing from his mother’s presence, and henceforth such pleasures 
may be forever alloyed with those associated with banishing her from the room.  But 
from where does this sense of power originate if not from a feeling of having avenged 
the injury, visiting it back upon the mother herself.  “Fine, go away!  I can play that 
game myself.  I didn’t want you here to begin with.”  Such games represent an effort to 
structure relations in which to not only find occasions for release, but also to 
domesticate and master the external threats and obstacles to pleasure.  
There is yet another noteworthy example from childhood development of this 
effort to master the object of desire that Freud does not mention in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle.  As the child increases in age, in order to advance the movement of 
development toward adulthood his parents undertake to wean him from certain 
infantile pleasures, such as thumb-sucking and being carried in the arms of the parent. 
To the appeals of the child to be held, for example, the parent now responds with a 
stern denial:  “No, you are a big boy now, you can walk on your own!”  Doubtless, this 
utterance of the word ‘no’ is among the first to have enormous implications for the 
child’s affective life.  Above all, it represents the denial of his desires.  To the parent’s 
utterance of this word the toddler often responds with an explosive emotional 
outburst—crying, screaming, kicking, scratching and a general non-compliance with 
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everything that he has been asked to do.  Ultimately, the child will appropriate the 
perceived power of this word to himself.  When he is asked to do some minor task that 
he has shown himself to be capable of at some other time, he proclaims “No!” as 
forcefully as he can.  With this proclamation, he demonstrates his capacity to rebel 
against the order that has been imposed upon him by his parents.  And when we 
consider the pathos with which this word is pronounced, it is clear that this is for him 
the most powerful word in his limited vocabulary.  The toddler now tirelessly wields 
this weapon indiscriminately against both his parents and his playmates.  
We may also view this impulse for revenge from a slightly different perspective.  
While it is true that the child seeks revenge for being deprived of the purity of pleasure 
that characterizes infantile sexuality, it is equally true that the desire for revenge follows 
from being compelled by the other to develop beyond his primitive state.  This bitter 
taste for vengeance that begins with the original separation from the state of pleasure 
can persist in adult life, and through the mechanisms of transference it may manifest 
itself in other relationships.  But what is especially remarkable is the creativity that is 
often apparent in these later efforts to get revenge.  Though the impulse for revenge 
may originate with the frustrations of being compelled to develop, later one develops in 
order to get revenge!   
Nevertheless, in the emphatic denials of other’s will the child does begin to 
achieve a kind of genuine mastery over others.  He realizes that he has the power to 
frustrate his parents, and some part of him delights in the feeling of having revenged 
himself for the frustrations that they have visited upon him.  By contrast to the largely 
imaginary revenge of the former example, now we encounter a behavior that has 
proven to be actually effective in altering the affective state of the one who has denied 
the child his infantile pleasures, which is evinced in the obvious vexation of the parent 
who is disappointed by the behavior of the child.   
Reflection upon this phenomenon provides us the opportunity to examine the 
origins of negativity, both with regard to how it manifests itself in the engagements of 
everyday life and also in its more advanced intellectual function.  Furthermore, we can 
identify this moment of development with the origins of the feeling of a lack associated 
with the specific unpleasure of the denial of libidinal satisfaction, which the toddler 
attempts to transfer to others through his repeated efforts to deny them of their own 
satisfaction.  Without committing ourselves to a careful inquiry into the affective origins 
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of dialectical thinking, we may nevertheless pose the question of whether this moment 
doesn’t mark the period of development in which conditions for dialectics first finds 
purchase in the mind of the individual.  It seems clear that this moment can be 
understood as one in which there emerges an opposition between the fullness of being, 
which can be associated with the nurturing presence of the mother, and the unsettling 
emptiness of her absence, which now supplies the affective basis for the concept of 
nothingness.  
 
5. The Stupidity of the Libido 
 
In Freud’s view, this disturbing lack continues to haunt the subject according to 
the constitution of the ego—a disturbance which, to varying degrees, is bound to 
continue for the remainder of the life of the subject. Psychotherapeutic technique avails 
itself of transference neurosis in order to render the repressed traumatic memory of the 
disturbing event over to the preconscious ego.  Compelling the subject to once again 
‘work through’ (durcharbieten) the traumatic event in this way will result in a 
recommencement of the binding effort.17 
It is hoped that this renewal of the effort to bind the source of traumatic 
excitation will be more successful than the initial effort, resulting in a diminishment in 
the disturbances that it provokes within consciousness.  Nevertheless, we have seen that 
the success of this effort is by no means assured.  It may be that there are forces on the 
path to recovery that inhibit the subject from reaching its destination that hold it back 
from its completion.  Indeed, these forces were probably responsible for the failure of 
the original effort, and even for the subject’s inability to give up his symptoms or to seek 
treatment for them.  Nevertheless, the successful completion of binding is the most 
important moment on the path to development.   
Without actually naming it, our entire analysis has circled around the invisible 
destructive drive that inhibits the subject’s movement toward health—the very same 
drive that obstructed the original binding effort.  What forces within the subject are 
responsible for this inability to overcome the disturbance?  Why has the subject 
demonstrated itself to be so unreceptive to the new arrangements which have been 
                                                
17 Vol. 14, On Metapsychology, p. 288 
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imposed upon it from without?   We can delay naming this drive no longer.  Freud 
designates this collection of destructive forces within the organism the death drive.   
This drive is not one that somehow infiltrates or overcomes the organism later 
in life.  No, it must have been present from the very start.   Freud even argues that there 
is a sense in which the operative forces in this drive precede those of the life instincts.  
But before we unpack this claim, let us briefly reexamine the active mechanisms within 
the neurotic subject. It will be noted that the inertial tendency that characterizes the 
death drive has been present all along in our account of neurosis.   
Our image of the neurotic subject is that of one that stubbornly desires the 
return to the lost purity of childhood sexuality.  Rather than adapting itself to its new 
situation and finding ways to evacuate its forces within the new arrangements of the 
adult world, we have seen that the libido of the neurotic instead withdraws to earlier 
positions in the course of its development, regressively reinvesting its energy in the 
fixations of infantile sexuality. To this regressive movement of the libido the repressive 
agency within the ego responds by coercing the development that reality demands, at 
least with regard to the outward behavior of the subject.  Like the external censoring 
agency, the internal agency of the ego that acts on behalf of reality can to some degree 
enforce appropriate behaviors by the inhibition of the movements that provided the 
original path for discharging libidinal energies.   
At this juncture, it will perhaps be illuminating to add yet another dimension to 
our account of the neurotic subject.  There is one more technique that the mental 
apparatus uses in view of advancing the process of development; namely, self-castigation 
and self-reproach.  These represent the principle instruments of what Freud, in his later, 
structural account of psychic life, will call the superego, which aims at something more 
than merely controlling the path of discharge.18  The superego berates the ego with the 
aim of inducing it to entirely abandon its infantile desires. However, whereas the 
repressive agency within the ego does achieve some degree of success with regard to 
inhibiting the movements according to which discharge is achieved, the superego lacks 
the sufficient means of enforcement to compel the unconscious to give up its desires. 
Notwithstanding the reproaches of the superego, the subject’s id nevertheless remains 
oriented toward infantile pleasure, and is either unwilling or incapable of giving up its 
regressive aim of returning to this state of pure pleasure—a fact that reveals the inherent 
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lassitude and indolence of the drives.  Because of this indolence, the sexual drives 
continue to rebel against the hysterical demands of superego by insisting upon their 
original aim, which provokes even greater resistance from the critical agency and 
exacerbates the conflict.   
This discussion brings us before an important insight.  It may be that our images 
of insurgency and rebellion are inadequate for capturing the nature of the conflict.  
Rather, the unconscious may be simply deaf and dumb to the calls of the critical agency. 
Perhaps it is the case that the drives are by nature stupidly resistant to development and 
the secondary processes.19  This description tallies well with Freud’s claims that the 
‘sexual instincts…are hard to educate.’20  Why, if not because its reproaches always fall 
upon deaf ears, does the superego feel that its voice must become harsher and louder 
in its remonstrations against the instincts?   Together with the inflexibility of desire with 
regard to its aim, this deafness of the sexual drives to the calls for development is a 
reflection of the power that the death drive exerts upon the mental apparatus.  
Earlier, we portrayed the path toward the recovery from a loss as an arduous 
one.  It was also said that there might be invisible forces hidden along this path that 
further complicate the movement back to health.  We have understood matters in this 
way because the death drive rarely, if ever, appears in pure form as a ‘beyond’ of the 
pleasure principle.  Insofar as it does reveal itself at all for the subject, it always seems to 
do so in the shadow of this loss—as the incapacity to move on from it that marks a 
lasting disturbance of the pleasure principle.   
Only now has it become clearer what the invisible forces of the death drive do: 
they obstruct the subject’s efforts to pass its cathexis on to a new and different object.  
They are also responsible for the inability of the subject to give up the hope for a return 
to the pleasures of infantile sexuality. But this account of the effects of the death drive 
upon mental life generates new problems. If the death drive is first of all responsible for 
the stubborn insistence of the aim of discharge that will later express itself in the 
pleasure principle, then why, in obstructing the completion of the work of binding, does 
it also seem to issue in the frustration of this aim?  There appears to be something 
paradoxical in the claim that the death drive is at once responsible for the organism’s 
inability to give up its insistence upon of the aim of pleasure while also undermining the 
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achievement of this aim through the reestablishment of the very principle that 
accomplishes it most effectively.   
 
6. The Death Drive: Gravity and Repetition 
 
In our discussion of the effort to bind the unpleasurable excitations issuing from 
the unconscious in the wake of the loss of the pure pleasure of infantile sexuality, we 
noted that this binding effort is characterized by the repetition of the traumatic 
experience.  By this repetitious activity the subject passes from a state of passivity to one 
of activity, thus mastering the excitation and enabling the psychic apparatus to pass 
beyond the memory of the loss toward the present. This is the process according to 
which the dominion of the pleasure principle over psychic life is reestablished.  In this 
regard, the repetitions of binding are not dissimilar in nature to those according to 
which habits are constructed.  In these activities, the subject conditions himself through 
repetition to react to excitations without conscious thought. Just like the work of binding, 
the effort to build up a habit aims at the transformation of an aspect of psychic life into 
a mechanism that automatically manages excitations without allowing them to break 
into consciousness, thus maintaining the openness of consciousness so that it may 
attend to the task of protection against new threats which might emerge within the 
organism’s environment or to other purposes such as those of cultivating new occasions 
of pleasure.21  
Between the repressed instinct for the return to infantile sexuality and the effort 
to pass beyond its loss we thus discover an essential similarity: both involve the 
persistence of repetition.  With regard to infantile sexuality, this repetition concerns the 
activities that generate pleasure itself.  “The repressed instinct never ceases to strive for 
complete satisfaction, which would consist in the repetition of the primary experience 
of satisfaction.”22   With regard to the binding activity, the haunting return to the 
“distressing experience” reveals the same tendency for repetition; only now these 
repetitions pertain to the effort to move beyond infantile pleasures—a movement that, 
as we have seen, is demanded by reality and its avatar within the ego.23   And finally, 
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22 Vol. 18, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 42 
23 Vol. 18, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 15 
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with regard to the well-adjusted adult, we also discover these repetitions in the everyday 
practices of normal life.   Freud traces this tendency for repetition to the instincts:   
How is the predicate of being ‘instinctual’ related to the compulsion to 
repeat? At this point we cannot escape a suspicion that we may have 
come upon the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of 
organic life in general which has not hitherto been clearly recognized or 
at least not explicitly stressed. It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge 
inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the 
living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external 
disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it 
another way, the expression of an inertia inherent in organic life. This 
view of instincts strikes us as strange because we have become used to 
see in them a factor impelling towards change and development, 
whereas we are now asked to recognized in them the precise contrary—
an expression of the conservative nature of living substance.24 
 
The death drive imposes a strict conservatism upon development, never letting it go 
further than external conditions demand, never further than is necessary merely to pass 
beyond the external obstacle to stability. It is the expression of an inertial tendency 
according to which all physical objects, whether living or non-living, tend ultimately 
toward the perfect stability of materiality.  Just as inorganic objects are subject to the 
pressures of gravity, so also does the death drive exert a gravitational power over the 
organism. The inertial tendency takes as its object the libido itself, which implies that 
the libidinal forces of the organism do not impel it toward higher forms any more than 
there is something within the river that impels toward the sea—a fact that expresses 
Freud’s tacit rejection of Aristotelian finalism. Rather, it is the external force of gravity 
that above all provides us with the best explanation for the demand for the release of 
the libidinal cathexis. The best that instinctual libidinal forces can do is to simply adapt 
themselves to the contours of external reality.  That is, they are incapable of changing 
course unless acted upon by an external force.  And because of the gravitational pull of 
the death drive, even this adaptation to external conditions may prove to be difficult.  
Thus, the death drive is a force that holds the libido down, obliging it to suffer under 
the weight of its own being.25 
However, from another standpoint, we may also assert that, just as gravity 
provides for the unity of the river, the inertial tendency of the death drive also provides 
the libido with its original unity.  Without the gravitational force that the death drive 
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exerts upon the flow of libido, the latter could scarcely hold itself together.  Rather, like 
a liquid in the weightlessness of space, it would simply burst into a multiplicity of 
discrete particles.  And insofar as the unified flow of libidinal forces provides the 
organism both with its spontaneous animating principle and with its integrity, the 
organism itself would quickly disintegrate.   
This comparison of the libidinal drive with those of the river that does not 
impel itself toward sea but is rather compelled by external gravitational forces to move 
in this direction will prove instructive going forward.   To further extend this metaphor, 
we may compare the effort of binding with that of the construction of a dam that 
redirects and controls the flow water so as to circumvent the village in the valley. Our 
discussions have revealed that the binding effort is the essential moment on the path of 
development.  As such, it serves several functions.  Above all, it functions to build up 
mechanisms that aim at keeping excitations from overwhelming consciousness, thus 
maintaining what in The Project for a Scientific Psychology Freud refers to as its 
restitutio ad integrum.26 From the developmental standpoint, binding obstructs the path 
of these forces back toward the residues of earlier iterations of the ego, and instead 
redirects the flow of forces emanating from the libido away from this its most 
primordial and easiest of paths.   
If the bindings have been constructed adequately, then the passage of the river 
of energy flowing from the libido will be obstructed from flowing through the low 
ground of infantile sexuality.  Rather, these forces will instead be directed into the 
system of reservoirs (cathexis) and drainage systems (discharge) that reflect the 
configurations that have been imposed by the external world.   
Extrapolating from Freud’s early assertions in The Project, we may wonder 
whether the opening that remains after this obstruction and redirection of libidinal 
forces is nothing other than consciousness itself.  Where before there was a constant 
flow of forces issuing from the libido, now there is a clearing (what is called “total 
facilitation” in The Project) within which the organism maintains an awareness of reality, 
and the threats that wait within it.27   
Binding can also be seen to exhibit a qualitative function, which is that of 
determining which sorts of excitations may be experienced as pleasurable and which 
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may not.  Excitations which were originally sources of pleasure may, with the 
completion of the binding effort, be transformed into sources of unpleasure and 
conversely. As we have seen, the process of binding is initiated when the organism is 
deprived of some avenue of discharge which was formerly available to it.  Whenever 
certain kinds of excitations overflow the bindings whose task it is to hold them back, 
this will invariably generate displeasure for consciousness, particularly in moments in 
which these sorts of excitations are inappropriate.   
Once the pleasure associated with discharge has been inhibited from taking 
place by external conditions, the child must not only learn to accept the loss, but it is 
also to be hoped that he may learn to enjoy the new possibilities for pleasure that are 
opened up to him in the wake of this loss.  We have already seen an example of this 
process in which what was originally a source of unpleasure is transformed into a source 
of pleasure, however impure this pleasure might be. In the self-beguilements of the 
child, he convinces himself that he actively wills the departure of the mother.  Whereas 
before the relations with the mother were characterized by the univocal purity of 
pleasure according to which the flow of libidinal forces encountered no obstacle, now, 
with the emergence of the obstacles, these relations are marked with conflictual feelings 
between the ego and the unconscious.  While the unconscious maintains its original 
orientation, the secondary processes have nevertheless triumphed over these tendencies 
within the unconscious at the level of controlling movement.  For the unconscious, the 
triumph of the secondary processes probably issues in deep-seated feelings of 
aggrievement and disappointment regarding the jilting experience.  As for the ego, the 
victory over the original orientation generates its own form of pleasure.  The child may 
even convince himself that he enjoys his mother’s departure, which provides us with 
our paradigmatic example of a transformation of an excitation that is distinctly 
unpleasurable into one that offers a yield of pleasure.   
Before the commencement of this process, because the infant has yet to 
encounter objects which do not service his libidinal needs, the object of his pleasure is 
inseparable from his aim.  This means that, for the child, the mother is the apotheosis 
of pleasure.  In this regard, the life of the infant may be compared with the prelapsarian 
lives of Adam and Eve.  Like God’s first children, the infant lives in a state of paradise 
within which he is wanting for nothing.  Given that the child experiences no separation 
from the object of pleasure, he has yet to become a subject for himself.  However, as 
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the mother withdraws, this generates a rupture in the immediately pleasurable relation 
with the original object of libidinal cathexis.  This rupture represents the primordial 
narcissistic wound of mental life.  It manifests itself as a difference within the ego 
between aim and object, and corresponds with the first emergence of a conscious lack 
within the subject.  And with this first moment of disappointment, we are confronted 
with the subject’s original moment of desire.   
This forcible differentiation of object and aim whereby the aim must hereafter 
realize itself with a substitute is received with great affective upheaval.  The primordial 
wound is thus responsible for the commencement of developmental processes. The 
excitations emanating from this wound must be bound if the subject is to win the clarity 
that he will need to go forward into the world.  The wound provides the impetus for the 
development of his perceptual and motor faculties whereby he learns to distinguish 
between those objects that promise to deliver him back into the state of pleasure and 
those which do not.  When the wound is healed and the confusion is overcome, this 
confused difference between desired aim and object articulates itself as a distinct 
difference between self and world, thus providing the coordinates of subjectivity and 
objectivity upon which the pleasure principle and the reality principle may do their 
work. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Though it may be true that the death drive has been present from the start of 
psychic life, this truth nevertheless remained for a long period unseen and unarticulated 
within psychoanalytical study.  Though the psychoanalyst can convincingly explain 
almost all behaviors in the course of psychic life on the basis of the libidinal drives and 
the frustrations that they undergo because of their confrontations with external reality, it 
has proven more difficult to identify instances of behavior that positively exemplify the 
death drive in its purity.  If the death drive remained undetected within psychoanalytical 
science for the longest time, then this is because above all it manifested itself as a 
feature of the libido itself—that is, as libidinal insistence. The libidinal instincts thus 
remained the primary point of focus.  The redirection of these instinctual forces was 
understood to follow first of all from an encounter with externalities, which were then 
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internalized within the ego as a repressive agency that functions as an internal avatar of 
reality.    
Psychoanalytic technique thus sought to reconfigure this internal avatar of reality, 
reconciling it to the present and bringing it into greater accordance with reality itself. 
How the analyst initiates this process is by bringing the patient back to the moment of 
the original trauma.  Such a confrontation invariably results in affective disturbances 
that are in many ways indistinguishable from the persistent repetitions of the symptoms 
within daily life.  By appreciating this likeness between the disturbances that arise when 
the memory of the traumatic event is brought before consciousness and those that 
afflict mental life in one’s engagements with the present, the subject can be induced to 
perceive that the latter disturbances do not follow from some present external cause but 
rather from an event within one’s own past.  That is, the subject will realize that the 
genuine cause of his affective disturbances are not to be found among the objects of the 
perceived present, but that the real cause of these affects is rather to be found only in 
his own past. The present objects represent only the pretext for the reassertion of his 
own traumatic memory—which is to say, they are not the efficient cause of his 
disturbances but merely their occasion.28  
To overcome the neurosis the subject must be brought to confront the memory 
of the painful separation that precipitated it. With the hope of teasing the subject’s 
traumatic experiences out of the obscure depths of his unconscious and into the light of 
consciousness, the analyst avails himself of the transference neurosis in order that the 
subject might come to see his symptoms as the expression of a moment of his own past. 
Transference neurosis is of course the principal tool of psychoanalytic technique, 
whereby the patient is forced in some measure to relive the original trauma in his 
engagements with the analyst.  Now, the analyst functions as the representative of the 
external force that initially obstructed access to the pleasures of infantile sexuality.    
There is thus a sense in which, because he is responsible for initiating the 
transference neurosis, the analyst comes to represent the disruptive external agent that 
first separated the subject from his pleasures.  Now, with the help of the analyst, the 
subject may learn to deal with this obstructing externality all over again, working 
through the original trauma and “forcing [the repetitions that manifest as neurotic 
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symptoms] into the channels of memory,” thereby rendering them over to the past 
where they belong.29   
The therapeutic process is thus one of altering the power that a distressing 
memory exerts over consciousness, and this is accomplished by transforming what 
formerly revealed itself as the repetition of symptoms into conscious remembrance.  
Through this process, the senseless repetition of symptoms can now be provided with a 
meaning and traced back to the encounter with some external force that has forcibly 
separated it from the purity of pleasure that characterizes infantile sexuality, issuing in 
the primordial would of psychic life.   
However, this confrontation with the original traumatic memory is but the first 
step along the path to health. Together with revealing the true cause of one’s 
disturbances, psychoanalytic technique seeks to bring about the recommencement of 
the binding effort.  The persistence of neurotic symptoms reveals that the original 
binding effort was not equal to the task of preventing libidinal forces from disturbing 
consciousness. Upon conclusion of the renewed binding effort, it can be hoped that the 
patient will learn to accept the loss, thus rendering the memory over to the past where it 
belongs and liberating consciousness for new engagements with the present.   
Though psychoanalytical technique had seen its share of success in relieving 
neurotic patients of their disturbances—successes that proved that psychoanalytical 
theory was on the right track—it would be the all-too-frequent failures of this technique 
to bring about the desired result that would provoke Freud to rethink libido theory.  
Why were some neurotics so stubbornly resistant to confronting the basis of their 
illness even after the commencement of transference neurosis, and why did others 
revolt so strongly against the termination of treatment?  Why did some war neurotics 
find themselves incapable of giving up their symptoms after the conditions of war were 
brought to a close? And finally, why were depressives incapable of transferring their 
cathexis on to a new object?   
These subjects remained incapable of placing the loss in the past where it 
belongs.  As these failures accumulated and the early optimism diminished, Freud was 
brought to confront the limits in understanding and technique of psychoanalytical 
science.  Until the period of the development of psychoanalytical theory that culminates 
with Beyond the Pleasure Principle, what comes forward most boldly in Freud’s 
                                                
29 Vol. 18, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 19 
 110 
account of the traumatic loss of infantile sexuality is primarily the negativity of this 
experience. Because of this emphasis upon subjective loss vis-à-vis some external power, 
it could be that Freud was unable to detect the active forces at work behind this 
phenomenon within the subject itself.  We may even wonder whether Sigmund-the-
subject’s intuitions with regard to his own mental life—intuitions which were confirmed 
and reinforced through psychoanalytical practice—stood in the way of the development 
of the more properly objective insights of Freud-the-scientist. It is conceivable that he 
was still too influenced by the interpretation of the subjective data of his own inner life 
and that of his patients.  For him, the dimension of loss stood in sharp relief because, 
from the perspective of the subject, this is apparently what plagues mental life first of all.  
This failure of the psychoanalytical theorist to detect the influence of the death 
drive follows from the fact that, whenever the libido passes its cathexis on to a new 
object or activity, the death drive straightaway retreats behind the pleasure principle in 
such a manner that it no longer reveals itself nakedly as a drive for senseless repetition, 
and now the ‘negativity’ that plagues the organism at least to some degree diminishes.  
With the retreat of the death drive behind the pleasure principle, the libidinal drives 
appear to regain their original dominion over the organisms, reinvesting themselves in 
the world and providing it with a sense of direction and meaning.  
What Freud and his team of researchers failed to see above all was that the 
forces of constraint were not only to be found outside of the organism. If the analyst 
fails in his effort to initiate the process by which the trauma is externalized in the past 
where it belongs, this is because there is a drive that inhibits this process by persistently 
exerting itself within the present.  Or rather, to be more precise, the death drive inhibits 
the organism from ever fully giving itself over to the present, anchoring it inescapably in 
the past.  
Most importantly, this past cannot be entirely identified with the original 
traumatic memory itself.  Just as the present external objects provide a pretext for the 
repetition of the neurotic symptom’s emergence, we may also say that the moment in 
the past in which the first agent to separate the child from his pleasurable situation 
provides merely the occasional cause of the organism’s reaction against the forces of 
reality.   The inertial tendency is always already built into the structure of the libido 
from the start. The encounter with the first external obstacle only supplies the occasion 
for it to reveal itself as such.  
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The exteriority against which the libido reacts is therefore not located 
somewhere within space outside of the organism.  It is rather an exteriority that the 
organism carries deep within itself.  These forces have been present within the 
organism from the start as a kind of lifeless exteriority that the subject forever carries 
within itself, which inhibits it from development beyond its primitive state.  Though this 
exteriority resides deep within the organism itself, it is still more radical than anything 
that the organism has encountered in the perceived exteriority of its surrounding 
environment.  In the transference neurosis the analyst may in some way come to 
represent to the patient the external power that originally disrupted the pure pleasure of 
infantile sexuality and thereby provide the opportunity for the subject to once again 
work through the original experience of separation from infantile sexuality. In this way, 
the analyst makes himself available to the patient as a kind of avatar of the one who 
disturbed the easy flow of libido toward its aim.  However, unlike the one who 
provoked the original disruption of infantile sexuality, the exteriority of the forces of 
death can have no specific avatar.  Paul Moyaert strikes the right note with the following 
comment:  
It should be clear that accounting for this shock in terms of the pain of 
separation from the mother is insufficient. Instead, it would be more 
fruitful to understand this shock in terms of the organism being 
burdened by the weight of being. Freud’s death instinct is another word 
for this gravity inherent to life. In melancholy, loss incarnates this 
gravity; for individuals with different dispositions, something else will 
embody that gravity.30  
 
The forces of the death drive are more original than even the libido itself, both with 
regard to the external object to which it was originally attached (the mother) and the 
object (the father) that may have initiated the original trauma by obstructing the path of 
desire.  As such, the subject can no more thwart these forces than it can reverse the 
forces of gravity.  
As we have seen, whatever development the organism undergoes is always 
precipitated by an encounter with a force that acts upon it from without. We may now 
say with conviction that, if the organism were at once guaranteed satisfaction for the 
libido, provided with the necessities of life, and safeguarded against external forces that 
might interfere with this situation, then no development would take place.  In other 
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words, if the organism could somehow remain in a womblike state for the duration of 
its life, it would exhibit no tendency for differentiation or development.  The stable, 
unbroken libidinal connection with the object that provides it with pleasure would be 
quite enough.  This means that the forces of life exhibit no deep spontaneity or power 
of self-transcendence.  They merely aim at self-perpetuation.   
The death drive exerts its gravitational pull in every moment of development, 
forever inhibiting the organism from moving to a more advanced stage.  If there is 
development in nature, this is only because the organism has had to take more 
circuitous routes to its original goal of death.  From the beginning, the libido has been 
subject to the forces of the death drive.  These forces seek only to commence the 
organism back to the state of perfect stability that is to be found in inorganic 
materiality.31   The persistence of life can be attributed to the fact that the libido 
continues to generate forces which, in accordance with the death drive, must then 
simply be “lived off.”32  The tenacity of life follows not from some deep desire for 
development and differentiation but merely from the fact that the forces of life continue 
to regenerate themselves.   
Still, this would appear to leave unanswered the question of why it is that the life 
instincts came to oppose the return to inorganic matter to begin with.  If the life 
instincts are not by nature opposed to the return to inorganic matter, then how may we 
explain the durability and self-insistence of life?  This is a question that asks after the 
very nature of life.  For his part, Freud refuses to speculate on this difficulty, opting 
instead for a kind of positivistic modesty:  “The attributes of life were at some time 
evoked in inanimate matter by the action of a force of whose nature we can form no 
conception.”33  All that can be said is that, at some point in the history of the earth, 
inorganic matter underwent some chemical transformation whereby it became organic, 
and that this transformation was above all responsible for life’s capacity for self-
perpetuation and regeneration.  
The effect of the death drive is first of all to compel the libido to maintain its 
current direction. Recalling our comparison between the flow of libidinal forces and 
that of the river toward the sea, the death drive is no more interested in serving the 
secondary processes of the ego according to which the pleasure principle maintains 
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dominion over mental life than gravity is interested in serving the purposes of the 
construction of the dam.  Nevertheless, just as the dam itself depends of the forces of 
gravity in order to accomplish the function of creating a reservoir which can be released 
according to man’s purposes, so also does the pleasure principle rely upon the death 
drive to maintain the downward directionality of libidinal forces, only now according to 
the configurations within the ego that have been accomplished through binding.   
By this comparison we have arrived at some understanding of what Freud 
means when he claims that the death drive does not work in the service of the pleasure 
principle.  Rather, the pleasure principle, “whose business it is to free the mental 
apparatus entirely from excitation,” works according to the pressures that are exerted by 
the death drive.34  But this can only take place once the bindings have been constructed.  
If the death drive can sometimes undermine the reestablishment of the dominion 
pleasure principle over mental life, this is because the inertial force does not only exert 
itself over the libido itself, but also over the effort to construct the bindings.  The death 
drive is thus responsible for the original orientation of libido and for the laboriousness 
of the effort to construct the bindings. 
We are now in a position to answer the question of how the death drive can be 
both responsible for the organism’s inability to give up its insistence upon of the aim of 
pleasure while at the same time undermining the achievement of this aim through the 
reestablishment of the pleasure principle.  Just as the death drive is responsible for the 
attachment to the repetitions of pleasure within the original situation, now, in the 
process of binding the flood of excitations issuing from the libido, it manifests itself 
again as the repetition of the trauma of separation.  Or, to put this slightly differently, 
just as the subject was before fixated and held up by the pleasures of infantile sexuality, 
now it gets held up within the process of binding.   
 The subject desires a return to the lost purity of infantile sexuality because it 
represents that moment in the course of life that approximates the perfect stability of 
death.  If the subject cannot give up the desire that has generated his neurosis, this is 
not only the result of “a weak point in the sexual function,” but because there is 
something at the core of what he is that has reacted against the life from the very start.  
In Freud’s view, this dark exteriority that reacts against time, consciousness and 
becoming dwells deep within us all.  When Freud says that “we are all ill—that is, 
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neurotic,” this is because there is no way for us to finally give up the desire for a return 
to the pleasure of infantile sexuality and ultimately to death itself.35  The most that can 
be done by the analyst is to attempt to hide the death drive as much as possible behind 
the pleasure principle, with the hope of inducing this naked force of senseless repetition 
to retreat behind some of mode of living that promises pleasure for consciousness.  At 
least with this, the subject can learn to enjoy his slow return to death.   
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What Does the Master Really Want? Development 
and Structure in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hegel takes the abolition of slavery to be a sign of historical progress and detects 
in the efforts for liberation of slave classes the outlines of the universal movement of 
historical struggle toward freedom. Among the chief inhibitors of historical progress is 
the slave’s inclination to misinterpret his own condition, not at the level of the ideas of 
freedom, dignity and justice—since for Hegel these genuinely represent the aim of the 
slave and, through him, the aim of history itself—but this misinterpretation occurs at the 
affective level. It is fear for his natural life that immanently orients the slave’s conduct, 
and as such he is inclined to misconstrue the broader meaning of his struggles with the 
master. While the slave believes that his struggles amount to a simple effort to release 
his own bodily self from a situation in which his natural life is threatened, the genuine 
meaning of these struggles, when seen from the speculative position of the dialectical 
philosopher, relates not to the preservation of the slave’s bodily self but to the 
realization of a dignified future in which slavery and irrational domination is finally 
abolished.1 Nonetheless, the slave’s susceptibility to his own fear for his natural life 
renders him vulnerable to the imposition of the master’s order. It is precisely this 
susceptibility to fear that maintains him in his position of slave and as an object within 
this order. The slave must realize that what is most essential is a future in which he is 
                                                
1  See §178-196.  G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit. Edited by J.N. Findlay. 
Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. From here onwards, 
references will be abbreviated with PS. 
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free.  When he does, he will be unafraid to engage the master in mortal struggle and will 
release himself from his yoke, whether in freedom or death.2   
 
1. Is the Satisfaction of the Master Sensuous or Social? 
 
In his Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Alexander Kojève also 
emphasizes the role that risking one’s natural life plays in this deadly game of 
recognition:  
Man’s humanity comes to light only in risking life to satisfy his human 
Desire—that is, his Desire directed toward another Desire […] To desire 
the Desire of another is in the final analysis to desire that the value that I 
am or that I ‘represent’ be the value desired by the other:  I want him to 
recognize my value as his value.  I want him to ‘recognize me as an 
autonomous value.  In other words, all human, anthropogenetic desire—
the desire that generates Self-consciousness, the human reality—is, finally, 
a function of the desire for ‘recognition.’ To speak of the ‘origin’ of self-
consciousness is necessarily to speak of a fight to the death for 
‘recognition’.3   
 
Man differs from animal in the following way: he is willing to risk himself for something 
more than life alone.  In order for the slave to be recognized as something beyond a 
mere animal, he must refuse to submit himself to the domination of the master, thus 
risking his natural life for the sake of his Desire.  But this refusal is fraught with danger.  
The master promises destruction to those of his subjects who refuse to obey his 
commands. As long as he is captivated by his fear of destruction, the slave will never 
stand and fight, and so he will never gain the recognition or the respect of the master. 
For this recognition, the slave must conquer his fear of death.  In the preface to The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel offers this consolation against this fear:  
Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the 
most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest 
strength.  Lacking strength, Beauty hates the understanding for asking of 
her what it cannot do.  But the life of spirit is not the life that shrinks 
from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life 
                                                
2 Dennis Schmidt also examines the obstacles to historical progress in “Why is Spirit Such a 
Slow Learner?” in terms of the master’s affective captivations with satisfaction and the slave’s 
with his fear of death. Research in Phenomenology 32, 2002.   
3 Kojève, A. (1980). Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. (A. Bloom, Ed., & J. H. Nichols, Trans.) Cornell: Cornell University Press. p. 7 
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that endures it and maintains itself in it.  It wins its truth only when, in 
utter dismemberment, it finds itself.4 
 
Because it is irreducible to the individual living thing, spirit forever recovers and 
reorients itself in the wake of material destruction. As such, the physical death of the 
slave in his individual struggle does not imply the end of history’s drive toward freedom. 
The slave’s death is just one instant in this epic struggle, and whatever dignity this death 
has derives from the way in which he instantiated a moment of the movement of spirit 
in his struggle for freedom. 
To understand the master’s obliviousness to spirit, can we not simply invert the 
immediate condition of the slave? One is trapped by the finite desire to escape the whip, 
the other by the finite satisfactions that are secured by wielding it. In the case of the 
master, rather than being affected by fear and deprivation, the captivation occurs at the 
level of the satisfactions he enjoys from being a member of the prevailing order. Each is 
held fast by confusions that issue from his position relative to the other and, as such, 
each is largely blind to the infinite movement of spirit. The master’s satisfaction explains 
his insistence upon his own finite mediation of the present, and why he has little interest 
in persevering to the absolute end in which he would be finally reconciled with the slave. 
In other words, it is just this insistent repetition of this selfsame, singular mediation 
upon the present that precludes the future unfolding of spirit's possibilities.  It is 
because of this that for the better part of history ‘freedom’ for one has meant death or 
subjection for the other.  
As long as both master and slave are held fast by the sensuous particularities of 
natural consciousness—the slave by his fear for its destruction and the master by his 
pleasure in its satisfactions—the advance of spirit in which the subject overcomes 
alienation and unifies with itself cannot take place, and alienation and suffering will 
persist.  Given as they both are to immediate affect and desire, they are devoid of a 
genuine sense of futurity.  Their hopes do not extend beyond the promises or 
possibilities of the day, either to find sensuous satisfaction in it or simply to survive it, 
and they have not learned to risk themselves for anything more than this.  In the 
dialectic we find the movement by which spirit learns to hope for something more—
namely, a future return to itself in the fullness of self-consciousness and freedom which 
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marks a final overcoming of alienation and suffering.  And because risking oneself for 
this freedom engenders real progress toward it, this is no idle hope.  
With regard to the master’s satisfaction, our definition remains ambiguous, and 
would appear to admit of two distinct articulations.  The first articulation would concern 
social status—that kind of satisfaction that follows simply from being acknowledged as 
master.  The second articulation would concern our bodily existence—a kind of feeling 
of animal life.  Which of these better describes the precise nature of the master’s 
satisfaction that prevents him from recognizing the dignity of the slave? Is it the kind of 
satisfaction that stems from being unilaterally recognized by the slave as his master, or is 
it the sensuous or animal satisfactions of the body, or is it perhaps some harmful alloy 
of the two?  It is clear where Kojève stands on this question. For him, the master’s 
satisfactions follow primarily from the recognition that he is the master: 
Without [a] fight to the death for pure prestige, there would never have 
been human beings on earth.  Indeed, the human being is formed only 
in terms of a Desire directed toward another Desire, that is—finally—in 
terms of a desire for recognition.  Therefore, the human being can be 
formed only if at least two of these Desires confront each other.  Each of 
the two beings endowed with such a Desire is ready to go all the way in 
pursuit of its satisfaction; that is, is ready to risk its life—and consequently 
to put the life of the other in danger—in order to be “recognized” by the 
other, to impose itself on the other as the supreme value; accordingly, 
their meeting can only be a fight to the death.   
[…] 
One must fear the other, must give in to the other, must refuse to risk 
his life for the satisfaction of his desire for ‘recognition.’  He must give 
up his desire and satisfy the desire of the other: he must ‘recognize’ the 
other without being ‘recognized’ by him. Now, ‘to recognize’ him thus is 
‘to recognize’ him as his Master and to recognize himself and to be 
recognized as the Master’s Slave.5   
 
In Kojève’s view, the master wants to be loved without loving, to be satisfied without 
satisfying, and he threatens to take the life of the slave for the sake of his desire for 
unilateral recognition. As brilliant as it is, we have to wonder whether this exposition 
doesn’t miss something important about Hegel’s image of the master.  Though I do not 
want to deny that, for Hegel, recognition is an essential element in understanding why 
the master threatens the life of the slave, to say that he is above all driven by “the 
prestige of recognition” is, in my view, to misinterpret the confused consciousness of the 
master—a confusion wherein it mistakes a consciousness or sentiment of the sensuous 
                                                
5 Kojève, 1980, pp. 7-8 
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particularity of its own finite body for self-consciousness and thereby confuses animal 
desire with properly Human Desire, bodily satisfaction with the realization of genuine 
freedom. In the above passage, Kojève offers a kind of ontological account of the 
relationship between the master and the slave, as if both master and slave are from the 
beginning oriented primarily by the desire for recognition from one another at the level 
of individual self-consciousness.  It is as if the master is simply the winner of a game for 
which both the stakes and the rules are apparent to all players at the outset.  In 
foregrounding this ontological account, there is a danger of obscuring the dynamic 
unfolding of spirit’s development that culminates in the demand for mutual recognition, 
thereby leaping past these developments according to which the problem of recognition 
first articulates itself in historical struggle. Furthermore, we must consider whether this 
tendency to leap beyond the specificities of the historical struggle between master and 
slave can be found in the Phenomenology itself—whether Hegel also doesn’t have a 
tendency to vacillate between the ontological and the dialectical accounts of this 
relationship, thus attributing to the master a desire for recognition that only first fully 
articulates itself in the slave.  
 
2. The Mastery of Sense Certainty 
 
In the chapter entitled ‘Self-Consciousness’, Hegel has this to say about the 
movement of synthesis that characterizes it: 
Consciousness, as self-consciousness, has a double object:  one is the 
immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception, which however 
for self-consciousness has the character of a negative; and the second, viz. 
itself, which is the true essence, and is present in the first instance only 
as opposed to the first object. In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits 
itself as the movement in which the antithesis is removed, and the 
identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for it. 6 
 
What prevents the overcoming of the antithetical relation between the immediate 
objects of sense-certainty and perception, and consciousness’ unity with itself in which 
the first moment is synthesized within the second?  What holds consciousness fast in 
this opposition? Something obstructs this movement, but what is it?  It can only be 
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something within this immediacy that captivates consciousness, thus preventing it from 
returning into itself as genuine self-consciousness.  
To answer these questions, let us examine for a moment the first figure of 
immediate knowing which is, as Hyppolite argues, “decisive for the interpretation of 
[Hegel’s] philosophy.”—that of sense-certainty. 7  Here we find a form of natural 
consciousness that involves an immediate apprehending and appropriation [Auffassen] 
of the objects that present themselves to consciousness.  This, as Hegel announces, is “a 
knowledge of the immediate or of what simply is” and it is supposed to offer the clearest 
picture of the object.8  Because of the way that sense-certainty seizes on the object itself, 
it would appear that this is the richest kind of knowledge. That is to say, its richness 
relates to the way that it is untarnished by negativity—a negativity which could only 
diminish its shining, compelling power, weaken its certainty, and introduce the 
possibility of a questioning disposition with regard to the object.  However, against a 
straightforwardly empiricist view of knowledge which holds that, because of its richness 
and pure positivity, sense-certainty represents the truest form of knowledge, Hegel 
counters that it is precisely this very richness and certainty that disposes us settle into the 
inverted viewpoint of natural consciousness, which is a primitive form of consciousness 
in which the universal miscarries into either a falsely essentialized ‘I’ or ‘thing.’  Far 
from making it more compelling, the very certainty of sense-certainty, which follows 
from the force and richness of the immediate, actually renders it poor in truth.  What is 
it, after all, that makes the immediate so rich if not a refusal to confront its deficiencies?  
This attitude of pure positivity and certainty forecloses on further interrogation, and 
arrests the effort to discover a truth beyond sensuous immediacy.  It is a sensuous 
richness that is won at the expense of spiritual poverty.   
In the moment of sense-certainty, consciousness is reduced to a relation 
between a singular ‘thing’ and a singular ‘I.’ And this ‘I’ is characterized not by its 
genuine desire for the universal—a desire that issues in an unrelenting effort to pass 
beyond the particularities of sensuous life toward a higher, more inclusive synthesis—but 
rather by the way that it founders in the present ‘richness’ of the immediate.   
I, this particular I, am certain of this particular thing, not because I, qua 
consciousness, in knowing it have developed myself or thought about it 
in various ways; and also not because the thing of which I am certain, in 
                                                
7 Hyppolite, J. (1997). Logic and Existence. (D. J. Schmidt, Ed., & L. L. Sen, Trans.) Albany: 
State University of New York Press. p. 15 
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virtue of a host of distinct qualities, would be in its own self a rich 
complex of connections, or related in various ways to other things.  
Neither of these has anything to do with the truth of sense-certainty:  
here neither I nor the thing has the significance of a complex process of 
mediation…On the contrary, the thing is, and it is, merely because it is.  
It is; this is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and this pure being, 
or this simple immediacy, constitutes its truth.9 
 
However, Hegel tells us the being of both the ‘the thing’ and the ‘I’ is not such a simple 
matter. Sense-certainty is not immediacy itself, but an instance of immediacy that 
already always bifurcates along two lines—the ‘thing’ and the ‘I’, the object and the 
subject—the pursuit of which leads us further and further down a path of dialectical 
mediation that has them ceaselessly crossing over and intersecting one another until 
they finally converge.  In other words, this bifurcation already marks the first primitive 
mediation between object and subject, between ‘this’ object and ‘this’ I, and introduces 
the question of the being of the ‘this’.  However simple and direct this relation might 
seem, Hegel undertakes to demonstrate that within it we find a kind of opening for self-
conscious reflection that goes as much beyond immediacy toward self-transcendence as 
it does beyond the ‘this’ toward their others both in space and in time.  (In this regard, 
like Heidegger and Bergson, Hegel can be seen to commence a critique of presence in 
which an absence or negativity makes an unremitting appeal to the ‘now’ and the ‘here.’)  
Consciousness never simply registers or represents its objects in the manner of a 
mirror of immediate presence. It is, in its relations to its objects, forever haunted by a 
hidden conflict—there is always an unseen scratch in the tain of immediate 
consciousness.  The rich and powerful presence of the immediate conceals an 
unexamined mediation in which the “sheer being of the thing” that is present in sense-
certainty is held back from the interrogatory movement of dialectical becoming and a 
possible future that goes together with it.  This uninterrogated mediation is always my 
own contribution, but to the degree that I refuse to submit the being of sense-certainty 
to dialectical examination, I will never understand this fact.  The present ‘I’ has selected 
from the flow of becoming what is relevant for its own experience, and it has done this 
not only at the expense of the remainder, but also at the expense of its own future.  
When the painstaking labor of the negative is undertaken, it can be seen that the 
‘thisness’ of sense-certainty depends entirely upon a more or less arbitrary exclusion of 
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what is not ‘this’—an exclusionary act which is performed both with regard to the time of 
the this (the ‘now’) and the location of the this within space (the ‘here’).    
In view of this problem of localizing the truth of sense-certainty in the ‘sheer 
being of the thing,’ can we not simply transfer the certainty of sense-certainty from the 
object to the ‘I’? Now it is the ‘I’ that appears as the basis of the truth of sense-certainty.  
Shifting the basis of certainty from object to I implies that 
the object, which was [beforehand] supposed to be the essential element 
in sense-certainty, is now the unessential element; for the universal 
which the object has come to be is no longer what the object was 
supposed essentially to be for sense-certainty.  On the contrary, the 
certainty is now to be found in the opposite element, viz. in knowing, 
which previously was the unessential element.  Its truth is in the object as 
my object, or in its being mine [Meinen]; it is, because I know it.10  
 
But this proves no more helpful than the former explanation.  The whole labor must 
commence again, the problem being merely displaced from the object to the I—that is, 
whereas before the difficulty was localized on the side of the object, now it reasserts 
itself on the side of the I.   The truth of the immediate, individual I with regard to the 
object springs merely from that fact that ‘I’ assert that the object is ‘this’ rather than ‘that’, 
‘now’ rather than ‘then.’ One’s certainty does not follow from the careful development 
of an understanding of the rich complex of connections and relations to other things, 
but from merely pronouncing oneself to be right, and either evading any awkward 
questions about the basis of this certainty or threatening those who ask them.  Now 
every appeal from another for an answer to the question of ‘Why?’ can only end in 
their disappointment or, at best, with the paternalistic declaration, ‘it is so because I said 
so.’  Nevertheless, this truth equally dissolves when it is seen that we can no more say 
what this ‘I’ is than what the thing is.  
  In this regard, sense-certainty resembles a kind of shell game.  In the first 
moment of the game, the universal and the certainty that follows from it is believed to 
reside with the object. But as this shell is lifted, the universality that is supposed to be in 
the immediate object is not there, and now one straightaway shifts the certainty over to 
the other shell, that of the ‘I.’ The shells are again shuffled, and because the player 
never asks to see under all of the shells at once, the whole game recommences in 
endless repetition, without ever arriving at a final resolution.  If the player demanded to 
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see under the shells, he would discover that there is nothing there, that the universality 
that he searches for resides neither in the immediate object nor the immediate ‘I,’ and 
that the whole game is really just an elaborate con.  But why, if not because he is afraid 
to lose his wager, does the player decline to ask to see under all of the shells at once?  If 
the game goes on indefinitely, he stands to lose nothing.  But he also does not gain 
anything—indeed; he misses the opportunity to exit the game.  If the game concluded, in 
despair he would walk away with nothing.  But since this nothing is essential to realizing 
his freedom, this would prove to be a gift.  
One can no more find essential being behind or within the immediate ‘I’ than 
one can find it behind the immediate ‘object.’  In both cases, their essence always slips 
into their others and pervades conscious experience broadly.11  Hegel concludes his 
examination of sense-certainty with a rather obscure passage.  In it Hegel conveys with 
wry humor the way in which the use or consumption of an object amounts to its 
negation:  
We can tell those who assert the truth and certainty of the reality of 
sense-objects that they should go back to the most elementary school of 
wisdom, viz. the ancient Eleusinian Mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus, 
and that they have still to learn the secret meaning of the eating of bread 
and the drinking of wine.  For he who is initiated into these Mysteries 
not only comes to doubt the being of sensuous things, but to despair of 
it; in part he brings about the nothingness of such things himself in 
dealing with them, and in part he sees them reduce themselves to 
nothingness.  Even the animals…do not just stand idly in front of the 
sensuous thing as if these possessed intrinsic being, but, despairing of 
their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness, they fall to 
without ceremony and eat them up.12 
 
Like the rest of nature, man’s dealings with the things of sense-certainty are largely 
utilitarian.  In his use of material beings, man need not possess some profound 
knowledge of their being in order to discover their nothingness.  He must simply 
consume them.  And so, it is not only in consciousness as such that we pass beyond the 
being of the This toward their others, but also in our practical involvements with the 
natural world.  
                                                
11 ‘The Here pointed out, to which I hold fast, is similarly a this Here which, in fact, is not this 
Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and Left…What is pointed out, 
held fast, and abides, is a negative this, which is negative only when the Heres are taken as they 
should be, but in being so taken, they supersede themselves; what abides is a simple complex 
of many Heres.’ PS §108    
12 PS §109 
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In our exploration of sense-certainty we have discovered that, while it appears at 
first blush to be a very simple thing that is easily understood, it is really a very strange 
thing that, to borrow a phrase from Marx, “abound[s] in metaphysical subtleties and 
theological niceties.” Marx would no doubt find inspiration in this critique of sense-
certainty for his own account of ‘commodity fetishism.’  In both Hegel and Marx’s view, 
the thing is something to be used and consumed by man—it is decidedly not something 
before which we should stand in awe as though it were the manifestation of essential or 
intrinsic being.  When taken as it should be, this object exists only as a negative; that is, 
it exists as something which possesses no value or meaning beyond its use by and for 
man.  Just as “those who assert the truth and certainty of the reality of sense-
objects…have still to learn the secret meaning of the eating of bread and the drinking of 
wine,” so too must those who assert the objective value of the commodity (re-)learn the 
primary instrumental value of the object with regard to its social use.13  Furthermore, 
only by forgetting or ignoring the mediation of human labor according to which the 
commodity was produced, does it emerge as an object of value in itself.  The double 
concealment of the essentially social movement of creation and use—which is always an 
act that involves transferring a fundamentally social need over to an fetishized object—is 
the condition for the translation of the singular value of this object into a general or 
universal system of valuation (money).  The relation between the eye that sees and the 
object seen is undoubtedly a relation between physical things, but an intrinsic meaning 
and value is never to be found among these present physical properties.  The eye itself 
never simply sees positive, intrinsic meaning or value.  Only man can apprehend this 
value, and this must always involve going beyond the thing toward the other, whether in 
a movement mystification, such as we find in sense-certainty, or in genuine 
understanding of the rich complex of connections between the this and its others that 
begins with perception and culminates in understanding.    
These observations become even more interesting when we realize just who 
Hegel’s principle antagonist is in these sections on sense-certainty—namely, John Locke, 
the father of modern liberalism.  Both here in the early moments of the 
Phenomenology and also in The Philosophy of Right (§34 – §70), though he never 
refers to him by name, Locke’s philosophy is plainly the target of Hegel’s attack, not 
only at the ontological and epistemological levels, but also at that of the political.   Now 
                                                
13 Marx, K. (1992). Early Writings. (R. Livingstone, & G. Benton, Trans.) New York City: 
Penguin Books. p. 42 
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is not the time to commence a detailed discussion the latter, but in light of what we have 
discovered regarding sense-certainty, it is not difficult to see the implications of one for 
the other.  The structure of sense-knowledge mirrors that of property relations as 
liberalism understands them.  The ‘thing’ is immediately available for possession by the 
‘I.’ Furthermore, both the ‘thing’ and the ‘I’ are endowed with essential being, and their 
relatedness functions merely augment and enrich one another.14   Whereas Locke 
believes that the ‘I’ is already fully formed in the state of nature and has only to take 
possession of what is immediately available to it in sense-certainty, Hegel argues not 
only that this ‘I’ is far from a natural endowment that arrives on the scene fully 
constituted, but also that the thing of sense-certainty always already exhibits mediation. 
Both subject and object must pass through a movement of development, and this 
implies an intimate involvement with its others in and through language.15  
These discussions have driven home the irreducibly social character of the 
‘This,’ which, for Hegel, has always to be understood according to the fundamentally 
linguistic dimension of man—a dimension that accords him nothing less than a “divine 
nature.”16  If the essence of the sensuous particularity of the ‘this’ can never truly be 
represented (or owned by the individual), every effort to do so must involve a 
perversion of language which makes of it something that it is not. Far from representing 
genuine essences, an attempt is made to compel language to represent only what is 
inessential (the particular ‘I’ or the particular ‘object’), and as such it is reduced to the 
                                                
14 With this, we find ourselves better equipped to understand Marx’s descriptions of the 
movement by which value is transferred from the fetishized object to the owner of the object, 
and the way that the individual augments deficiencies in his own being by means of money, 
possessions and property:  “The stronger the power of my money, the stronger am I.  The 
properties of money are my, the possessor's, properties and essential powers.  Therefore, what 
I am and what I can do is by no means determined by my individuality.  I am ugly, but I can 
buy the most beautiful woman.  Which means to say that I am not ugly, for the effect of 
ugliness, its repelling power, is destroyed by money.  As an individual, I am lame, but money 
procures me 24 legs.  Consequently, I am not lame.  I am a wicked, dishonest, unscrupulous 
and stupid individual, but money is respected, and so also is its owner.  Money is the highest 
good, and consequently its owner is also good.  Moreover, money spares me the trouble of 
being dishonest, and I am therefore presumed to be honest.  I am mindless, but if money is the 
true mind of all things, how can its owner be mindless?  What is more, he can buy clever 
people for himself, and is not he who has the power over clever people cleverer than them?  
Through money, I can have anything the human heart desires.  Do I not possess all human 
abilities? Does not money therefore transform all my incapacities into their opposite?” (Marx, 
Early Writings, 1992, p. 377) 
15 Thomas, P. (2004). Property's Properties: From Hegel to Locke. Representations (84), 30 - 
43. 
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status of an instrument.  Nevertheless, language never really cooperates in this 
movement of its own perversion. Hegel asserts that “the sensuous this that is meant 
cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to that which is 
inherently universal.”17  Every effort to communicate the particular ‘this’ can only but 
turn against itself.  Hence, even in the mode of sense-certainty, our propositions betray 
a truthfulness that is inherent to language itself—a truthfulness to which we are 
inattentive when we attempt to restrict the ‘This’ of sense-certainty to the particular 
‘here’ and ‘now’ by excluding their others.  Whatever we really mean to say in sense-
certainty does not get said, and by attempting to say it, we have already refuted what we 
mean.  In truth, the ‘this’ always announces the ‘universal This,’ or ‘Being in general,’ 
and is irreducible to the distinct sensuous presence to which we ‘envisage’ or believe 
ourselves to refer.18   
When the negative that is hidden within is permitted to disturb sense-knowledge, 
the certainty of its object begins to evaporate.  And as it discovers that what it is can no 
more be found in the object than in the ‘I,’ its true essence begins to come forward. 
This essence is in both as a primordial relatedness between them that can be realized in 
and through language alone, which always involves not only the ‘I’ but also the ‘they’. 
Opening oneself up to the negative implies acknowledging that the universal is 
announced in every utterance, and that I do not have the power to designate the now or 
the here according to my own impulse or whim.  Each of these terms lends itself to its 
others.  Ever designation depends upon the rich complex of connections with others 
that are not themselves designated. Whenever I merely use language for my own selfish 
purposes, I have bastardized it and fundamentally misunderstood its true nature.  
Rather, to borrow a Heideggerian formulation, language is the house of the universal, 
and whenever I enter there, I lose my identity as a particular ‘I,’ and must relinquish my 
sensuous particularity in favor of what dwells there.  More precisely, when I enter there, 
rather than losing my individual identity and sensuous particularity, I am brought to 
realize that I never really had them to begin with, that they belong among of the divers 
ephemera and delusions of natural consciousness.     
Sense-certainty exemplifies the initial stages of natural consciousness; it at once 
exhibits a tendency for dialectical bifurcation and also a conflicting tendency for 
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inhibiting the process of bifurcation and foundering in the present here and now.  In its 
first moments, dialectical interplay involves a proliferation of differences between object 
and subject, and it is just such an interplay that makes learning from one’s experience 
possible.  Without this infinite dance of displacements within which ‘subject’ and 
‘object,’ ‘I’ and ‘thing,’ ‘here’ and ‘there,’ ‘now’ and ‘then’ constantly give way to one 
another, the experience of the object is condemned to stagnation and stupidity.   Sense-
certainty, because it arrests this dance, is just such a stupidity.   
Now we can begin to understand how the master comes to believe that he alone 
rises to the level of essential being.  As one in whom the confusions of natural 
consciousness continue to hold sway, the confrontation with the negativity in himself 
never happens.  And because he believes that he can augment any deficiencies in his 
own being merely by taking possession of the other that is immediately available to him, 
the master is encouraged in this effort.  Every dialectical displacement between ‘I’ and 
‘other,’ here and now, is recaptured and arrested under the sign of the master’s ‘I.’ The 
same is true for the slave—only now the displacements are recaptured under the sign of 
the other ‘I’ that is the master’s. But the belief that the master is the essential being is 
wrong: indeed, there is no essential being (except, of course, that which can be found in 
the reflected unity of spirit).  Rather, what is essential is the infinite becoming of self-
consciousness: “Essence is infinity as the supersession of all distinctions, the pure 
movement of axial rotation, its self repose being an absolutely restless infinity.”19  In the 
master, we have someone who, because he refuses to confront the negativity in himself, 
also refuses this movement of supersession.  And, if in coming to suspect that the being 
of the master is really a kind of shell game and a confidence trick, the slave confronts 
the master with this negativity, he is either ignored or threatened.  In order to realize 
true essence, both the master and the slave must realize that he who has claimed 
essential being is not this at all.  He too must pass beyond the contingent particularities 
of sensuous immediacy.   
We are brought before the questions with which we began:  What is it that 
inhibits the movement according to which the master passes beyond the sensuous 
immediacy of life?  Why does the master appear to refuse to confront the negativity in 
his own being? We have already suggested a name for what produces this abortive 
movement of the subject—bodily satisfaction.  It is true that with this suggestion we have 
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ventured a hypothesis that takes us beyond the strictest kind of textual analysis.  
Nowhere within The Phenomenology of Spirit does Hegel make the explicit claim that 
it is ‘bodily satisfaction’ which inhibits the master from coming to confront his own 
negativity.  As we have seen, he does speak of the confusions of sensuous immediacy in 
terms of sense-certainty, but never does he go so far as to name the bodily cause of 
these confusions.  Just as Hegel hesitates to name the “non-actuality” of death in §32 of 
the Preface (and yet he does name it), so is he also reluctant to name this non-actuality 
of sensuous particularity that obstructs the master’s becoming, electing instead to 
highlight its dialectical confusions.  The reason for Hegel’s reluctance is clear.  If, as 
Hegel claims, the universal is announced in every utterance, how can we bend language 
to the task of naming a tendency that issues only in singularities?  This tendency is 
excluded from the process of historical development, and forms a residue of prehistory 
that continues to insist upon itself in the present.  Nevertheless, can we venture a name 
for this non-actuality which issues in the insistence with which the master holds to his 
confusions? Hegel comes so close to naming it himself in the term “sensuous 
immediacy.” And what is another name for this if not sensuous feeling?  As Kant would 
say in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, when distinguishing it from the higher 
form of feeling that is found in the judgment of taste, this is a feeling that is devoid of 
“universal validity,” a “mere sensory taste” [bloßen Sinnegeschmacks]. 20    In the 
master’s case, it is nothing more than an exciting feeling of sensuous pleasure vis-à-vis 
the slave/object.  
We have already mentioned the way that, for the slave, what looms largest is the 
menacing presence of a master who threatens to take his (individual) life.  For the 
master, it is the inverted satisfaction in his situation vis-à-vis the slave/object.  Both are 
characterized by their state of natural consciousness.  “Appearing immediately on the 
scene, they are for one another like ordinary objects, independent shapes, individuals 
submerged in the being of Life.”21  As it stands, each produces in the other a tendency 
to reinscribe him/herself in immediacy.  Whereas when the slave sees the master, he 
gets carried away with his immediate fear for his natural life, the master sees in the slave 
only a source of immediate satisfaction for himself. In both cases, this non-actuality of 
affective immediacy has contaminated the relation with the concrete perceived object, 
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disallowing it to pass beyond toward its others.  Their mode of immediacy has yet to fall 
entirely under the sign of the negative, and continues to provide the basis for one’s 
sense of oneself, however illusory and transitory this basis might be.  To realize this, the 
consciousness of each must pass through a moment of pure negativity with regard to the 
immediate objects of sense-certainty—this is the condition for its return to itself for-itself 
as a form of Desire that transcends the affective contamination of consciousness, and 
the origin of the sense of futurity beyond the sensuous immediacy of nature. For this 
experience of the independence of the object to happen, consciousness must suffer its 
alienation or separation from it—an experience that the master, by virtue of his position 
as mastery, never really undergoes.   
This experience of pure estrangement from material reality is typified in the 
situation of the slave.  Indeed, the master plays an essential role in creating this situation, 
unwittingly fulfilling the condition for the slave’s realization of what he is essentially.  
Because of his attachment to the concrete thing of sense-certainty, the master, in his 
sensuous self-insistence, enforces a separation between the slave’s consciousness and 
the object by taking it for himself.  Along with the rest of nature, he uses the slave and 
the products of his labor for his own sensuous enjoyment.  Whereas the master finds in 
the immediate object the positive basis for his feeling of himself, because this object 
remains out of reach and unavailable to the slave as a basis for his enjoyment and his 
feeling of self, the slave finds in the very same object only a moment of the negative. 
The latter is disallowed from finding satisfaction in the world and, in thus finding it to 
be devoid both of love and of pleasure; he is ultimately driven back into his self-
consciousness where he discovers himself as pure desire.  Only now does life point to 
something beyond itself.  Only now the slave realizes that he is more than a living thing.  
And with this, the slave finds the courage to overcome his fear of losing what the master 
threatened to take from him—namely, his own natural life.   
 
3. Self-Consciousness and the Process of Life 
 
The process of life is the movement of separation from the inorganic, in which 
there is a solidification of the immediate fluidity of becoming into independent shapes, 
or being in-itself.  The latter  
comes forward in antithesis to the universal substance, disowns this fluid 
continuity with it and asserts that it is not dissolved in this universal 
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element, but on the contrary preserves itself by separating itself from this 
its inorganic nature, and by consuming it.  Life in the universal fluid 
medium, a passive separating out of the shapes or becomes Life as a 
process.  The simple universal fluid medium is the in-itself, and the 
difference of the shapes is the other.  But this fluid medium becomes 
the other through this difference; for now it is for the difference which 
exists in and for itself, and consequently is the ceaseless movement by 
which this passive medium is consumed:  Life is a living thing .22  
 
In this description of the way that the independent shape passively distinguishes itself 
from the fluid medium and emerges as being in-itself, then holds itself apart from this 
differential flux and, wheeling round on it, consumes or destroys it in order to preserve 
and satisfy itself, do we not notice the broad formal outlines of the life of the master, 
only in this case raised to a higher level of magnitude and made reactive?  Both master 
and slave are, of course, living things.  Both must consume to survive.  As organisms, 
both are the product of this movement of separation from a fluid continuity.  But unlike 
the slave, precisely because the master already finds sensuous pleasure in his mode of 
separation, he remains still too riveted to the specific shapes of his own life.  For this 
reason, he consumes the element out of which he has emerged without acknowledging 
that it is universal or that it represents the basis of not only his own life but also of life 
itself, of which he is merely a moment.  “Life consists rather in being the self-developing 
whole which dissolves its development and in this movement simply preserves itself.”23   
But in Hegel’s view, this active insistence upon the specific shape marks a reaction 
against the process of life, since this process is both the movement of separation into 
distinct moments of being in-itself as living things, and the dissolution of these distinct 
moments in favor of new ones which are themselves more inclusive with regard to the 
universal element out of which they initially emerged, or being for-itself.  
This individual maintains himself at the expense of this universal.  He has 
withdrawn himself from the fluid unity of becoming, has established himself as a 
specific thing distinct from this flow, and now he remains insistent upon this specificity.  
Because he refuses the movement of return to the unity of the original simple substance 
and because of the way that he is fixated on the specific shapes of life as he knows it, his 
consciousness remains undeveloped.  Only in the movement of return is this original 
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unity—a unity which was, before the movement of withdrawal, merely the confused 
immediacy of becoming—only then is it transformed into a reflected unity.    
Contrasted with that immediate unity, or that unity expressed as a 
[mere] being, this second [unity] is the universal unity which contains all 
these moments as superseded within itself.  It is the simple genus which, 
in the movement of Life itself, does not exist for itself qua this simple 
determination; on the contrary, in this result, Life points to something 
other than itself, viz. to consciousness, for which Life exists as this unity, 
or as genus.24 
 
The genus of life is distinguished from that of consciousness only when it realizes that it 
does not exist for itself vis-à-vis a simple determination.  Life must itself fall entirely 
under the sign of the negative in order for consciousness to truly come into its own as 
self-consciousness—this is the condition for the emergence of the ‘I’ in its spiritual purity, 
which already always exists in relation to the ‘we.’  Without this total negation, the ‘I,’ 
insofar as it does emerge at all, will remain still too rooted in immediate being, 
suspended in confusion between its desire for the immediate spatial objects of life that 
are presented to it and human Desire, which essentially transcends space and these 
objects toward the other’s Desire.  In order for consciousness to understand itself as 
Desire as such, the desire for the immediate objects of life must go unfulfilled.  This 
individual consciousness must be prevented from appropriating and folding these 
objects into itself, and thereby realizing itself in a confused way as a moment of (merely 
apparent) objective identity in sensuous satisfaction.  While it is true that, as Hegel says, 
“self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness,” because 
the Master has not risen to the level of pure self-consciousness, because the ‘I’ is for 
him still too alloyed with the sensuous particularities of natural life, ‘satisfaction’ for him 
above all means possession and consumption.  As long as his insistence upon the 
pleasures of possession and consumption continues to be realized, the master’s ‘I’ never 
fully rises to the level of pure self-consciousness. By contrast 
The ‘I’ which is the object of the Notion is in fact not ‘object’; the object 
of Desire, however, is only independent, for it is the universal 
indestructible substance, the fluid self-identical essence.  A self-
consciousness, in being an object, is just as much ‘I’ as object.  With this, 
we already have before us the Notion of Spirit.  What still lies ahead for 
consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is—this absolute substance 
which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses 
which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence.  ‘I’ 
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that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.  It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion 
of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves 
behind the colorful show of the sensuous here-and-now and void of the 
supersensible beyond, and steps into the spiritual daylight of the 
present.25  
 
The realization of the “’I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’” amounts to “the 
reconciliation of its individuality with the universal.”26  Genuine self-consciousness arises 
in precisely the moment at which consciousness realizes that it is irreducible to the 
objects of nature toward which it was formerly directed. If consciousness remains 
invested in these objects and discovers in them the basis for its own self-certainty, it can 
only but fail in its effort to find its pure self.  To the degree that self-consciousness 
emerges at all, it exists as a confused mixture of object and ‘I’, a muddled alloy of in-
itself and for-itself.  This confusion explains the way that the desire of the master 
remains oriented toward consumption, possession and pleasure.  He fails to see that the 
slave is something infinitely more than a means for his own sensuous satisfaction, and 
that the slave is, like himself, purely for-himself in the mode of the in-itself.   
Self-consciousness is the condition of genuine freedom.  Freedom means letting 
go of the body as horizon of the “the colorful show of the sensuous here and now.”  It 
means bringing this sensuous here and now totally under the sign of the negative.  Only 
when this is done can consciousness realize its own autonomy from the body and “find 
its turning point” that leads back to the reflected unity of spirit.  Because of this newly 
realized irreducibility of consciousness to object, this consciousness must search for a 
new basis for its sense of itself, and this it finds only in recognizing, and being 
recognized by, the other as a moment of spirit.  Within this reflected unity man finds 
the former objects of his desire transformed into mere shadows of the infinite, and he 
relinquishes his efforts to enjoy them for himself at the expense of this infinity.  If they 
are to be truly enjoyed, then this enjoyment can only unfold within this infinity. With 
this, these objects are recuperated as moments of self-reflective freedom, and man 
finally becomes just as much as much ‘we’ as ‘I’.   
What within history marks the turning point that leads humanity back to the 
reflected unity within which master and slave can reciprocally recognize one another as 
equals? We have spoken briefly about the way that the master functions to dispossess 
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the slave of his own sensuous body, and how this dispossession amounts to an 
opportunity for the slave consciousness to realize itself as pure Desire beyond the body.  
It is with this realization that the slave reaches his turning point. He does not need to 
own property, to command a position of influence within the existing institutions of 
society, or even to exhibit the outward features of ‘human being’ as it is understood by 
his given historical epoch. His arrival at the turning point has nothing at all to do with 
these externalities—except, of course, that he has been totally deprived of them. Because 
his condition is characterized mainly by privation and lack, his situation with regard to 
these conditions can only be defined negatively.  It is on the basis of his Desire alone 
that the slave might first assert himself as human, and as deserving a level of dignity and 
respect that has hitherto been reserved for the master alone.  But if the slave’s 
deprivation is the necessary condition for the movement of absolute abstraction by 
which all (of his) immediate being is rooted out, it is not sufficient.  The slave has, after 
all, only appeared as pure Desire to himself, and it remains for him to reveal himself to 
the master as pure being-for-self, or as self-consciousness.   
The presentation of itself as pure abstraction of self-consciousness 
consists in showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in 
showing that it is not attached to any specific existence, not to the 
individuality common to existence as such, that it is not attached to life.  
This presentation is a twofold action: action on the part of the other, 
and action on its own part.  In so far as it is the action of the other, each 
seeks the death of the other.27 
 
To the degree that a man is not willing to risk his natural life for the desire to be 
recognized by the other, his humanity remains hidden.  But this hiddenness pertains 
not only to the slave, but also to his master, who is still too immersed in the immediacy 
of nature to acknowledge a Desire that transcends it.   Thus, if the master risks his life, it 
is not yet entirely for recognition as such. He may also want recognition, but like the 
slave, his Desire is mingled too confusedly with the urgencies of animal life, and thus it 
gains no priority over them. For the master, however much he might reserve for himself 
the distinction of ‘human being’, this urgency expresses itself as a desire for animal 
satisfaction.  For the slave, because he is weaker than the master and yet must share the 
world with him, this urgency expresses itself simply as a will to survive.  If the master has 
risked his life, it is not primarily for recognition, but mainly for this animal satisfaction.  
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Because of this double captivation—of fear for his animal life in the slave and of 
satisfaction with animal pleasures in the master—man’s difference from the animal, 
which is motivated entirely by the instinct for self-preservation and for animal 
satisfaction, does not manifest itself clearly.  The slave must risk his life to break the 
master’s trance-like captivation with the pleasures of bodily satisfaction.  He must do 
one of two things:  either threaten to tear out the master’s immediacy root and branch, 
to forcibly impose upon him the same separation from the body that he has endured, 
and to destroy him if he should resist or, in realizing that he provides for the master’s 
satisfaction with his own hands, he must simply refuse to continue satisfying his desire 
for pleasure with his work.  With this, the master will be confronted with a tenacity and 
a resolve that can only arise through Desire as such.  And with this, he will be 
confronted with a true exemplar of humanity.  This is the master’s turning point.  
Not only is the master himself lacking in pure self-consciousness, insofar as the 
slave does not risk his life in a sustained effort to free himself from bondage, the master 
is also never confronted with it in his traffic with nature.  The slave must expose himself 
to the master “in the form of pure being-for-self, or as self-consciousness” in an act of 
rebellion.28  In this regard, the master has yet to meet with a genuine exemplar of 
humanity, and so from his perspective the slave remains on the side of nature in its 
immediacy as yet another means to his own enjoyment.  And, to reaffirm our 
divergence from Kojève with regard to the master’s supreme concern for recognition, if 
the master has no reason to admit the humanity of the slave at the outset, how could the 
slave’s acknowledgment that the master is indeed his master accord to the latter a sense 
of “prestige?”  Because the slave has not yet risked his life for recognition and thus 
demonstrated his humanity, there could no more prestige for the master in 
commanding slaves than that which derives from the obedience of his horses.  Robert 
Pippen summarizes the “conventional view” of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in the 
following way:   
[The acknowledgment of the slave] is worthless to the Master because 
he is recognized by one whom he does not recognize and because the 
acknowledgment is coerced, cannot be assumed to be genuine 
submission, and so is dangerously more like a temporary truce than a 
victory.  The Bondsman, by submitting, has for the Master been 
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reduced to the level of animal life and so the Master’s resolve to realize 
the mastery that he claims is thwarted. 29  
 
Doubtless, the conventional view cuts close to the crux of the matter, but I want to argue 
that it nevertheless marks a critical confusion regarding the development of the 
conditions for the problem of recognition to first emerge, one in which the essential 
structure of human being as a being of Desire for whom recognition is the central 
problem has yet to be articulated.  This conventional interpretation, expressed so 
succinctly by Pippin, assumes that the master is motivated primarily by his desire for 
recognition.   But if because of his immediate involvement with the natural pleasures of 
mastery the master is less concerned with recognition from the slave than with his 
submission, then the victory over the slave matters less than the pleasures that follow 
from this submission.  From this standpoint, the slave represents to the master nothing 
more than a means to his own enjoyment.  Indeed, as Pippin says, as long as the slave 
remains submissive, he remains at the level of animal life, and has not appeared to the 
master as a human who is even capable of recognition.  And yet the conventional view 
continues to assume the primacy of the problem of recognition even for the master, 
who is frustrated because he does not realize the mastery that he claims. Whereas 
Kojève has his master ascribing intensionality to the slave in order to account for a 
satisfaction that follows from being unilaterally recognized as master, Pippen’s master is 
dissatisfied precisely by the apparent lack of intensionality in the slave, and the 
incapacity for recognition that follows from this.  
The master is characterized by Hegel chiefly by his “attachment to natural 
existence,” and this explains the way that he exists as a moment of “pure being-for-self”–
his immediate self-certainty derives from this attachment.30   In other words, it is 
precisely in the mode of a natural being that the master is for himself.  From the 
master’s perspective, the immediate truth of his being is to be found chiefly in the 
enjoyment of his natural life, not primarily in the prestige of recognition or victory over 
the slave.   The emphasis on the primary concern for ‘victory’ or the ‘prestige’ of 
recognition also runs contrary to a striking historical fact; namely that, throughout the 
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history of slavery, the very humanity of the slave was often strongly denied.31  If prestige 
in the eyes of the slave were so supremely important, then it seems clear that his 
humanity would have been affirmed rather than denied.  Prestige is only a matter of 
importance among equals.  And in this regard, the slave represents for the master yet 
another “unessential, negatively characterized object” of nature, characterized primarily 
by its “thingness.”32  Just like the beast of burden, the slave remains immersed in the 
immediacy of nature.  Far from being motivated by his desire to be recognized by the 
slave as his master, the latter often denies the slave’s very capacity for recognition or 
respect, and concerns himself mainly with the enforcement of obedience for his own 
enjoyment.  Slaveholding may have been a matter of prestige within the society of the 
master, but certainly not with regard to the slave himself.   
For these reasons, the problem of recognition would appear to arise firstly on 
the side of the slave—an interpretation that accords with Hegel’s broad position that it is 
with slaves and the oppressed that we discover the vanguard of spirit.  Only after this 
problem of recognition has been articulated can reason really begin to make its advance 
and become solidified in the form of the social and legal institutions of the state.  And 
so it is with the slave’s first articulation of the problem of recognition that the 
preconditions of rationality begin to emerge, and historical reason makes its first giant 
leap forward.  Kojève’s famous quote about the prestige of recognition goes together 
with an ontological or structural account of the relation between master and slave, and 
its truth can be grasped entirely on this basis. But we must be careful to separate the 
ontological analysis of this relationship from the specificities of its historical 
development—a distinction that Hegel himself scarcely makes in the Phenomenology. 
In his analysis of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Robert Solomon points to the same 
ambiguity in Hegel, and to be fair, it is this ambiguity that might explain the very 
confusions to which Kojève has succumb:  
Hegel is not at all clear about the relationship of general self-
consciousness to specific self-consciousness. It sometimes seems as if 
the general self-consciousness is already formed at the outset of the 
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master-slave confrontation, which is concerned with the determination 
of the specific sense of self. But a good case could also be made for the 
argument that Hegel first establishes specific self-consciousness through 
the original meeting and then introduces the formation of the general 
sense of self-consciousness through the life-and-death struggle.33  
 
We are confronted with a problem of genesis.  If “general self-consciousness” is already 
formed, then the problem of recognition can be said to be primary in the original 
meeting of the master and the slave. In this light, Kojève’s account in which the concern 
for the prestige of recognition is supreme would appear to be accurate.   And while this 
claim appears to be legitimate from the lofty standpoint of the dialectical philosopher 
who has detected in nature’s development, even from its most primordial beginnings, a 
broad movement toward the recovery of itself in the reflected unity of self-
consciousness, it falls short when we account for the specific consciousness of the 
master, who like the slave before him had to be compelled by his other to move beyond 
consciousness toward self-consciousness.  In this light, what we have called the 
‘ontological’ or ‘structural’ account is itself conditioned by the historical development of 
a higher dialectical rationality within which nature broadly can be realized to be driving 
toward understanding and recognition. We find the nascence of the development of this 
higher rationality in the moment that the slave realizes himself as pure Desire and as a 
self-consciousness that is irreducible to the living thing that is his own body.  With this 
he becomes unafraid to challenge the master, knowing as he now does that he is 
something infinitely more than this individual body, and that the loss of his own natural 
life does not imply the end of self-consciousness of which he is merely a moment.  Only 
now, from the standpoint of this higher rationality, it can finally be seen that even at the 
level of living nature, individuality is always haunted by a latent conflict; it needs to 
complement itself in another individuality, as Hyppolite claims. 34   Insofar as the 
master—together with the rest of nature—is “haunted” by this need, he too must be 
oriented in his own way toward recognition. But this does not necessitate that at the 
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level of his own consciousness that his interest is first and foremost one of recognition 
or that he is dominated by his concern for ‘prestige’ vis-à-vis the slave.   
Hyppolite’s image of the haunted master goes together nicely with an 
observation of Pippin, who notes that Hegel makes the “rather extraordinary claim that 
the unjustified exercise of mere power itself creates a form of dissatisfaction and 
suffering visited on those exercising such power, and in a way that makes it plausible to 
assume that such positions of domination and submission cannot long stand.” 35  
Nevertheless, the master persists in his mode of separation and thus remains oblivious 
to this unarticulated need for recognition.  Though it may haunt him—perhaps 
preventing him from getting good sleep—it remains unarticulated as Desire, and thus 
gains no real purchase in how he structures his relations with others. It could even be 
the case that this disturbance drives him to seek the pleasures of mastery more 
tenaciously, to insist upon and repeat precisely that order which is responsible for the 
haunting disturbance.  This most human of desires is still too removed from his 
consciousness and the concepts according to which he understands himself. As a being 
that is divided between animal life and human Desire, between sensuous satisfactions 
and a unarticulated need for community with other human beings, he is lacking in the 
pure self-consciousness that is the basis for a demand for recognition. As such he does 
not understand that mutual recognition promises infinitely more satisfaction than does 
bodily pleasure.  By contrast, the role of the slave in history is to be the first being for 
whom sensuous being is disentangled from spirit, body from mind, and space from time.  
He is the first to experience the pure difference between himself and the world, and it is 
within this difference that he realizes the singular importance of a recognition that is 
based on one’s spiritual value alone.   
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5  
 
Suffering as Negativity or Necessity?  
Hegel and Nietzsche on the Master/Slave Dialectic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is a philosophical Bildungsroman that 
sketches the movement of nature’s maturation.  This story begins with nature in a state 
of naïve, bewildered childhood, then traces its development into its adulthood in which 
it willingly accepts the necessity of an laborious effort to learn about itself, and which 
finally culminates in a ripe, knowing maturity wherein it enjoys the products of its own 
“labor of the negative.”1  This movement of nature’s development is best personified in 
the historical relation between master and slave.  It is a relationship that begins 
tumultuously, with suspicion, discord, and convulsions of violence.  However, because 
the slow yet inexorable awakening of rationality bends history toward justice, the discord 
between master and slave yields to a growing sense of reciprocity between them.  
Ultimately, enmity gives way to reconciliation and mutual recognition, and the 
opposition between master and slave is overcome.   
In this chapter, we pick up the thread from the former chapter in which we 
examined Hegel’s understands the first “unmediated” moments of this relation between 
master and slave.  We will ask the question of whether we cannot already detect an 
error in this image of the master that falsifies (his) nature in a very fundamental way. Far 
from yielding maturation, such an error could perpetuate—even propagate—a tendency 
within nature toward immaturity, weakness, and stupidity.  Furthermore, such an error 
could serve to inhibit the emergence of superior types.  It was of course Nietzsche who 
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first highlighted this error, and it will be Nietzsche who provides us with the broad 
outlines for our critique. This error concerns the way that the master is understood to 
be captivated by the affective satisfactions associated with his position of mastery.  As we 
established in the last chapter, Hegel asserts that it is the master’s insistence upon these 
satisfactions that inhibit the development of a consciousness of the necessity for going 
beyond the specific, one-sided mediation that perpetuates the injustices of slavery.  We 
will consider whether Hegel doesn’t falsely characterize the master’s drive for power, 
and thereby falsify what could be the highest and most important expression of nature’s 
vitality.   
By way of passages from Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, we 
will consider whether this error is really a mere mistake, or whether it is actually 
productive and useful for securing the conditions of existence for those who cannot 
endure the aggressive creativity of the powerful.  In the History’s portrayal of the Melian 
response to Athenian aggressions, we discover not only the first shoots of dialectical 
thinking, but we are also given some sense of the conditions under which this kind of 
thinking appears; namely, in situations of danger and vulnerability.  On this basis, 
Nietzsche views Hegel’s thought as something rather less dignified than a philosophy 
that simply favors the slave because the represents the ‘vehicle of spirit’—it is viewed as a 
philosophy of the slave and, even more damningly, a slavish philosophy.  
 Finally, we will examine Nietzsche’s own image of this relation between master 
and slave.  In this image, the utility of mystification and deception is emphasized as an 
intractable feature of all relations within nature.   What distinguishes the master from 
the slave is not that one is honest and the other deceitful, but that one possesses the 
capacity to acknowledge the necessity of deception.  And because the creative master is 
strong enough to see becoming for what it is—that is, a movement without orientation, 
purpose or meaning—he can embrace the necessity of the creation of forms which 
impose order, direction and stability upon life.   Relating to this, we will see that the 
master separates himself from the slave in another critical way.  His aims differ from the 
slave’s in that he is not motivated by satisfaction or respite from danger and pain.  
Rather, he is driven by an insatiable will to creative mastery.  Unlike the slave, the 
master does not hold that pain is a reproach against life.   
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1. Hegel on the Master and the Slave 
 
As we discussed in Chapter 4, Hegel finds the contours of the universal 
movement of historical struggle toward freedom within the efforts for the emancipation 
of the slave classes.  Nietzsche finds in these efforts only a drive to exist at any price—the 
very same drive "which makes stunted plants push their roots into arid rocks.” All of the 
slave's cries for dignity, freedom and justice aim only at delivering him from suffering.  
The "phantasms" of the dignity of man and the dignity of work are nothing but the 
slave’s “transparent lies” and represent an effort to hide from the hopelessness of his 
condition.2  For the same reason, the slave imagines for himself a future in which the 
violent externalities of nature, including the master himself, are finally rendered 
manageable and brought into line with his own modest capacities.  He then transforms 
these products of his own imagination into weapons of morality, using them to measure 
and condemn a reality that in comparison with these images appears terrible, oppressive 
and violent.   
If someday freedom is actually to be shared by both slave and master, then they 
must mutually recognize one another’s spiritual dignity, understanding that this dignity is 
something in which they both participate rather than something that is reserved for one 
and excludes the other.  Though it bends imperceptibly toward justice and the 
harmonious resolution of its ongoing battle with itself, time remains out of joint until the 
day when the last master recognizes the last slave to be free.  For Hegel, it is precisely 
this out-of-jointness of time that drives the dialectical movement of becoming.  Whether 
he believes that time is to be brought back into joint through a final synthesis in which 
freedom is realized as a historical universal, or whether the movement of history is 
asymptotic in nature and the ideal synthesis that marks the “end of history,” as ideal, is 
never actually realized—this is the source of much discussion among Hegel scholars, 
though it is not our concern at the moment.  What is paramount for our purposes is 
Hegel’s image of becoming:  it is the movement by which nature progressively 
overcomes its own self-estrangement and comes back to itself in the fullness of 
conscious understanding, culminating in the master’s discovery of himself in the slave 
                                                
2 “The Greek State” in Nietzsche, F. (2008). On the Genealogy of Morality and Other Writings 
(Revised Student ed.). (K. Ansell-Pearson, Ed., & C. Diethe, Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. p. 165 
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and conversely.  Concealed behind the historical roles that each living, breathing, 
suffering man plays, spirit soundlessly drives toward just this moment of discovery.  
Even as becoming plunges these men headlong into the horrors of war, spirit endures 
the conflagration and always “finds itself in absolute dismemberment.”3  War doesn’t 
only destroys the finite, historical Concept, it provides spirit the occasion to reorient and 
recompose itself in a more self-realized form, and ultimately further diminishes nature’s 
estrangement from itself.   The horrors of war draw slave and master alike down into 
the impersonal cauldron of bodily suffering, thus melting down those hardened 
sovereign formations of the master that obstruct the progress of spirit. Far from being 
mutilated by the fires of war, spirit finds in them new opportunities for its advance.  In 
this way spirit prevails upon history with a new lucidity.   
Hegel’s affirmation of the superiority of Christianity to what preceded it follows 
not only from the fact that the Christian god is part man but also, and no less 
importantly, because He is a god who suffers, and it is precisely this suffering that joins 
His lot with that of man.  F.W.J. Schelling, whose affinities with Hegel exceed those of a 
youthful friendship, goes so far as to assert that  
God is a life, not merely a being. But all life has a fate and is subject to 
suffering and becoming.  Without the concept of a humanly suffering 
God all of history remains incomprehensible.4  
 
The God that wears a crown of thorns by his own choice consecrates suffering, and 
through it, history itself.  Because it engenders the desire for self-transcendence, 
suffering is the negative that drives being beyond itself toward ever-fuller articulations of 
freedom.  But, in spite of this sanctity, suffering is in another sense also an offense.  As 
the unsettling attendant of every finite social order, it is the unsightly, withered twin of a 
fattened, cruel satisfaction—a twin that refuses to hide the meanness of its condition.  
This twin resurfaces as a persistent indictment of every new social order in which the 
ideal of freedom is not realized.  Eventually, this indictment insinuates itself into a 
reproach against life itself, insofar as the latter recurrently submits to mediations that 
generate so much pain.  And finally the value of life can only be redeemed through the 
diminishment of the suffering that accompanies slavery.  But even if the slave falls to the 
violence of the positive order of a superior power—perhaps especially if he falls to this 
                                                
3 PS, Preface §32 
4 Schelling, F. (2007). Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. (J. 
Love, & J. Schmidt, Trans.) New York City: SUNY. p. 274 
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violence—because he embodies the suffering exterior of the current order, he represents 
the necessity and urgency for the further development of spirit.  In this way, he 
advances the cause of freedom as a martyr of the absolute.   
 
2. The Dangers of the Vanguard 
 
If, as Hegel believes, the negative is the real motor of historical movement, then it 
is the dialectical historian who is the vanguard of spirit.  He is the one who possesses the 
tenderness and sensitivity of feeling that enables him to comprehend this movement of 
the negative, suffering this movement only as god must suffer it.  But we must be careful 
to emphasize that Hegel holds that suffering is not something to which we must blindly 
submit, but that it must be overcome in a superior synthesis of intellect.  Suffering really 
only marks the limit of the finite concept.   This means that as the concept extends its 
domain or is replaced by a less one-sided concept, suffering diminishes along with it, 
and the hostile alterity of immediate nature becomes gradually more domesticated.  But 
if our historian merely remained on the side of the positive order and did not surpass its 
limits toward suffering, he could not comprehend those dark currents that disrupt the 
institutional petrifications of the state. Though he aims at “mastering the particulars,” 
this does not mean that he privileges one moment of becoming over another.  Whether 
negative or positive, the dialectical historian must love every moment of this movement 
in order to comprehend it fully.  Loving the positive involves “abiding in the subject 
matter” and “comprehending a concrete and copious fullness in terms of exact 
determinations.”  Loving the negative involves “looking it in the face and abiding with 
it”—it involves a willingness to suffer at and beyond the limits of these exact 
determinations, which in turn engenders a desire to extend the concept’s range and 
accordingly diminish this suffering beyond the limit.5 
Just as for the slave the real value of existence derives from the hope and the 
struggle for the future realization of the ideal of justice and freedom, so also is this true 
for the dialectician. What separates the dialectician from the slave is only the way in 
which the dialectician shuttles between his comprehension of the current social order 
with its respective finite concept on the one hand, and the rational negation of this 
concept on the other, always with an eye toward arriving at a superior synthesis between 
                                                
5 PS, Preface §32 
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this opposition that would diminish the estrangement from the other.   Whereas the 
dialectician moves fluidly between the exact, positive determinations of the finite 
concept and its negation, the slave is condemned to suffer on the side of the negative.   
But here we find ourselves confronted with one formulation of that most 
bothersome of theological questions—the very same that threatens the prospect of its 
undoing and, as such, opens up a terrain that is uniquely Nietzschean; namely, what 
distinguishes a love for everything from a love for nothing? If the dialectician must love 
both the positive and the negative in history, what becomes of his sense of 
discrimination and selectivity when this imperative for slogging about in the darkest, 
most miserable moments of history for signs of spiritual progress reigns supreme?  And 
because of the dialectical historian’s preoccupation with recognizing himself in 
everything, doesn’t he become incapable of separating himself from what is lowest 
within it, finding traces of himself “even in the profoundest depths of the sea, as living 
slime.” 6   For our historian, conscious recognition should penetrate the depths of 
everything—everything must be suffered by spirit, and it follows that everything should in 
turn be taken up by the dialectical historian as yet another aspect of his representation 
of himself; that is, as an essential development in the painstaking movement by which 
he discovers himself.7  
There are further dangers.  If suffering is immediately taken to be both sacred 
and negative—that is, as an offense within nature that must be rectified—and the 
dialectical historian’s most important task is that of confronting these negativities soberly 
in order to comprehend historical becoming, then what prevents him from being 
damaged and weakened by the weight of this painstaking project?  Only the obstinacy of 
a metaphysical faith that becoming bends imperceptibly toward a good end galvanizes 
our historian against despair of the negative.  This faith secures his resolve to continue 
confronting the endless procession of suffering as such, and it also secures his much-
touted objectivity and judicious impartiality with regard to the for and against of things.   
                                                
6 Nietzsche, F. (1997). Untimely Meditations (2nd ed.). (D. Breazeale, Ed., & R. J. Hollingdale, 
Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 107 
7 Here we notice a similarity between Hegelian cosmology and the vagaries of modern scientific 
investigation.  Like the universal historian, the ‘pure scientist’ indiscriminately measures, 
documents and represents the phenomena of nature.  Without a higher goal that gives his 
investigations direction, he is content to probe aimlessly in the lowest, darkest corners of nature, 
simply in the name of a general imperative for growing the body of scientific knowledge.   
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But is this faith enough?  In his book Inner Experience, Bataille speaks to this 
when he imagines seeing in a portrait of the aged Hegel, “exhaustion, from being in the 
depths of things, from being God.”8  What if this exhaustion is really the result of a life 
that has, because of the errors and inversions of dialectics and its historical sense, 
turned against itself?  If it were possible to look upon the face of old Heraclitus, would 
we detect this same weariness? Undoubtedly suffering was just as real for the ancients as 
at is for us, the descendants of modernity—perhaps even more intensely so.  But what if 
it is not suffering as such that diminishes life so much as the pervasiveness of the 
apparition of suffering that casts its shadow over everything, diminishing life’s vitality 
and capacity for an action that would redeem it? We may compare this to the way in 
which the traumatized soldier’s view of the world is forever obstructed by the haunting 
memory of the suffering he endured. Every moment of life after the damaging event 
appears to unfold in the shadow of the experience.  Ultimately this shadow comes to be 
confused for the threat itself, and manifests itself as yet a further extension and 
repetition of the original injustice. Because dialectical consciousness carries its own 
discontent along with it wherever it goes, everything appears with an alloy of injustice.   
 
3. Are We Moderns Freer? 
 
What does the slave and the dialectician mean when he uses the word ‘freedom?’  
From where does the value of their existence arise if not the “seriousness, painfulness, 
patience and labor of the negative”—that is, from a struggle for freedom from the master 
and from the disturbances and the traumas that he has caused?9  What happens to the 
ideal once the last master recognizes the dignity of the last slave?  And what would 
become of the dialectician himself if his labor were ever finally completed?  From what 
would he derive the value of his existence and his value vis-à-vis other men? Would our 
newly liberated slave or his dialectizing benefactor be capable of creating a new value 
and a new meaning for existence, beyond that of the labor of the negative that hitherto 
gave it purpose and direction?    
We spoke of the way that the negative insinuates itself into every positive order, 
as a shadow that persistently appears behind it that is always ready with a new rebuke.  It 
                                                
8 Bataille, G. (2014). Inner Experience. (S. Kendall, Trans.) Albany, NY: SUNY Press. p. 111 
9 Hegel, G. W. (1931). Phenomenology of Mind (2nd Edition ed.). (J. B. Baillie, Trans.) 
London : G. Allen & Unwin. p. 81 
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would appear that this insinuation of the negative into every positive order obstructs the 
advancement of an unequivocally positive definition of the ideal by the dialectician.  
And while we know what the slave would like to have his freedom from, the question of 
what this newly won freedom might be for is one for which neither the dialectician nor 
the slave has an answer.  Thus, the value of his life derives more from the struggle for 
the infinite ideal than any positive realization of the ideal itself, since every attempt to 
articulate the ideal casts the shadow of the reproving negative.  In his short essay 
“Homer’s Contest,” Nietzsche articulates modern man’s wretched condition by way of 
contrast with the ancient Greeks:  
Individuals in antiquity were freer, because their aims were nearer and 
easier to achieve.  Modern man, on the other hand, is crossed 
everywhere by infinity, like swift-footed Achilles in the parable of Zeno 
of Elea, infinity impedes him, he cannot even overtake the tortoise.10  
 
In Nietzsche’s view, this excess of infinity is a sickness, and dialectics has made it 
immeasurably worse.   Irrespective of the act to be accomplished or of the specific 
qualities of the master, dialectical rationality is always waiting with new misgivings, 
objections and reproaches for it. 
 
4. The Dialectical Falsification of the Master 
 
What is it about the master is really being reproached?  If we bracket our interest in 
the normative ideal of freedom as Hegel understands it and offer a direct description of 
the active man, what is he if not the image of the man who enforces a worldly arche that 
is his own, the man who is strong and free precisely because he has cast off the labor of 
the negative and the burden of infinity? This is the image of a man of concrete hardness, 
a man around and in whom powerful forces gather and are embodied.  He is the one 
who possesses strength of will to create meaning according to which strong forces are 
channeled and exert themselves over weaker forces, both in himself and in the world.  
He sets limits, enforces a regime of hygiene, and forbids any promiscuous mingling of 
forces that would result in their useless dissipation.  Thus he prevents conflicting forces 
from exhausting themselves in petty dialectical confrontation and, sometimes subtly, 
sometimes violently, he directs these forces toward his own purposes, all without any 
                                                
10 “The Greek State” in The Geneology of Morals, 2008, p. 179 
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final appeal to rational justification.   This of course does not preclude an appeal to 
rationality.  Rather, it means only that reason is not the last arbiter in how his forces are 
organized.  It is one among many instruments of the sovereign.  Thus, as reason’s 
ultimacy is rejected, so also is any rational imperative for reconciliation and universal 
synthesis.  
Among the sovereigns we find “those law-giving and tyrannical spirits capable of 
tying fast the meaning of a concept, holding fast to it, men with that spiritual force of will 
who know how to turn the most fluid thing, the spirit, to stone for long periods and 
almost to eternalize it.”11  His subordination of rationality does not amount to a lack of 
concern with truth.  On the contrary, we find in him the highest expression of a will to 
truth, which amounts to… 
a making fixed, a making true and lasting, a removing from sight of that 
false character, its reinterpretations into something that is.  Truth is thus 
not something that’s there and must be found out, discovered, but 
something that must be made and that provides the name for a process 
— or rather for a will to overcome, a will that left to itself has no end.12 
 
This stands in stark contrast with the task of the dialectician as described by Hegel in 
The Phenomenology of Spirit, whose aim is “to sublimate fixed, determinate thoughts 
and thus to actualize the general and infuse it with spirit…to make fixed thoughts 
fluid.”13  Whereas the “law-giver” by the force of his will arrests the flux of becoming 
and imposes order upon it, the dialectician dissolves this order and renders it back over 
to the fluidity of becoming.  
When we are no longer blinded by the ideal we can see that the actual impact of 
the dialectic expresses itself not only in the slow depletion of the will and the blood of 
the active, sovereign man, but also in the active forces within the dialectician’s own body.  
Doesn’t ‘justice for nature,’ as the dialectician understands it, really mean imprisonment, 
deprivation and a slow death for the creative master?  Rather than progressively 
reducing injustice, dialectics drives toward the substitution of the conditions for a vital, 
powerful life with a darkened and shifting shadow of itself.   It is an impoverishment 
that follows from separating every emerging strong force from a domain within which it 
could be active and what it might do within it.  The sovereign man—that strongest, fullest 
                                                
11 Nietzsche, F. (2003). The Late Notebooks. (R. Bittner, Ed., & K. Sturge, Trans.) Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. section 34[88], p. 6 
12 The Late Notebooks, section 9[91], p. 155 
13 PS, Preface §33 
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expression of life, that sculptor for whom the rest are only clay who imposes a sense of 
meaning, direction and purpose—is reoriented toward his own shadow and becomes 
painfully encircled within it such that he can no longer find himself.  He descends into 
depression, self-loathing, and the pathetic self-involvement of dialectical consciousness. 
This is the outcome of a dialectical historicization of the sovereign will—which is to say, 
the dissolving of every fixed sovereign order in the corrosive fluid of infinite rationality 
and its mode of temporalization.   It amounts to a ‘progressive’ leveling out of every 
successive order, each of which is characterized more by an increasing lack of being, 
substance and purposiveness than by any genuine fullness of freedom and justice. 
 
5. The Phantasm of Progress 
 
But surely we must admit that Hegel’s account is superior to that of Nietzsche’s 
when we consider its explanatory power with regard to the movement of historical 
development.  How else can we explain the apparent success that modern man has had 
in progressively rendering what is hostile and alien in nature over to the comforting 
balm of the concept, thereby diminishing by degrees the totality of nature’s injustice and 
suffering? For instance, the advent of democracy has created the opportunity for the 
masses to select leaders who represent their own interests, rather than being subjected 
to heteronomous powers over which they haven’t even the smallest measure of control. 
How account for the development of democratic institutions if not by recourse to the 
spiritual power of suffering to engender a conscious desire for progressively overcoming 
every positive order that depends upon exclusion and cruel forms of subjection?  What 
becomes of the sense of necessity of this movement of history if we revert to a 
Nietzschean image of life?  But still, we cannot be blamed for extending a suspicion for 
dialectical consciousness to any historical and historicizing sense that ‘discovers’ 
progress.  If the explanatory power of Hegel’s thought rests on its elegance with regard 
to this question of historical development, when this image of historical progress is 
rendered dubious as yet another phantasm of an afflicted or threatened body, the entire 
edifice falls into disrepair.   
In Nietzsche’s view, the historical sense that discovers orientation within 
becoming itself represents a further reaction of an individual against the chaos of his 
own changing conditions.   Just as the Greeks gave birth to the Olympians because they 
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could not abide the unadulterated violence of Chronos, so also did the moderns 
attribute to temporal becoming a sense of purposiveness and justice as a reaction against 
its chaos, blind violence and overwhelming multiplicity.  But this analogy extends only 
so far, since the cosmology of the Olympians affirms the essential necessity of cruelty 
and injustice for life, whereas dialectics circles relentlessly around the movement of its 
diminution.  If cruelty and injustice are as essential to life as the Greeks would have it, 
then the apparent progress that spirit has made in reducing the suffering of existence 
follows more from a generalized diminishment and leveling out of life itself than any 
genuine alteration of it into something less hostile.  The ideal of the progressive 
realization of justice could be nothing more than the wishful hallucination of a huddled 
multitude of sick and threatened creatures.  And Hegelian idealism, as the most erudite 
articulation of this hallucination, may have gained its credibility and currency as a world 
philosophy not so much from its truth as from the way that the sickness has taken on 
the proportions of an epidemic.  Hegelian thought cultivates our sense of ‘injustice,’ but 
this is really just the normativization of an anxious feeling that we are, in our weakness, 
threatened with destruction.  This harbors the added danger of despair, and it explains 
the further effort to shield consciousness from the pervasiveness of ‘injustice’ with an 
optimistic appeal to faith in its own future.  
 
6. Hope for the Unseen 
 
We discover an exemplary articulation of the way in which this sense for justice 
and hope for the future piques in situations of weakness and vulnerability in 
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War.14  Even in the margins of the Greek 
empire at its height we discover the first shoots of dialectical thinking attempting to force 
their way into the earth.  When confronted with the prospect the Athenian invasion, 
Melian diplomats attempt to engage Athenian generals in the “exploration of ideas and 
arguments” regarding a just course of action that accounts for “the good of all.”  
Rebuffing the Melians’ effort to embroil them in rational arguments about justice, the 
Athenians respond, “You know and we know, as practical men, the question of justice 
arises only between parties equal in strength, and that the strong do what they can, and 
                                                
14 Thucydides. (1959). The History of the Peloponnesian War (Vol. Five). (C. F. Smith, 
Trans.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Book 5, p. 155 - 179 
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the weak submit.”  Upon realizing that the Athenians will not be taken in by any 
“obligation” to engage in considerations about the good of all, Melian diplomats then 
appeal to the “impartiality of fortune” with regard to disproportions in strength of 
numbers, claiming that “If we fight, there is still a hope that we shall stand secure…We 
trust that heaven will not allow us to be worsted by fortune, for in this quarrel we are 
right and you are wrong.”  But the strength of the Melians rests only upon deferred 
hopes—hopes that will lead them to be ruthlessly crushed by the superior power of the 
Athenians, who would ultimately execute every Melian man of military age and press 
the women and children into slavery. To avoid this outcome the Melians would have 
had to abide the tenet, put forth by the Athenians, that the most successful people are 
those who stand up to their equals, behave properly to their superiors, and treat their 
inferiors fairly.   What prevented them from heeding this sober imperative?   That they 
would “regard the future as more certain than the present, and to allow hope to convert 
the unseen into reality.”   
How do the lessons of the Athenians stand when we view them through the lens 
of the dialectician’s historical sense?  As long as the ideal remains intact, consciousness 
will be miserably stretched between this ideal and the body that moves in its shadow.  
This shadow represents the ‘margin of error’ within which the concrete order of things 
is always inverted, falsified and de-substantialized.  Not only is it within this margin that 
one’s current situation will be evaluated and judged, but the past will always be taken up 
within it as well.  This is because what this margin really measures is the time between 
the lost ideal and a present state of fallenness from this ideal.  Everything that happens 
in between is trapped in the shadow of the valley of the negative, as a moment that leads 
fatefully toward a future recovery of itself in the ideal.   As long as one remains in the 
margin, one is inescapably caught in temporal becoming, and prevented from making 
the ascent from becoming into being—which is to say, one is consigned only to reacting 
against circumstances that forever reflect the absence of the ideal, and one is in this way 
prevented from acting.   As a mode of the consciousness that hangs as on a cross 
between the ideal and the immediate body, the historical sense of the dialectician not 
only prevents one from acting but it also precludes recognizing a genuine act of the past 
for what it is.    
Consciousness in this mode of the historical sense accomplishes this because it 
mystifies, flattens out and glosses over the site of the genuine act; namely, the body itself.   
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It induces man to give himself to “the hope for the unseen,” and to judge and measure 
everything according to this hope, rather than confronting the concrete bodily pressures 
and restraints of active forces.  And just as the body itself is mystified, so also the forces 
that cross over and through it are never soberly evaluated—that is, evaluated as strong or 
weak, noble or base.  In this way, the body is forever prevented from realizing itself as 
anything more than a moment of the suffering negative.  What’s more, as the image of 
the slow rectification of the ‘injustices’ perpetrated by the sovereign unfolds, what 
ensues is a globalized inhibition and censoring of every attempt at such a sober 
evaluation of strength and weakness, an evaluation that can only unfold beyond any 
dialectical imperative of justice, since the ascendancy of the latter is really just a sign of 
reactivity and symptom of weakness. It is in this same way that the historical sense 
actually falsifies the critical lesson of the Athenians, transforming the foolish destruction 
of the Melians into an early victory for spirit, if only because for the universal historian 
their act of defiance displays a superior sense of the good and, as such, they are held to 
have “looked the negative in the face” and recognized what was really at stake in their 
confrontation with a superior power; namely, the supreme import of an 
uncompromising demand for justice and freedom from oppression. (PS, Preface §32)   
In this way, the Melians chose death over a life of ‘injustice’ and subjection.  
 
7. The Dialectical Interiorization of the Struggle against Domination 
 
The progressive rise of dialectical rationality in history corresponded with the 
disappearance of the social institutions of slave trade.  But this disappearance does not 
imply that slavery has become extinct, only that the battle against ‘irrational’ forms of 
domination now largely plays itself out within the individual.  We may hide scenes of 
domination from our outward view, but “inescapable powers remain law and restraint to 
the individual.”15  Thus if modern man finds himself less and less within a breach that 
manifests itself as a struggle between a remote ideal and an openly suffering external 
world, it is not because slavery has been overcome but that man has internalized the 
breach. The negativity of consciousness within him always undermines, assails and 
sequesters every dominating, active force, whether within himself or abroad.  Now, man 
is so pathetically divided against himself that he can hardly outrun the turtle. Thus 
                                                
15 “The Greek State” in The Geneology of Morals, 2008, p. 167 
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modern man is enfeebled less by that never-ending labor of the negative that manifests 
itself historically in the wider world vis-à-vis other men than by the way in which the 
body itself has become the primary site of this breach—this insofar as there are 
immediate forces within the body itself that remain intransigent, and refuse to submit 
themselves to this labor and its mode of temporalization.   
This means that there are forces within the individual body that are unrelenting 
in their resistance to dialectical sublation and historicization.  At the level of the 
individual, the obstinacy of these unruly forces signifies a residual tension between the 
individual’s immediate bodily ‘in-itself’ and the mediated ‘for-itself’ of a consciousness 
that has succeeded in the rational sublimation of other forces of the individual’s body to 
itself.  That this tension should be progressively restricted to the inner-life of the 
individual rather than instantiating itself as a concretely conditioned external relation 
between the real flesh and blood slave and the real flesh and blood master is held to be 
a sure sign of progress for spirit by the dialectician.  With this internalization of the 
breach there corresponds the internalization both of the ideal and the material 
conditions against which the ideal struggles, such that it no longer represents a goal to be 
realized between men, but one that instead plays itself out between the individual 
subject and his body alone.   
 
8. Nietzsche’s Rejection of the Sign of Suffering 
 
From this discussion it should be clear that, for Hegel, suffering is ultimately a 
matter of the separation of the immediate body from the absolute, with consciousness 
unhappily inhabiting the breach between them.  It is explained by the way in which 
spirit has lost itself in this breach between the abstract immediacy and alterity of the 
body on the one hand, and the ideal on the other. The advance of the concept through 
which the subject overcomes alienation and unifies with itself generates the enjoyment 
of a victory over suffering.  Clearly this vaguely Cartesian opposition between the infinite 
and the finite, between thought and the immediate body, is not sufficient as an account 
of the origin of suffering.  Could it be that it is not the lack of unity with itself that makes 
it suffer so much as too much unity with itself under the sacred sign of suffering?  
Here we approach another point of convergence of several uniquely 
Nietzschean concerns: reactivity against suffering, slavish gregariousness, and 
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representation.  All of these concerns appear to congregate around what, from 
Nietzsche’s perspective, mark the essential lacunae of Hegel’s thought—a lacunae that 
can be formulated along Nietzschean lines in the following way: why interpret suffering 
as the sign of a deficiency or a lack within existence?  Hegel takes it for granted that 
alienation and suffering are the most urgent of problems, and that the demand for its 
reduction drives history toward a final synthesis. Even his interpretation of why the 
master insists on his own finite mediation of the present exhibits this inability to imagine 
that one could be motivated by something other than relief from displeasure.  He 
argues that what inhibits progress toward this ultimate synthesis is chiefly the master’s 
affective captivation with the satisfactions accorded to him by participating in the 
prevailing order.  As we saw in the previous chapter, these satisfactions maintain the 
master’s investment in this order—at once they assure his continued insistence upon the 
banal repetitions of habitual and administrative activities that extend its day-to-day 
existence and also his willingness to perform the occasional demonstrations of violence 
necessary to sustain it.  But when we look a bit more closely, we can see that Hegel has 
fashioned his master as an inversion of the image of the slave, unwittingly projecting into 
the former the deepest “unmediated” desires of the latter; namely, those of satisfaction, 
happiness and freedom from lack and deprivation.  To be sure, many of those who are 
taken to be masters are chiefly interested in hedonistic satisfaction.  These men take 
advantage of their position of privilege in order to maintain themselves in comfort and 
to satisfy their basest impulses.  It is just this drive to satisfy themselves that made them 
seek positions of privilege to begin with.  
This irrepressible urgency for gratification is indeed a common feature of those 
who enjoy positions of privilege within the establishment—the very same that Hegel 
regards as masters.   But surely this cannot be what it means to be a genuine master.  If 
this is so, then the only thing that would separate the master from the swaddled infant is 
that the former knows how to avail himself of elaborate institutional and social means to 
satisfy himself.  One is helpless, and one has means, but both are ultimately interested 
in relief.  The true master could not be more different from this image. Nietzsche says it 
best:  
Brave and creative men never see pleasure and suffering as ultimate 
questions of value — they are accompanying states, one must want both 
if one wants to achieve anything.  Something weary and sick in the 
metaphysicians and religious men is expressed in their foregrounding 
problems of pleasure and suffering.  Morality, too, only has such 
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importance for them because it is considered an essential condition for 
the abolition of suffering.16 
 
Hegel’s image of the master can be readily contrasted with Nietzsche’s creative master 
who never foregrounds the problem of suffering.   Because the creative master holds 
the task of realizing his image of life to be important above all else, he exercises a 
pitiless severity with regard to what is weakest in himself and in others, all with a view 
toward a goal that is his entirely his own.   As such, he refuses to allow any aspect of his 
affective life to be subsumed under the sign of the suffering negative, and in this way he 
prevents these passions from arraying together alongside others against what is best and 
strongest within himself under this sign.  In short, he denies representation to what is 
weakest and most reactive within himself in order to defend what is exceptional, thereby 
giving it the distance from the others that is necessary for it to do what it can do. 
But this does not mean that the creative master accords to his own affective life 
less importance.  On the contrary, far from placing it tidily under the general or 
‘universal’ sign of suffering, he honors his affective life more genuinely by abiding the 
chaotic battle of its multiplicity long enough to create concepts that are unique to what is 
strongest within it. By synthesizing these multiplicities into new organs of power, the 
master’s concept serves to redouble and enhance their respective forces. To be more 
precise, the concept abets in the elevation of superior forces to the status of an 
organized power, but at the same time, the master’s concept is itself the product of a 
genetic process according to which the strongest forces have been allowed to distinguish 
themselves from those that are weaker without interference from representations 
derived from the existing tablet of values.  Through this playful process of 
disenchantment, dissolution and forceful consolidation, the affective multitude is now 
compelled to serve under the banner of his concept, or be banished to the margins.  
And because the creation of the master’s concept was undertaken while disallowing 
contamination from the sign of the suffering negative, those that are forcefully 
assimilated to this concept are given a purpose and a goal that is unalloyed with 
negativity and is thus radically affirmative. This stands in contrast to the dialectical 
concept that is forged from the labor of the negative—a concept that forever begins as a 
reaction against suffering, unhappiness and a lack of freedom.  
 
                                                
16 The Late Notebooks, 2003, p. 142 
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9. Being, Becoming and the Subject 
  
Whether we speak of the slave or the master, both are driven ultimately by a will 
to power.  The highest expression of this will to power is the “imprinting upon 
becoming the character of being”—an imprinting that, at least for man, unfolds under 
the aegis of the concept.17  What distinguishes the concepts of the master from those of 
the slave is that the master’s concepts are the outcome of an original movement from 
becoming to being that is uninterrupted by negativity. The slave’s concepts are 
derivative because they arise out of the negative as a reaction against 
the disturbances and too-muchness of becoming and change.   Because the slave 
cannot endure the chaos of affective multiplicity, he clutches desperately for the 
modicum of stability, identity and being that he finds in the metaphysical beliefs in his 
inherent dignity, his hope for the unseen and a future for himself in which justice will be 
realized.  But, as Nietzsche says, “a belief’s strength alone guarantees nothing 
whatsoever about its truth.”18   More than anything else, these kinds of beliefs reveal 
how little becoming one can endure.  To the degree that these beliefs concern one’s 
supposed essential being, we can say that their strength is inversely proportional to the 
creative impotence and weakness of the one who adheres to it.  They are precisely 
attempts to compensate for one’s own impotence with regard to actively, creatively 
realizing the substance of these beliefs. 
Nonetheless, the slave would like for us to accept that his beliefs represent his 
true nature.  As such, they signify an effort to draw a boundary between the deep, 
unrealized essence of what he is and the worldly realities that are merely accidental to 
his being. On this basis it is also supposed that we can distinguish between those acts 
that he intends (and what he intends of them), and those acts that are ‘unjustly’ 
compelled by the forces that threaten him.  The slave's belief aims at representing this 
ideal borderline between what he is and what he is not, what is properly his own and 
what is not, both at the level of his ultimate value and also that of the intention of his 
acts.  On one side of this borderline we are supposed to discover the immobile locus of 
value within the world; namely, the soul or subject, whose value derives from its 
privileged relationship to the good and the absolute.   On the other side we discover 
                                                
17 The Late Notebooks, 2003, section 7[54], p. 138 
18 The Late Notebooks, 2003, section 4[8], p. 104 
 157 
the hostile, friendly or indifferent beings that populate the world of this subject.  Each 
of these beings possesses a relative value, whether negative or positive, that ultimately 
derives from the superior value of the subject itself and, by inference, the ultimate value 
of the absolute.  Therefore the borderline that the belief represents is thought to 
divide the realm of beings.  While some of these beings carry in their hearts the values 
of the absolute and others have sacrificed these values in view of their own selfish 
satisfaction, what is common to them all is that they are believed to be, to exist as this 
or that, and as such they possess a value that can be determined according to their 
respective relationships to the ultimate truth of the absolute.  In this sense, one’s value 
is always already established, and this renders the movement of its creation 
unnecessary.  Really, the only reason to undertake the effort to actualize this inherent 
value is so that one can live it out in the world rather than carrying it like a secret deep 
within oneself. 
Whereas the slave would have us accept that these beliefs represent the truest 
values, it is by means of the illusion upon which these beliefs are based that value is 
conferred.  Nietzsche's notes:  
From the values attributed to what is derives the condemnation with 
what becomes: such a world of being having been invented in the first 
place.  
 
‘What is’ as illusion; reversal of values: the illusion is what conferred 
value— 
 
Knowledge as such is impossible within becoming; so how is knowledge 
possible?  As error about itself, as will to power, as will to deception.19 
  
The slave erroneously takes himself to be a being that is.  He believes that 
he discovers value in his being, and he derives his reproaches for whatever threatens to 
press him into service from this uncritical self-valuation.  It is as if there exists deep 
within him a sensitive, inscrutable core of value that should be protected from all 
thoughtful evaluation—an immobile locus of ‘dignity’ and ‘respectability’ hidden deep 
within, which only God can confer. Whatever changes may occur at the level of his 
external condition, he holds that this deep value remains unchanged, and it is this that 
provides him with the basis to judge and condemn externalities that do injustice to his 
inherent value.  
                                                
19 The Late Notebooks, 2003, section 7[54], p. 138 
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The above is perfectly exemplified in the Christian ‘Right to Life’ movement in 
the United States.  The anti-abortion activist clings to his belief in the ‘sanctity of life,’ 
and he holds abortion to be a terrible sin.  For him, the unborn child represents this 
inscrutable core of value of the soul. Given the activist’s lack of concern for the child 
once it has entered the world (which is evident in the former’s indifference to poverty 
and despair), we can even surmise that for him the unborn fetus is more valuable 
precisely because it has yet to emerge into the world.  This is, after all, a fallen, evil 
world that will inevitably corrupt the child with impurities.  In short, the fetus signifies 
the deepest, uncorrupted value and meaning of the human being—a value that not only 
endures independent of one’s actions, but is even sullied by the efforts that the fallen 
world will inevitably demand of it once it has been born.  The activist has projected his 
own attitudes toward himself into his struggles against abortion.  Because he hates what 
the world has done to him and resents the world for doing it, he holds to the fiction of 
his own essential being and value even more tenaciously.   
But this involves an inversion and a ‘reversal of values.’  The movement from 
becoming to being which originally created value is hidden, and one takes these values 
to have existed prior to this movement.  The inversion places the essential being first, 
and it makes of becoming a subordinate movement by which the pre-existing being, 
with its ready-made essential value, either recovers or is deprived of itself.  In this way 
the inversion amounts to a (self-)deception: it hides that absolutely everything 
undergoes the movement of becoming—one’s depths are no exception.  And if this is 
the case, then the effort to carve an inscrutable core of value out of becoming implies a 
fear either that nothing of worth can be made from what moves there (nihilism), or that 
one lacks the strength, vision and determination to undertake the painstaking process of 
making it (infirmity, weakness).  Indeed the first might follow from the second.  
Whether the slave has forgotten that his being is an invention and not an 
endowment, or whether he simply ignores it, this is an open question for us.  It should 
not surprise us if the former were the case, that he has forgotten or repressed the 
movement of invention.  Tracing it back genealogically, the movement of invention 
descends toward the affective chaos of becoming out of which his being was originally 
fashioned as reaction.  It recedes in the direction of the unspeakable dissolution and 
destruction of the subject, and as such it marks a limit that he dare not cross.  But a 
lack of courage is not the only thing that prevents him from crossing over toward the 
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chaos of becoming.   The slave’s invention of ‘what is’ originally unfolded as a reaction 
against powerful forces of compulsion within becoming.  His reactivity arises because 
he is simply not strong enough to endure the creative passions without perishing from 
them, whether literally or in madness.   
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6  
 
Nietzsche’s Supreme Phantasm 
 
 
 
You can tie me up if you wish,  
But there is nothing more useless than an organ.   
 
—Antonin Artaud, 1947 
 
 
 
Nietzsche’s deepest confrontation with vital forces would come about through a 
disturbance in his organism.  Beleaguered by excruciating headaches, his later years 
found him struggling to accept a life of relentless suffering.  Because his work had until 
then been an effort to give voice to the diabolical forces of the body that conditioned 
thought, to now turn away from this host of increasingly hostile forces would have been 
a betrayal of his sovereign impulse.  Not that such a betrayal would be uncommon.  For 
instance, the young poet who wrote The Hollow Men and The Wasteland—those sober 
modernist testaments to the vacuity of modern culture and the self-delusion of 
religion—is but one example of someone who, later in life, would validate his own claim 
that “humankind cannot stand very much reality” and turn against the profound and 
terrifying insights of his younger days.  Given over to a fancy that often goes together 
with decline, T.S. Eliot would ultimately become a Christian and “give his life” to God.  
By contrast, Nietzsche found in his debilitating illness yet another opportunity for self-
overcoming.  Instead of flying from these seemingly alien forces that exerted themselves 
on his organism and threatened his consciousness, he would give himself to them 
willingly, even though this would only accelerate the advance of a palsy that would drive 
him to madness, and finally kill him.   
In this image of a languishing, yet relentlessly affirmative Nietzsche, Pierre 
Klossowski finds not an image of decline, but of the culmination of a life of genuine 
 161 
power.   The book Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle,1 where Klossowski expounds 
upon this image, is relatively untouched by English readers.  This is somewhat puzzling, 
given that Foucault said that it was the most profound book he had ever read, “on a par 
with Nietzsche himself.”  One finds in Deleuze’s later works a number of explicit 
references to Klossowski and even more allusions to his thought, specifically in Anti-
Oedipus where the figure of Klossowski casts a long shadow.  Deleuze’s concept of the 
‘schizophrenic body’ is an appropriation of aspects of Klossowski’s thought on 
Nietzsche, and his notion of the ‘body without organs’ is a synthesis of the thought of 
Klossowski and Artaud.  But aside from the fact that there was no English translation of 
the book until 1997, the book’s relative obscurity is due in no small part to its difficulty.  
It is also important to acknowledge how entirely terrifying its truths are, and how 
unready most of us are to hear them. Any authentic text written on the philosophy of 
Nietzsche must summon the same forces that move in his thought.  Because I believe 
that Klossowski’s text accomplishes this, we will treat it almost as if Nietzsche himself 
wrote it.  If it strikes the reader of this book that there are no discernable differences 
between the positions of Klossowski and Nietzsche, this is because the former adopts 
no critical removal or reflective distance.  He is vitally concerned with the same 
questions as Nietzsche and finds great powers hidden in his answers.  He had no 
interest in criticizing Nietzsche – still less was he interested in defending him.  For more 
than a century Nietzsche’s thought withstood the attacks of those who feared that letting 
this philosophy go unopposed would result in a wildfire of nihilism. It endured the 
same from others who were inured to the warm comforts of institutions, and for whom, 
as we’ll discuss in a moment, this philosophy represents a grave and constant threat.  If 
Nietzsche’s philosophy could withstand the relentless attacks in his brain, if it could 
endure the primordial forces that surged in his own sick body, then surely it can hold 
out against the reactionary polemics of pale intellectuals and frightened moralists.   
 
                                                
1 Klossowski, P. (1997). Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle. (D. W. Smith, Trans.) London: 
Continuum. 
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1. The Reactive Forces of Consciousness and  
The Active Forces of the Body 
 
How shall we understand these attacks on Nietzsche’s organism?  If these 
attacks are left unaccounted for within the movement of his philosophy, how genuine 
could such a philosophy be?  Klossowski says, “Everything the body says—its well-being 
and its diseases—gives us the best information about our destiny.  Nietzsche wanted to 
go back toward what, in himself, was most distant in order to comprehend what is most 
immediate.”2  What is it that is most immediate?  Consciousness and the physical self 
are the immediate element in which the ego dwells.  When you become unwell, don’t 
you experience this as a sort of invasion of your physical self by an alien power, which 
then in turn undermines and destabilizes your consciousness?   But how do you come 
to make this distinction between what is your own and what is alien in the body?  
In order to answer this question, it will be instructive first to look at the relation 
between the body and thought in the absence of such an ‘alien presence.’  In our 
normal, ‘healthy’ comportment, the body appears to function according to the ends and 
purposes assigned to it by consciousness.  When healthy, I can make progress toward 
my goals and fulfill my institutional responsibilities.  The body is a mere instrument in 
the accomplishment of these goals and, as long as it functions properly in this 
instrumental complex, it goes more or less unnoticed.  By analogy, we can think of the 
way in which, for the master machinist, his tools function as prostheses.  He wields 
them as if they were parts of his body.  When the tool breaks, so too does the rhythm 
and rapport of the machinist’s work. Just like the tools of the master craftsman, I forget 
my body until it fails to fulfill the functional directives under which I have placed it.   
But if it is the case that I effectively forget my body when it functions properly, 
does this mean that a condition for truly remembering it is its failure?  If so, what can I 
be said to remember about it? Only that it can deviate from the directives under which 
my consciousness has placed it.  As we get older, we learn to take better care of our 
bodies in order that it will be ready to respond to our commands.  Whatever has been 
learned from the ailment, it does not seem to tell us anything about the body as such; 
only about our need for it to remain strong and healthy so that we can press it into the 
service of our purposes and goals.  At best, we’ve discovered that our bodies are fragile 
                                                
2 Klossowski, 1997, p. 23 
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and that we depend upon them for the advancement of these purposes. When the tool 
breaks, the craftsman concerns himself only with either fixing or replacing it so that he 
can continue with his efforts. In the future, he might use a bit more care with the tool, 
but only to avoid the inconvenience of having to replace or repair it – certainly not 
because he cares about it in itself. Like the craftsman’s relationship with the tool, our 
relationship with our bodies remains oriented by the ends that we assign to it in 
consciousness.  Thus, this invading force of illness that has assumed control of my body 
is defined as ‘other’ or ‘alien’ only insofar as it does not accord with my image of what 
the body should be.  What emerges is an opposition between the forces that 
occasionally take over the body and a consciousness that instrumentalizes this body in 
view of its own ends; between the forces of the body as such and a consciousness that, 
whether explicitly or not, thinks of the body as something over which it has a sovereign 
right. But if we want to side with the powerful and genuine forces of life, which side of 
this opposition should we embrace? 
 Nietzsche’s earlier work had taught him to be suspicious of this opposition 
between the spiritual forces of consciousness and the somatic forces of the body.  He 
saw in it the mark of a mistake in becoming that apparently inverts the natural order of 
things – a mistake that makes it possible for the weak to dominate the strong.  A 
moment ago we said that consciousness interprets illness as a kind of interruption of the 
advancement of its projects and goals, and thus as a contingent moment in the 
development of spiritual purposes that transcend the body.  If consciousness always 
considers the body only in terms of whether it functions for its spiritualized ends, it 
would seem that consciousness would be incapable of knowing anything about the body 
as such.  Such ‘knowledge’ of the body could only refer back to the standards that 
consciousness has imposed on it. In light of Nietzsche’s suspicions concerning the 
inversion of the weak and the strong, couldn’t it also be the case that consciousness 
lacks the capacity to distinguish an actual sickness from a surge of powerful forces in the 
body as such?  Consciousness’ interpretation of what seems to it an invading power is 
entirely shaped by the way in which it destabilizes its efforts to realize its spiritualized 
ends.  It makes the distinction between what is its own and what is other purely on this 
basis.  Thus all of the pathologies of the body are defined by way of their oppositions to 
the purposes of consciousness, which has the implication that what we call “pathological” 
is always a function of interpretation.    
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2. Functionality and the Brain 
 
From the preceding, we can see that Nietzsche’s interest was not with 
abandoning himself to morbidity, but rather, more broadly, with the struggle between 
the reactive forces of consciousness and the active forces of the body.  Furthermore, 
we’ve discovered that not only is consciousness unable to consider the body as such, 
but, accordingly, it lacks the capacity for distinguishing between sickness and a surge of 
powerful forces – both are something that beset it.  But how does this obfuscation 
unfold within the organism itself?  And, more importantly, why does the organism 
produce consciousness if it only serves to obscure the true nature of the forces of the 
body?  Extrapolating from Nietzsche’s later writings, Klossowski suggests that the 
frontline of the battle between somatic and spiritual forces is precisely the brain itself.  
Klossowski remarks: 
There seems to be a strict correlation between the phenomenon of pain, 
which is experienced by the organism as the aggression of an invading 
external power, and the biological process that leads to the formation of 
the brain.  The brain, which concentrates all the reflexes on fighting the 
aggression, is able to represent the inflicted pain as degrees of excitations 
oscillating between pain and pleasure.  The brain can have 
representation only if it meticulously spiritualizes the elementary 
excitations into the danger of pain or the good fortune of pleasure.3  
 
By concentrating the reflexes on fighting the aggression, the brain manages the body’s 
functionality, and, as we said, this movement of the imposition of a function on the 
body corresponds with the emergence of the rift between what is ‘alien’ within it and 
what is not.  Because the sensation of illness or pain is immediately interpreted by the 
brain as a warning that the body is tending to defy the functional directives under which 
consciousness has placed it, the brain appears to be constitutionally incapable of 
reckoning that this defiance could be an expression of something that is trying to make 
itself heard that is superior to these directives.  After all, its role is one of filtering the 
powers of the body that cannot be assimilated to consciousness’ spiritualized ends.  
This means that, even before these forces could possibly reveal themselves to 
consciousness such that the latter might be able to align itself with them, they have been 
interpreted by the brain as hostile.  In other words, the brain’s role within the organism 
is one of imposing a functional equilibrium and stability on the body.  But what if the 
                                                
3 Klossowski, 1997, p. 25 
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body has its own ‘intelligence’ and its own ‘language’ to transmit this intelligence?  The 
brain has already rendered consciousness deaf to this language, and thus is it forever 
oblivious to the genuine order of impulsive movement that determines the body as such. 
 Now that these forces of the body have been filtered, consciousness can 
constitute a code of signs to represent only what was weak enough to have passed 
through the cerebral filter; that is, for those impulses which exhibit little or no resistance 
to the movement of representation within this code of signs.  Through this process, 
Klossowski remarks, “The body, insofar as it is grasped by consciousness, dissociates 
itself from the impulses that flow through it, and which, having come together 
fortuitously, continue to sustain the body in an equally fortuitous manner…The body 
adopts only those reflexes that allow it to maintain itself for the cerebral activity, just as 
the latter henceforth adopts the body as its own product.”4  This explains not only how 
the ‘body’ comes to be represented as the property of a ‘person’, but also how it 
becomes an automatism, a mere instrument of consciousness.  Furthermore, this helps 
us to understand the growing detachment of this ‘person,’ who understands himself 
entirely through this code of everyday signs, from the body as such.  Because the 
movement of representation is not a total sublation of intensive forces, the afflux and 
reflux of these forces continue on their own in spite of their partial subsumption under 
a code of signs, if in a somewhat diminished form.  Only the weakest quantities of the 
body’s intensities are fit for admittance into the cerebral citadel.  The remainder 
“overflows the fixity of signs and continues on in their intervals” – that is, in the 
awkward silences that interrupt the linkage of signs.5  In these gaps of silence where our 
representations fall short, the body is allowed to be fundamentally what it is; namely, 
“the prolonged extremity of chaos,” a “product of chance,” a “fortuitous cohesion of 
contradictory impulses.”6  Regardless of the cerebral inversion, the body is and will 
always be the battleground of a combat of impulsive movements.  The brain simply 
shields consciousness from the better part of this combat through the process of 
filtration of those impulses that oppose the image of meaning that consciousness has 
produced for itself.   
 
                                                
4 Klossowski, 1997, p. 27 
5 Klossowski, 1997, p. 3 
6 Klossowski, 1997, p. 33, 26, 28 
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3. The Body as Genuine Self 
 
Illness marks a moment when the body overpowers the brain and the fortuitous 
cohesion of forces upon which consciousness depends is threatened.   If only 
temporarily, the conscious person, his image of meaning, and the code of signs that 
lends them support – all so many products of the cerebral inversion – are put in 
abeyance.  Nietzsche saw in this suspension of the phantasms of consciousness an 
opportunity to reconstitute the self authentically.  Klossowski remarks:   
Everything that the brain had refused him lay hidden in his corporeal 
life.  All evil and suffering are the result of a quarrel between the body’s 
multiplicity, with its millions of vague impulses, and the interpretive 
stubbornness of the meaning bestowed on it by the brain.  It is from the 
body, from the [genuine] self, that every creative force and every 
evaluation arises.  And it is from their cerebral inversion that mortal 
specters are born, starting with a voluntary ego, a mind ‘deprived of itself 
(my emphasis).’7 
 
But once the body ceases to resist the cerebral inversion, these vague impulses are once 
again ‘put in their place’ and we are hasty to return to our institutional responsibilities 
and engagements with others.  But what about this haste?  Is it not the mark of our 
avoidance of the painful effort of an authentic reconstitution of the self?   
And what about these others?  Among the “mortal specters” of the cerebral 
inversion of which Klossowski speaks are not only the ‘person’ and the ‘voluntary ego,’ 
but also the other person. Nietzsche himself remarks:  
What then is our neighbor? Something within us, some modification of 
ourselves that have become conscious: an image, this is what our 
neighbor is.  Our self of which we are conscious: is it not an image as 
well, something outside of us, something external, on the outside?  We 
never touch anything but an image, and not ourselves, not our Self.  Are 
we not strangers to ourselves and also as close to ourselves as to our 
neighbor?8   
 
The you has no more reality than the me, except as a “modification of the Self.”  What 
is this modification, if not precisely the cerebral inversion? And just as my own 
conscious person depends for its integrity and meaningful unity on the image and the 
code of signs that gives this image support, so too does that of the other person.  Once 
the image, with its corresponding code of signs, is redeployed within the convalesced 
                                                
7 Klossowski, 1997, p. 32 
8 Nietzsche, F. (n.d.). www.nietzschesource.org. Retrieved May 1, 2013, from Nietzsche Source: 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF1883, 1883, Summer, section 12[40] 
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body, the agent can then speak ‘intelligibly’ about his experience when he was ill, if only 
negatively in terms of the way that it disallowed him from meeting his responsibilities. 
But this redeployment also marks the moment that a chattering social self resumes his 
apparent sovereignty in the body, which corresponds to the concealment of the silent 
movement of intensive forces.  Because this social self is anxious to avoid the palpable 
silences in which the impulsive movements exert their pressures, he enlists others to 
help him to sustain the images that lend meaning and purpose to his life. Again, these 
images are the product of a movement according to which they have been stripped of 
anything that resembles the impulsive forces that originally condition thought.  As soon 
as I identify with them, I have already submitted to the unequal exchange of my 
genuine self for the social, public self.  To the degree that I ‘understand’ myself in this 
way – that is, through these images that circulate in culture – I am fundamentally 
impotent to either authentically evaluate or create because I am not my self. How, then, 
do I overcome this creative powerlessness? I must find a means by which not only to 
speak, but also to genuinely affirm what took hold of me when I was ‘unwell.’   
 
4. Good Intentions and Institutional Goals 
 
I would like to add just a few closing remarks about institutions to suggest a 
direction for further discussion. From the preceding, it should be clear enough that a 
necessary physiological condition for inscription into an institutional framework – 
whether a mere societal practice or an established organization – is precisely this 
cerebral inversion which we have just tried to describe.  As such, only the weakest, most 
domesticated of the impulses are transformed into ‘good intentions’ and work in the 
service of institutional goals. The brain already filters out the most powerful forces, 
which are, in themselves, neither good nor evil.  Now, what unfolded originally at the 
level of physiology replicates and hypostasizes at the level of the social.  
But there is something else at work here, something that is unique to the social 
phenomenon of institutions; they enforce a regime of inversion.  In this strict regime of 
inversion, weak forces are enjoined with other weak forces in view of collectively 
holding out against those active forces of the body that are powerful enough to thwart 
the inversion.  More than this, the regime functions to cut down the rare cases of 
authentic creative force, to an-nihil-ate and immobilize them before they can become a 
threat.  They gather together and, in the name of their ‘lofty’ values and purposes, array 
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against the rare manifestations of overt powerful forces.  Of course, the genuinely 
creative self cannot be pressed into the service of a purpose or a cause, whether 
institutional or otherwise.  It will not try to represent its powers according to established 
values; still less will it try to increase them through the harmonization with others’ 
interests or goals.  Indeed, from the moment at which its powers submit to association 
and representation according to the established code of signs, everything genuinely 
valuable is lost because the inversion has already happened, and weak forces have 
prevailed.    
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The Ambiguity of Sensation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Only through what Bergson calls ‘intuition’ can one sympathize with the 
primordial becoming of life, which he characterizes in terms of duration.  
Fundamentally, duration is nothing more than the endless flow of qualitative 
multiplicity, and can be understood by analogy to the unfolding of a song, in which the 
past notes melt organically into the present, which in turn gives way to and suggests 
those that are yet to come.  There are no distinct moments in duration, only the 
synthetic flow of the past toward the future; the present instant being merely an 
abstraction of the intelligence that marks the limit between the two. Out of and within 
the raw fabric of immediate data, the individual consciousness erects physiological 
mechanisms and habits within the organism in order to create the best conditions for its 
adaptation to the environment. And while these habits are entirely necessary and useful 
for the successful adaptation of the organism to this environment, they can become 
obstacles to intuiting the durational flow that is at the core of reality.  This tendency to 
decimate duration results in the formation of our representations, which are really 
nothing more than hypostatizations of our habitual, useful comportments vis-à-vis the 
forms of the external world. When human being’s natural bent of mind toward utility 
goes unchecked and we are unwilling to attempt to value the useless, the 
representations and concepts that emerge will further diminish the vitality and creativity 
of our organism, thereby weighing it down in inertia. 1  
                                                
1 The English and French editions of Bergson’s texts are cited alongside one another, with the 
page number for the English translation in the first position and the original French following it; 
e.g. (Time and Free Will, p. English/French).  I have made use of the following editions 
throughout:   
Bergson, H. (2001). Time and Free Will. (F. Pogson, Trans.) Mineola: Dover Publications.  
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But precisely how does this inertia express itself in terms of sensation?  In 
Bergson’s Time and Free Will, the answer to this question has to do with to the way 
that our sensations are spatialized, and speciously situated by the understanding in the 
causal network that is the material world.  Bergson says that when sensations are 
understood correctly, we find that they do not occupy space, are not quantifiable or 
divisible, but rather exhibit the unextended qualitative multiplicity of duration. When 
purified of the forms borrowed from the external world, we find that they are nothing 
more than “simple states,” “intermediate between superficial efforts and deep-seated 
feelings.”2  Being nestled in this intermediate position comes with a price; namely, that 
sensations become ambiguous; sometimes functioning as useful signs of reality, 
sometimes exhibiting reality itself.  In order to determine this difference, Bergson says 
that we must set “ourselves the…problem of ask[ing] whether the most obvious states of 
the ego itself, which we believe that we grasp directly in intuition, are not mostly 
perceived through the medium of certain forms borrowed from the external world.”3  
As mere signs, not only are these forms at a remove from reality, but they also loose the 
dynamism and creative force that issues from it.  The intelligence is at least in part 
responsible for this loss of dynamism because of the way that it introduces the forms of 
the external world into sensations, including its very externality. Thus, Bergson sets 
himself the task of driving this externality out in the name of the unextendedness of 
sensation.  The advance of the forms of the external world marks a real encroachment 
upon the proper field of duration.  This encroachment of the forms of the external 
world upon simple, unextended states has the impact that consciousness becomes 
alienated from sensation in its nakedness and purity of qualitative multiplicity.  This 
results through a process in which this multiplicity becomes more deeply buried under 
representations. Furthermore, the organism, formerly dynamized by its intimacy with 
duration, stiffens and congeals into a routinized engagement with its surrounding 
environment.  
                                                                                                                                      
—(1991). Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France 
—(1991). Matter and Memory. (W. P. N.M. Paul, Trans.) New York: Zone Books. 
—(1990). Matière et mémoire. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
—(2005). Creative Evolution. (A. Mitchell, Trans.) New York City: Barnes and Noble Books. 
—(2007). L'Evolution créatrice. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
2 Time and Free Will, p. 31/23, 27/20 
3 Time and Free Will, p. 223/168 
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In Time and Free Will, it is clear that Bergson understands sensation to be the 
frontline of this encroachment of the forms of the external world upon duration. With 
his method of intuition, he attempts to liberate the dynamic powers of consciousness 
from this incursion. But, like many who find themselves firmly on one side or another 
of a battle line, the attacks on the enemy can become polemical and reactionary.  The 
driving question of this chapter will be this:  In his attempt to reclaim sensation for 
duration by driving extensity from it, hasn’t he gone too far, effectively alienating man 
from his own suffering body?  It seems that in the maturation of his thought Bergson 
realized just this: in Matter and Memory he gives ground by conceding that sensation is 
“vaguely” extended. 4   His task shifts from purifying sensation of the intrusion of 
extensity, to showing that, like concrete perception, sensation is an alloy of both matter 
and duration.   
The broader goal of this chapter is to trace the development of Bergson’s 
concept of sensation between these two books, paying especially close attention to the 
specific sensation of pain.  We will discover that indeed this concept is improved from 
the early work of Time and Free Will to the later work Matter and Memory, if only 
because he concedes that sensation is genuinely alloyed with something that is not 
immediately subject to the synthesis of durational consciousness.  He thus restores a 
certain externality to sensation, which, as we will see, is necessary to account for that 
sort of excruciating pain that expresses itself as an external aggression.  By way of 
conclusion, we will suggest that what escapes this synthesis cannot be reduced to 
something inert; that there are forces at work in the body as such that are independent 
of individual consciousness and memory as he understands it.   
Among the main goals of Time and Free Will is the repudiation of the 
‘common sense’ assumption that intensive states are inherently quantitative, and can 
thus be assimilated to magnitudes.  This is the principle mistake of psychophysics, 
which, he argues, 
is condemned to revolve in a vicious circle, for the theoretical postulate 
upon which it rests condemns it to experimental verification, and it 
cannot be experimentally verified unless its postulate is first granted.  
The fact is that there is no point of contact between the unextended and 
the extended, between quality and quantity. We can interpret the one by 
the other, set up the one as the equivalent of the other; but sooner or 
                                                
4 Matter and Memory, p. 53/53 
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later, at the beginning or at the end, we shall have to recognize the 
conventional character of this assimilation.5 
 
If in our intensive states we find measurable or comparable intensities, this is because 
we have assumed, petitio principii, the intensive to be of the same nature as the 
extensive. Bergson tells us that if both are understood by common sense to be 
measurable or comparable, then both are presumed to be extended, however miniscule 
or “compressed” this extension might be.  And it is in this mistaken way in which our 
intensive states are understood to unfold in a compressed space that we find the original 
conditions of our representations.  That is, he argues that it is this effacement of their 
fundamentally qualitative, and thus unextended, nature that makes it possible for us to 
speak intelligibly about these intensive states: 
As speech dominates over thought, as external objects, which are 
common to us all, are more important to us than the subjective states 
through which each of us passes, we have everything to gain by 
objectifying these states, by introducing into them, to the largest possible 
extent, the representation of their external cause.  And the more our 
knowledge increases, the more we perceive the extensive behind the 
intensive, quantity behind quality, the more also we tend to thrust the 
former into the latter, and to treat our sensations as magnitudes.6 
 
If we understand intensive states in terms of extensive magnitudes it is, in Bergson’s 
view, because we “define the intensity of a sensation, or of any state whatever of the ego, 
by the number and magnitude of the objective, and therefore measurable, causes which 
have given rise to it.”7  His analysis of the two principal forms of sensation, affective and 
representative sensation, describes the ways that intensity is mistakenly introduced into 
sensation.  Let us first look at an example of representative sensation, in which 
magnitudes are inserted into sensation by reference to the cause.  Later, we will turn to 
affective sensation, in which magnitudes are projected into the sensation according to 
the number of parts of the body that are recruited into the reaction.  
 
                                                
5 Time and Free Will, p. 70/52 
6 Time and Free Will, p. 70/52 
7 Time and Free Will, p. 4/3 
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1. Representative and Affective Sensation 
  
When setting out into the spring morning for our cycling tour, our inclination to 
believe that the ascent of the sun into its afternoon apex will bring with it a greater 
intensity of heat accords nicely with common sense.  The sun does seem to blaze with 
increased strength after midday.  Together with the visual awareness of its enlarged size, 
we feel on our neck its proximity even more palpably.  If the sun seems to hang closer 
to the earth, it is not only because of our actual proximity relative to it, but also because, 
coupled with this visual awareness, our sensation of heat seems to have increased 
exponentially.  In this case and others like it, it is quite natural for us to hold that our 
sensation of heat increases.  But let’s look more closely at this from the standpoint of 
Time and Free Will.   
While it may be true that with scientific method we can prove that the heat has 
increased as the day progressed, Bergson argues that it does not follow that my 
sensation of heat increases along with it. This is not to say that my sensation has not 
changed according to my position relative to the sun.  Indeed it has.  How then do we 
explain the apparent presence of quantity or intensity in this specific sensation? We all 
know that as the sun ascends the air temperature tends to rise.  Moreover, we tend to 
associate certain higher or lower temperatures with specific sensations. Bergson says 
that it is in this manner that we relate a certain physical temperature, quantified by the 
thermometer, to a certain shade of sensation, thus transferring the idea of temperature 
into the sensation itself, the quantity of the cause into the quality of the effect.  What 
was originally purely a passing of one simple state of my consciousness to another—each 
of which in truth has its own specific shade or quality—is transformed into a magnitude 
according to the representation of the cause.  This account becomes subtler when we 
account for the way in which specific sensations, associated with particular causes 
through conventional means, solidify into what he calls “landmark sensations.”8   Our 
consciousness, in turn, totals up these landmarks in order to arrive at the magnitude of 
sensation.  For instance, 22 degrees Celsius is commonly identified as optimal room 
temperature, and is considered by many as creating a favorable environment for home 
or work.  When one asks, “does it seem hot in here?” this is because the temperature 
                                                
8  “We estimate the distance between the  two given sensations by a rough guess at the number 
of these sudden jumps, or at least of the intermediate sensations which usually serve as 
landmarks.” Time and Free Will, p. 68/50 
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has deviated from the landmark sensation to which one is most accustomed.  In other 
words, the specific sensation of heat is not explicitly associated with the deviation from 
the actual temperature of 22 degrees, but from the landmark sensation that has been 
associated with it.  After a while, one doesn’t even need to look at a thermometer 
except to verify that the landmark is where it should be. To say that I am ‘extremely hot’ 
means that I have passed through the “intermediate sensations” of ‘warm’, ‘hot,’ ‘very 
hot,’ etc.  And ultimately, one’s claim that the afternoon sun is ‘intensely hot’ can be 
roughly attributed to the number of deviations from the sensation with which I am most 
comfortable, or to put it in slightly different terms, the sensation to which I have 
become habituated; namely, room temperature.  “Representative sensation, looked at 
in itself, is pure quality; but seen through the medium of extensity, this quality becomes 
in a certain sense quality, and is called intensity…[This gives] them in a new form in 
reflective consciousness, which immediate perception did not attribute to them.” 9  
These kinds of sensation involve the surreptitious insertion the representation of the 
intensity of the cause into the effect, thus rendering what is, when taken independently 
of this representation, a mere change of quality into a change of quantity.   
With representative sensation so defined, let us now return to our cycling tour 
for a moment in order to arrive at a working definition of its affective counterpart.  
Massive mountains await us on the horizon, and we know, as we grow closer to them, 
our endurance and strength will be pushed to their limits.  As we begin to ascend the 
foothills, we can feel our respiration increasing and sweat begins to collect on our 
foreheads.  As we get higher and the road steeper, our effort intensifies, as does the 
tension in our muscles.  Ultimately, once we have ascended into the switchbacks and 
slowly snake our way toward the summit, our leg muscles saturated in lactic acid, our 
respiration quick and shallow, we feel as though we have reached the limit of our 
capacities.  On the climb, it indeed does feel as though our sensation of pain has 
increased.  How does the nature of this sensation differ from that of the simple increase 
in temperature? Of course our body temperature has risen because of the effort—we 
feel hotter—so this too is something for which we must account. But these are 
afterthoughts; there is something more essential at work in these kinds of sensation that 
cannot be accounted for in terms of the representation of the cause, as in the so-called 
                                                
9 Time and Free Will, p. 90/65 
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‘representative sensations’. Primarily what we feel in this case is pain, not heat. How do 
we account for the intensity of this pain? 
Bergson tells us that this can be explained simply by the number of sensations 
that localize at different points in the body.  If the pain is slight, it is because the 
sensation is localized to one place at the periphery of the body.  If the pain is intense, it 
is because sensation is distributed throughout the whole region of the body affected, or 
even throughout the entire body.   It should not surprise us that the same confusion 
that applies to pain also holds for effort, given the close relationship between these two 
phenomena.  That is, with a greater effort of the will we believe ourselves to be 
conscious of a greater expenditure of force.  As in his explanation of pain, Bergson 
points out that this really amounts to the way in which this effort is distributed over a 
larger surface of the body and appropriates to itself a greater and greater number of 
organs. In what does our perception of the strength of the will consist if not the degree 
to which the body is brought into its efforts? 
We are conscious, not of an expenditure of force, but of the movement 
of the muscles that result from it[…]The more an effort seems to 
increase, the greater is the number of muscles which contract in 
sympathy with it, and that the apparent consciousness of a greater 
intensity of effort at a given point in the organism is reducible, in reality, 
to the perception of a larger surface of the body being affected.10  
  […] 
Our consciousness of an increase in muscular effort is reducible to the 
twofold perception of a greater number of peripheral sensations, and of 
a qualitative change occurring in some of them.11   
 
What prevents us from realizing this duality between the will and the effort required to 
realize it is precisely our unwillingness to find in the affective state anything more than 
the conscious expression of an organic disturbance.  Consciousness mistakes itself for 
the causal networks of matter, and its sole purpose becomes one of registering inwardly 
what has been outwardly caused.12  Nevertheless, sensation and perception remain for 
Bergson a moment of consciousness.  The latter, because it is irreducible to the 
material reality of the body, only follows the causal laws of nature by its own accord—
that is, when under the direction of the intelligence, it confuses the pressures of the 
extended world for the cause of its affection, and reckons this as a disturbance only 
                                                
10 Time and Free Will, p. 24/18 
11 Time and Free Will, p. 26/19 
12 Time and Free Will, p. 32/24 
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according to the degree to which the feeling deviates from the preferred or habituated 
shade of sensation.   
 Let us now apply this to our example of climbing the mountain on our bicycle.  
While in the valley, we feel only a modicum of exertion, our legs remain loose and we 
have little or no pain.  As we ascend into the foothills, the sensation of pain and effort 
increases because of the slight tightening of the calves, the quadriceps and the gluteus.  
As we further ascend into the switchbacks and the gradient increases, these parts 
combine with the muscles of the chest, the back and the arms. The lungs are strained, 
and the beating of the heart becomes noticeable.  The ‘pain’ of climbing is nothing 
more than this general organic disturbance that is distributed throughout the entirety of 
the body.  And we assess the intensity of our sensations by recourse to the distribution 
of our muscular effort at the periphery.  Because the reflective intelligence is lacking in 
anything else by which to make this comparison, it seizes on this muscular effort or 
disposition of the organs to measure the intensity of our feeling of pain and the intensity 
of our effort.  But in truth the sensation is only contingently linked with this specific, 
superficial disposition or effort of the bodily organs.  Affective sensation is just this 
contingent bodily disposition that is confused with the sensation itself.  Because the 
perception of the number of bodily parts recruited into the effort is what is most 
apparent to the intelligence, what is fundamentally a qualitative difference is mistaken 
for a quantitative difference.   
We can characterize the relation between the bodily disposition and sensation 
in terms of a kind of intimate, differential tension. Indeed, it is this intimacy that allows 
for the conflation of the primordial, qualitative multiplicity of sensation with the 
spatialized, quantitative multiplicity of peripheral sensations, affects or bodily 
dispositions.  But it is also this differential tension that is the condition of exercising a 
freedom of response vis-à-vis the body—thus does our freedom mingle so closely with 
what appears as a mere mechanism, plying its way, so to speak, through this 
mechanism’s indistinct shadows.  In order to realize this freedom, we must learn to 
distinguish the present bodily dispositions from the sensation. When this is done, we 
can see that the function of sensation is not merely to reflect what has happened in the 
physical structures of the organism, but also to suggest to consciousness what is tending 
to happen, thus giving it the choice of whether to yield to the automatic or habitual 
reactions or to interrupt this movement with other possibilities for action.   
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It must be noticed that we rise by imperceptible stages from automatic 
to free movements, and that the latter differ from the former principally 
in introducing an affective sensation between the external action which 
occasions them and the volitional reaction which ensues.  Indeed, all 
our actions might have been automatic, and we can surmise that there 
are many organized beings in whose case an external stimulus causes 
definite reaction without calling up consciousness as an intermediate 
agent.  If pleasure and pain make their appearance in certain privileged 
beings, it is probably to call forth a resistance to the automatic reaction 
which would have taken place: either sensation has nothing to do, or it is 
nascent freedom […] The affective state must then correspond not 
merely to the physical disturbances, movements or phenomenon which 
have taken place, but also, and especially, to those which are in 
preparation.13 
 
As the ambiguity of sensations is effaced by the intelligence and they are identified and 
represented as pleasurable or painful, the differential tension, which is a condition of 
the freedom of the organism, appears from the standpoint of reflection to break down 
into a relation of identity. From now on, the preferred pleasure is mistaken for a greater 
pleasure.  And the specific peripheral sensations upon which I have fixated as 
pleasurable now function as a standard by which I measure other sensations that have 
themselves been localized within the organism.  From this moment on, the entire 
organism seems to be defined by this attraction to preferred pleasures.  The structure of 
desire now appears to be determined and to correspond with that of the organism itself, 
and these desires seem to make their demands on the organism felt as a need to share 
in this optimal balance of pleasure. In other words, when under the spell of these 
habitual preferences, consciousness seems to become a passion. Bergson seeks to 
purge sensation of any externality that would render consciousness passive in this way.  
 
2. The Problem of Excruciating Pain 
 
Still, we have to wonder whether Bergson’s emphatic pronouncement in Time 
and Free Will that sensation is entirely unextended doesn’t overstate the case.  While 
he faults affective and representative sensation for the way that they localize sensation 
squarely within the causal relations of the external world, Bergson now seems to 
delocalize sensation altogether, possibly going too far in the opposite direction by 
pushing extension entirely out of sensation.  In his attempt to reclaim it as the proper 
                                                
13 Time and Free Will, p. 34/25 
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field of the qualitative multiplicity of durational consciousness, he tends to downplay 
the inherent ambiguity of sensation according to which it sometimes exhibits the 
unextended, purely qualitative differences of duration, and sometimes the qualitative 
differences that inhere in the body itself prior to their effacement by the reflective 
intelligence.   
The distinction that he makes in Time and Free Will between the perception of 
extensity and the conception of space is instructive here.  He says that, for instance, 
animals perceive extensity but do not conceive of space, and because of this likely 
experience the external world very differently than we do.  Speaking of the animal’s 
remarkable sense of orientation that enables it to return home by a course previously 
unknown to it, he states, “Qualitative differences exist everywhere in nature, and if this 
is the case, then why can’t two distinct directions be marked in immediate perception as 
two colors?” Animal perception is defined by its attunement to qualitative differences 
within the extended world.  By contrast, the conception of the homogeneous medium 
of space is peculiar to man. Bergson asserts that this conception of space probably 
represents “a kind of reaction against that heterogeneity which is the ground of 
experience.”14 
Our question is whether in trying to correct this reactionary tendency Bergson 
hasn’t gone too far, thus adopting a position that can itself be characterized as 
reactionary.  In his attempt to reclaim sensation from the spatialization that is speciously 
introduced in representative and affective sensation, has he also driven the extensity 
from sensation, making of it something that is wholly unembodied? By his own 
admission regarding animals, extension is not reducible to space—the latter emptied of 
quality, the former shot through with it.  If the animal’s perception is shot through with 
quality and yet still pertains to the extended world, why then can’t man’s sensation— 
also essentially qualitative —exhibit this same extendedness?    
There is a further problem with his account in Time and Free Will.  As 
compelling as his conception of sensation is in moments, it is unconvincing particularly 
when we try to understand excruciating forms of pain through it.  With respect to the 
kind of pain associated with climbing the Mont Ventoux on our bicycles, for instance, 
we have seen that intuition can reveal the qualitative differences that are hidden behind 
this pain, and thereby reveal the way that we measure it relative to our preferred 
                                                
14 Time and Free Will, p. 97/72 
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affective states.  Pushing ourselves harder simply involves overcoming these personal 
preferences and inuring ourselves to these qualitative differences in sensation.  But what 
about torturous pain, or pain that expresses itself as an external aggression?  Is there not 
a difference in kind between torturous pain and that of climbing the summit road on 
our bicycles?  When confronting this form of pain, are we not struck by the externality 
of pain to consciousness?  How can we continue to maintain that sensation not 
genuinely extended in the face of such pain?   
Bergson’s early definition of sensation revolves around a clear opposition 
between quality, which is held to be subjective and unextended, and quantity, which is 
held to be objective and extended, and he seeks to reveal how one is speciously derived 
from the other.  Sensation, he argues, never genuinely registers quantity, and thus never 
provides consciousness with a real point of interface with the objective world of 
extensive magnitudes except in a purely symbolical way. As a further example of the 
difference of kind between the intensive and the extensive, Bergson suggests an 
experiment in which we hold a pin in our right hand and prick our life hand 
progressively more deeply:   
At first we shall feel as it were a tickling, then a touch which is succeeded 
by a prick, then a pain localized at a point, and finally the spreading of 
this pain over the surrounding area.  And the more we reflect on it, the 
more clearly shall we see that we are here dealing with so many 
qualitatively distinct sensations, so many varieties of a single species.  
But yet we spoke at first of one an the same sensation which spread 
further and further, of one prick which increased in intensity.  The 
reason is that, without noticing it, we localized in the sensation of the left 
hand, which is pricked, the progressive effort of the right hand, which 
pricks.   We thus introduce the cause into the effect, and unconsciously 
interpreted quality as quantity, intensity as magnitude.15 
 
This example underscores much of what is problematic about Bergson’s account and 
gives rise to a number of perplexities:  Do we really measure the magnitude of the pain 
of a pinprick simply by recourse to the parts of the body that are recruited into the 
effort of pressure from the other hand?  If this is the case, how can we account for the 
magnitude of pain of a pinprick received by accident? Could this really be a matter of 
imagining to myself the number of parts of my own body that would be necessary to 
produce such a feeling, and then transferring this imagined representation of the foreign 
cause into the magnitude of the immediate effect?  And, from the standpoint of 
                                                
15 Time and Free Will, p. 43/32 
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affective sensation, is the magnitude of pain really a simple matter of the number of 
body parts that are recruited into the reaction?  Against Bergson’s account, do we not 
feel the pain of a pinprick the most at precisely the point at which it is received? While 
it is true that the entire body is drafted into the reaction, perhaps this pertains to the 
way that this external aggression seems to threaten to disturb the real material integrity 
of the organic totality that is my own extended body.  And, finally, if sensation is 
entirely unextended, why does it localize here rather than there?  If it is the case that 
there is something more at stake in this sort of sensation that the tendency to confuse 
the cause and the effect, then Bergson’s entire account would appear to be insufficient.  
Whereas in Time and Free Will he attempts to dismantle the presuppositions 
involved in the attribution of extensity to sensation while nonetheless conceding their 
utility, in Matter and Memory he ultimately resuscitates its extensity in the name of 
common sense.  That is, he begins by accepting the common sense belief that extended 
matter is entirely real.  He now holds that matter, far from being merely a derivation of 
duration, is simply duration in actualization.  For this reason, we can attribute to 
sensation an actual extensity, however ‘vaguely localized’ it might be, rather than just the 
mere appearance of extension that we find in his accounts of affective and 
representative sensation in Time and Free Will.   
 
3. Interval and Affection  
 
Beginning with the image of matter, as he does in Matter and Memory, provides 
several conceptual advantages.   The most notable among them is that it makes it 
possible to speak of the practical, embodied situation of the organism without totally 
subordinating it to his concept of intensive duration.  Rather, duration and matter are 
understood to be the two sides of reality.  But more importantly, as we will see, this shift 
in his thought provides better resources for accounting for the objections that we just 
raised concerning excruciating pain.   
The more balanced approach of Matter and Memory is as much in evidence in 
his elucidation of the image of matter and perception as it is in his revised conception 
of sensation.  Beyond the limit between external objects and the object that is my own 
body, consciousness utilizes perception to monitor the practical situation in which the 
organism finds itself. Far from being a faculty of representation or contemplation for 
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the subject, perception functions first of all to prepare the body for action by appraising 
the organism of the promises and threats that await it in the material world.  In the early 
work, perception was held to be a specific mode of subjective sensation.  In the later 
work, perception goes as much together with the image of objective matter, which is the 
domain of action for the organism, as it does with the subject.  To be more precise, 
perception is no longer merely a specific mode of sensation, but also ranges over the 
image of objective matter.   
Just as matter in this view possesses real extensity, so also does perception 
involve real extended movement within it.  “There is no perception that is not 
prolonged into movement.”16   The nervous centers within the body represent the 
instruments of perception and movement.  Bergson states, “My nervous system, 
interposed between objects which affect my body and those which I can influence, is a 
mere conductor, transmitting, sending back or inhibiting movement.”17  Through the 
inhibition of movement, the nervous system creates an interval that is a necessary 
condition for the free response of the organism.  This interval is the opening in which 
free responses to the appeals from the extended body and from the external world 
begin to articulate themselves.  Freedom is not a property that merely exists somewhere 
deep in the subject.  Rather, it follows from the interface between deep states, 
comprised primarily of pure unextended memories, and superficial efforts that concern 
the situation of my body relative to its extended surroundings.   
Bergson is somewhat unclear on the precise nature of this relationship, 
suggesting sometimes that it is the memories that launch themselves into the intervals of 
sensation, sometimes that these intervals involve an effort to actively take up merely 
passive memories.  This obscurity dissolves straightaway when we see that it is 
consciousness that plays the active role here, ranging relentlessly between the extensive 
and inextensive.  Consciousness occupies itself simultaneously with the reflections of 
the material world that are provided in perception and with probing the depths of 
memory, selecting those images that might aid it in its efforts to create new advantages 
for the body.  The interval is thus an interval of consciousness.  It is the interval that 
follows from every genuine question of vital interest for the human being—an interval 
                                                
16 Matter and Memory, p. 94/101 
17 Matter and Memory, p. 44/43 
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that indicates not so much an interruption of action for contemplation as the nascence 
of a form of action that is novel and unpredictable.  
It is in this way that the organism makes of itself a center within the material 
world.  But we are not speaking of a center in the sense of a definite, geometrical point 
located at the center of a plane with infinitely receding boundaries, but a center of 
indetermination that renders unpredictable and indefinite the relationships between it 
and the objects with which it shares the universe. 
This center is not a mathematical point; it is a body, exposed, like all 
natural bodies, to the action of external causes which threaten to 
disintegrate it…It does not merely reflect action received from without; it 
struggles, and thus absorbs some part of this action.  Here is the source 
of affection.18   
   
While the organism surely also possesses mechanisms of reflex that deploy 
unconsciously, it is because of the indetermination of the center that it is much more 
than the sum of these reflexes.  In the interval of perception the organism chooses 
between the hosts of different reflex movements, each with its own highly specific 
function vis-à-vis the surrounding material environment.  Moreover, the interval allows 
for a refinement of these physiological reflexes, and in it the organism liberates itself 
from mere repetitions of the same movements in the face of subtly differing situations.  
 Concretely, this interval reveals itself in the form of a distance between the 
center that is my own body and the object of perception.  Of course this distance is not 
originally one that is measured according to conventional metrics; the latter are always 
introduced as abstractions after the distance is immediately revealed to consciousness as 
interval.  The organism uses this interval to choose among the host of possibilities for its 
specific response, which are imagined in the form of virtual actions.  As the objective 
distance between my body and the object of vital interest closes, so too does the interval 
in which the memory images can launch themselves into it, thereby providing the 
organism not only a window of freedom for response vis-à-vis the approaching object, 
but also a means of structuring these responses.  In the immanence of contact, when 
the object is either pressed upon me or me upon it, the response realizes itself as act.   
 
 
 
                                                
18 Matter and Memory, p. 56/57 
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4. The Spectrum of Sensation 
 
But what is the precise point of contact between the unextended virtual images 
and those of the material world?  Mustn’t there be a locale in which the organism can 
be resolved into actual centers and not simply virtual ones, if only 
instantaneously?  Where, but in the extended body, can the actual contact between the 
organism and the material world occur?  It is precisely in affection that we discover that 
aspect of the organism that is fettered by the material world—this is why pain localizes in 
the place where it is felt.  
But still, sensation is not wholly reducible to the image of matter either.  It is a 
spectrum that includes ambiguous sensations that are not entirely affective or bodily.  
As in Time and Free Will, Bergson conceives of sensations as the intermediate states 
between deep-seated feelings and actual efforts. What distinguishes his position in 
Matter and Memory from that of the earlier work is not only that he now conceives of 
these intermediate states to be “vaguely” localized and extended, but also that pain—
being that extremity of the spectrum of sensation that is immanent to matter—now 
genuinely exhibits extension:  
Between images and ideas—the former extended and the latter 
unextended—[there are] a series of intermediate states, more or less 
vaguely localized, which are the affective states.  Our understanding, 
yielding to its customary illusion, poses the dilemma that a thing either is 
or is not extended, and as the affective states participates vaguely in 
extension, is in fact imperfectly localized, we conclude that this state is 
absolutely unextended[…]There is hardly any perception which may not, 
by the increase of the action of its object upon our body, become an 
affection, and more particularly, pain.  Thus we pass insensibly from the 
contact of a pin to its prick.  Inversely, the decreasing pain coincides 
with the lessening perception of its cause, and exteriorizes itself, so to 
speak, into a representation.  So it does seem, then, as if there is a 
difference of degree and not of nature between affection and 
perception.19  
 
Similar to perception, affection is no longer conceived merely as a mode of subjective 
sensation, but represents the extremity of a spectrum that ranges from extensity on the 
one side to the unextended on the other.  It is the “that part or aspect of our body 
which we mix with the image of external bodies” and “[it] possesses, from the outset, a 
                                                
19 Matter and Memory, p. 53/53  
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certain determination of extensity.” 20   Both perception and affection are adaptive 
faculties of the body which occupy intermediate positions between the image of 
objective matter and the pure memory which is the true substance of the subject.  
Exhibiting both extensity and qualitative multiplicity, sensation supplies the condition of 
freedom within the real world.   
In the above description, we discover the reason why intermediate sensations 
are conceived to be only ‘vaguely’ localized.  To the degree that the higher organism is 
always characterized by a virtual reserve of possibilities for action, it cannot be 
determinatively situated in that system of images called ‘the material world.’  The ability 
of the organism to stretch between duration on the one side and matter on the other is 
always the best measure of its vitality. While the organism must in every instant resolve 
itself or be resolved into definite relations within the external world, this instantaneous 
resolution into definite relations does not exhaust its possibilities; a halo of 
indetermination endures in the continuity of perception and intermediate sensation, 
forever passing beyond the actual moment of extension into which the part of the 
organism has been resolved.  
Pain arises at the precise moment and place at which the material object acts 
upon our body or the body upon it.  “While perception measures the reflecting power 
of the body, affection measures its power to absorb.”21  By this Bergson simply means 
that perception indicates the ability of the body to prepare itself for action.  Affection, 
on the other hand, indicates an ability to endure the actual situatedness of the body 
among other bodies.  “Affection is that part or aspect of the inside of our body which 
we mix with the image of external bodies.” 22 
Among the errors which lead the psychologist to consider sensation as 
unextended is the way that the localization of an affective sensation in one part of the 
body appears to be a matter of gradual training.   
A certain time elapses before the child can touch with the finger the 
precise point where it has been pricked [by a pin].  The fact is 
indisputable, but all that can be concluded from it is that some tentative 
essays are required to coordinate the painful impressions on the skin, 
which has received the prick, with the impressions of the muscular sense, 
which guides the movement, of arm and hand…There is, for each 
affection, an immediate localization of a certain kind, a local color which 
                                                
20 Matter and Memory, pp. 58/59, 59/61 
21 Matter and Memory, p. 56/57 
22 Matter and Memory, p. 58/59 
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is proper to it…There must be in the affection itself something which 
distinguishes it from other affections of the same kind and permits of its 
reference to this or that potential datum of sight or touch rather than to 
any other.  But is this not equivalent to saying that affection possesses, 
from the outset, a certain determination of extensity?23 
 
Now we can see how, Bergson’s early position also renders both perception and 
affection inexplicable, insofar as they posses nothing within themselves that would 
indicate why they should be localized in this place within space rather than that.  To 
overcome this problem, Bergson shifts away from conceiving of sensation as utterly 
unextended, and begins by positing the totality of perceived images.  Perception, in his 
view, does not begin as my perception, but gradually limits itself to my body from the 
aggregate of perceived images that surround it, ultimately realizing my body as a 
privileged center of action and personality.  This means that my body is not my own at 
the outset.  With its transformation into a center of action vis-à-vis the outside world, it 
gradually becomes my own.  The localization of affection measures the progress of this 
process, as does the degree to which I have made my body into an instrument of action 
and self-preservation.  
 Pain is the partial or vague materialization of that part of the body that is 
affected. This means that, in the part of the body that is affected, there is a danger that it 
will be drawn even further down into the image of matter, and this represents a threat to 
the integrity and durability of the organism. The localized part of the body is tending 
toward subjection to the physical laws that govern the image of the material world, and 
for this reason pain signifies something akin to a simple reaction to stimulus.  But, as we 
said a moment ago, the affect is localized to the part of the body that absorbs the impact, 
and the halo of indetermination that characterizes the center that is my own virtual 
body continues on, enveloping and adjusting itself to the new situation. For this reason, 
not only can I feel that I am in pain, I can perceive it.   Likewise, not only am I reacting 
to the pain, I am responding.  That doctors, in spite of their own extreme pain, have 
under urgent circumstances been known to perform surgery on their own open wounds 
attests to this differential tension in affection and perception, which is really just the 
enduring tension between a present (re)action of the body and future possibilities for 
action.  
                                                
23 Matter and Memory, p. 59/60 
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But we must ask this question: what happens when this differential tension 
really closes into the identity and massivity of externality, when I can no longer perceive 
my own wound because the pain is too great?  We are of course speaking of those 
instances of excruciating pain in which the organism is wholly absorbed by it—so much 
so that perception itself ceases.  And because perception and affection are two aspects 
on the same objective plane of the organism—the one reflecting and the other 
absorbing—if perception ceases, it is also likely that affection goes along with it.  The 
entire image of the material world seems to collapse into the torturous suffering of the 
organism.  At least from the standpoint of the bystander, the organism appears to 
become inert materiality and is reduced to nothing more than a twitching bundle of 
flesh, bones and nerve fiber.  The damaged body withdraws entirely into its own 
mechanisms and “closed system of automatic movements.” 24   The intervals of 
consciousness into which virtual images are launched have closed utterly, the body 
becoming entirely unreceptive to memory and devoid of personality.  If it has survived 
the impact, the healing mechanisms of the body must do their work.  And it is not as if 
the organism waits for this to happen—waiting implies an interval of perception, which 
has closed, as has the opportunity for memories to be taken up by the organism into 
action.  The body is given over to the pure massivity and alterity of matter.  “If you 
abolish my consciousness, the material universe subsists exactly as it was; only, since 
you have removed that particular rhythm of duration which was the condition of my 
action upon things, these things draw back into themselves.”25 
We saw that Bergson argues in Time and Free Will that the degrees of intensity 
in affection are really just unextended qualitative differences that are interpreted by the 
organism as extended quantitative intensities, and this for the practical purpose of 
maintaining an optimal balance vis-à-vis its environment.  Bergson says that this optimal 
balance is really just the preferred state of the organism, but its status as preference is 
masked as a determination from without.  The sensation is shrouded in the forms of 
the external world and this conceals the primordial unextended qualitative multiplicity 
at the heart of sensation.   We found this to be insufficient because it fails to account for 
the way in which sensation marks a contact with something genuinely outside of 
consciousness, which is best exemplified in the externality of excruciating pain.  Finally 
                                                
24 Matter and Memory, p. 80/82 
25 Matter and Memory, p. 208/233 
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the same question that we asked in terms of Time and Free Will we put to Matter and 
Memory: what happens when the organism is subjected to torturous forms of pain?   
We found his position in Matter and Memory to be superior insofar as it characterizes 
sensation as a spectrum ranging from the vague extendedness of intermediate sensation 
to the genuinely and precisely localized affection, which provides a means of accounting 
for the externality of pain. 
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8  
 
The Force of the Present:  A Bergsonian Challenge 
to Psychophysics 
 
 
 
Now it is beginning to dawn on maybe five or six brains that physics too 
is only an interpretation and arrangement of the world (according to 
ourselves! if I may say so) and not an explanation of the world.  But to 
the extent that physics rests on belief in the senses, it passes for more, 
and will continue to pass for more, namely for an explanation, for a long 
time to come.  It has our eyes and our fingers as its allies, it has visual 
evidence and tangibility as its allies.  This helped it to enchant, persuade, 
convince an age with basically plebeian taste—indeed, it instinctively 
follows the cannon of truth of the eternally popular sensualism.  What is 
plain, what “explains”?  Only what can be seen and felt,—this is as far as 
any problem has been pursued. 
 
—Friederich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 
 
 
 
Bergson’s philosophy poses a challenge to the ordinary direction of thought.  
Like Nietzsche, Bergson believes that until now all philosophy and science—indeed all 
intellectual thinking—is secretly oriented by the aim of securing the conditions for a 
particular form of organic life.  This kind of thought invariably presents itself as 
disinterested, and still it congratulates itself for having discovered what it covets most—
the objective truth.   But what if truth does not find its ultimate basis with the object, but 
with the subject?  And what if, rather than providing a window into the present, sense-
perception merely outlines an interest of the subject that pertains more to its future 
than its present?     
 In Matter and Memory, Bergson pursues these problems further than physics, 
which is content to translate common sense (what Nietzsche has called, ‘popular 
sensualism’) into scientific principles.  He seeks to determine what in their ostensibly 
‘impartial’ and ‘objective’ accounts of material reality can be attributed to the practical 
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interests and instincts of the embodied subject, and he challenges those concepts of the 
physicists that neglect the way in which these interests play an essential role in shaping 
their vision of objective reality.  Likewise, he disputes psychological theories that lean 
heavily upon the concepts of physicists in their efforts to explain human experience, 
and which, by inverting the true order of subject and object, subordinate the subject to 
the blind mechanisms of the material world.  In Bergson’s view, these theories all 
exhibit the same error; namely, that they project beneath what originally appears to 
consciousness as the brightly colored whirlwind of the senses the colorless, impersonal 
medium of space within which qualitative difference is flattened out and equalized.  
Now, rather than appearing in their true light as so many variously colored local 
differences of tone and hue, the objects of experience assume the appearance of 
already-composed, mutually indifferent objects, each of which is driven from behind by 
invisible forces.  
Nevertheless, like Nietzsche, Bergson’s aims far surpass those of Kantian 
critique.  His aim is not only to supplant wrong-headed epistemological and 
metaphysical concepts with carefully examined ones or to reveal the conditions of 
possible experience but, more ambitiously, to liberate the creative powers of 
consciousness which are effectively suppressed by spatial thinking.  However, the 
comparison with Kant is not totally inappropriate.  While Bergson has no interest in a 
further enumeration of the transcendental conditions of possible experience, believing 
these to resemble the principles of physics in the way that they follow the ordinary 
direction of thought and, as such, amount to nothing more than a further codification 
of commons sense, his goal is one of revealing the real conditions of experience as 
such.1  Indeed, the latter task remains subordinated to the former; the examination of 
the conditions of experience will have the effect of reintroducing us to what is also the 
condition of our creative involvement with the material world.  With these dual tasks in 
mind, Bergson suggests a radically new method according to which the pure duration 
that dwells behind our customary images of the material world can be revealed; the 
method of intuition.  In the intuition of pure duration, which is in the words of Jean 
Hyppolite, “pure succession, the extension of the past into the present and therefore 
                                                
1 Deleuze, G. (1991). Bergsonism. (H. Tomlinson, & B. Habberjam, Trans.) New York City: 
Zone Books. p. 23 
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already memory,” we are returned to the depths of the subject and the sense of our 
own freedom is renewed.2  
What will interest us in this chapter is not only Bergson’s critique of physics on 
the basis of his concepts of duration and memory, but also the implications of this 
critique for psychophysics, specifically as it pertains to affection.  Though Matter and 
Memory deals with these implications, its broader aim is the critique of the tradition of 
metaphysics and epistemology. Time and Free Will, Bergson’s first major work, also 
concerned the way in which the concepts that we use to understand and act upon the 
external world distort our understanding of the subject.  His central aim is to drive the 
principles of physics out of our psychological understanding of man. In the latter work, 
the notion of force as it is applied to affection is among the main target of his attacks, 
and it is this notion that will also be one of the main focuses of our inquiry.   
The main line of his early critique is the following:  If, as he argues, the center 
of the subject is devoid of extensity, must we not also understand sensation, which is 
itself a moment of subjective consciousness, as yet another moment of the same 
unextended durational multiplicity, only now pertaining to the peripheral body?  If 
sensation lacks extensity, then in what sense can we assert that it increases or decreases 
according to the forces that are exerted on the body?  In Time and Free Will he arrives 
at the following conclusion:  Sensation is indeed a moment of consciousness and a 
function of the subject—which is itself comprised only of the unextended qualitative 
multiplicity of duration—and so it must also be entirely unextended.  As such, the 
Fechnerian notion that sensation registers degrees of force is incorrect.   
Many of the conclusions of the earlier work will return in the later one, if in a 
more refined form.  But with the later work, which will be the main focus of this essay, 
we nevertheless find a rather radical shift in perspective concerning both the status of 
sensation and that of the extended world. While Matter and Memory also concerns the 
way that the form of homogenous space obscures the true nature of the subject and 
consequently diminishes its free will, it also submits a revised understanding of material 
reality.  Whereas before extended matter was subordinated entirely to the subject, 
really existing only as a function of its representations, in Matter and Memory this 
extensity is restored—now extended matter is understood to be yet another moment of 
duration whose ‘tension’ is relaxed (a claim that we will examine in some detail later 
                                                
2 Hyppolite, J. "Various Aspects of Memory in Bergson". in L. Lawlor, The Challenge of 
Bergsonism. New York: Continuum. p. 112 
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on). The material world, even if it depends upon the subject for its sense, is 
nonetheless accorded an ontological status equal to that of a subject. Thus, with Matter 
and Memory Bergson passes beyond his earlier position and accords to sensation its 
own materiality. These sensations that were formerly understood merely as moments of 
the subject’s unextended durational consciousness are now understood to be sensations 
of a world that is genuinely extended, and to occupy an ambiguous position 
intermediate between the subject and the present object.  Accordingly, the material 
world is understood to exist in a kind of equiprimordial tension with the subject, each 
according to their respective durations.  Sensation registers just this tension.   
Given the way that the later Bergson restores to materiality its own existence, this 
chapter reopens the question of whether we might characterize the movements of 
matter in terms of force—a question that Bergson does not readdress on the terrain of 
the later work.   We will find that within the revised understanding of sensation of 
Matter and Memory there is indeed a place for the reintroduction of something akin to 
the common sense notion that affection admits of degrees of force.  But this novel 
concept of force must nevertheless differ fundamentally from that of psychophysics.  
Whereas psychophysics suggests that sensation merely translates degrees of force 
coming from the objects of the extended world into degrees of discomfort and pain for 
the subject, the concept that we will suggest is one in which an increase of force 
measures the movement by which the subject is deprived by degrees of its capacity for a 
free response to the material world.   
 
1. Sensation and Memory 
 
More succinctly than Nietzsche ever could, Bergson managed to demonstrate 
that, rather than laying bare the true nature of material reality, physics offers nothing 
more than “an interpretation and arrangement of the world according to ourselves.”  
More than this, by pointing out how perception merely outlines our virtual action upon 
its objects, Bergson problematized the notion that perception grants to consciousness 
access to the immediate givenness of objects; a fact which renders dubious the 
physicist’s belief that the senses provide visual evidence and tangibility for the principles 
of his science.  If perception seems to exhibit objects positioned indifferently within 
space, this has more to do with the way in which the perceptual function dilutes 
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qualitative multiplicity in view of the subject’s action than with anything essential about 
its objects.  This dilution of qualitative multiplicity corresponds with the emergence of 
perceptual habits according to which the object increasingly reveals itself as a ready-
made thing.  This object, like all objects, must have initially presented itself as an event 
of pure qualitative difference between itself and what preceded it.  But as consciousness 
progressively selects from its qualities what is useful, increasingly filtering out what is 
unusable in view of securing the exigencies of life, qualitative differences begin to make 
their retreat into pure memory, leaving only the hollowed-out crust of our habitual 
bearing toward the object remaining.  It is this inert crust that physics takes as its object.   
Likewise, it is this inert crust that forms the basis of our representations.  Nevertheless, 
these qualitative differences continue to abide in the original event in which this reality 
was encountered; only now they no longer appear for perception, but are consigned to 
memory alone.  If one plumbs deeply enough in memory, one can discover this 
original event in its purity, unalloyed with the habitual mechanisms that have come to 
replace it within perceptual experience.     
In Bergson’s later view, there are two principle substances that synthesize in 
concrete perception: sensation and memory.  Whereas sensation is the feeling of 
movement within matter, memory is the virtual ground from which these movements 
derive their sense.  Perception’s chief interest is matter in movement, whether to move 
it oneself or to evade the movements emanating from the object, and it avails itself of 
the assistance of memory images to fulfill this interest.  Perception avails itself of 
memory not only to find in movement the confirmation of expectations vis-à-vis what 
has happened before or deviations from these expectations that demand novel 
responses, memory also suggests to perception movements that can supplement 
habitual reactions and thus further assist it in its free traffic with external objects.   
As a ceaseless search for openings in the present movements of matter within 
which to insert the memories of the past, the special office of perception is really to 
carry the subject forward into the future.  These ‘openings’ it finds in the distance 
between itself and its objects.3  For concrete perception, what this distance measures is 
not an area of objective space as physics understands it, but rather an interval of 
duration within which it can turn to memory for answers to the question of how it might 
adjust its relation to its object.  As this durational interval closes, so too do the 
                                                
3 Matter and Memory, p. 57/55 
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opportunities for possible adjustments. If they are to be successful, these adjustments 
must always involve a kind of intimate dance with the object, whereby the subtlest 
movements of the object are anticipated and answered with movements of ones own.  
Perceptual consciousness must inwardly mimic the movements of objects in order to 
appropriate them to itself and thereby pass beyond them toward a future that is entirely 
its own.  In this way, just as it reflects the anticipated movements of the external world, 
perception also prepares those of one’s own body that will be necessary to respond to 
external movements.   
However, as a sensation tends to overpower the efforts of perception for 
thwarting the movements of external bodies, this registers within consciousness as 
affection, which Bergson identifies as a ‘specialized perception.’  And while there is no 
perceptual sensation which, by the increase of the action of its object upon our body, 
may not become an affection, there is likewise no external source of affection which, 
when distanced from the body, may not become perceptual sensation.4  Whereas 
perception concerns the sensation of movement of external bodies, affection involves 
the sensation of movement within my own body. The latter represents the moment 
when movement encroaches on my body; the former the moment when this 
encroachment remains merely virtual.  Thus, the body does not merely reflect the 
action of external objects in the mode of perception; it also absorbs some measure of 
this action in the mode of affection.5  Affection is thus a special kind of perception in 
which what is perceived is the sensation of an external movement that encroaches upon 
the common limit between the external world and one’s own body.   
Both concrete perception and the specialized perception of affection can be 
opposed to what Bergson calls ‘pure perception,’ which merely reflects the 
‘instantaneous’ movement of external objects and their reciprocal relations.6  Bergson 
tells us that pure perception exists only in principle.  We might say that it occupies 
much the same position in Matter and Memory as the concept of ‘sense-certainty’ does 
within Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.  That is, it functions in no trivial way to 
highlight the deficiencies in former philosophical concepts of perception according to 
which it is held to plainly apprehend immediately present objects and provide an 
uncomplicated starting point from which to understand our relation with them.   
                                                
4 Matter and Memory, p. 53/53 
5 Matter and Memory, p. 56/57 
6 Matter and Memory, pp. 58/59, 65/67 
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But perception appears as simple, unmediated presence-to-object only when the 
essential role that memory plays in synthesizing instances of movement is repressed or 
ignored, as it is by materialism. While it is true that the sensational component within 
perception originates from the action of the object upon the sensitive nerves and ranges 
from “elementary vibrations” that are perceived as color or sound to the movements of 
solid mass, concrete perception is nevertheless much more than this.7   It selects from 
these vibrations only those that are of vital concern for the body.  However essential it 
may be, the reflective activity of perception forms only one aspect of its function.  It not 
only reflects in the manner of a mirror of immediate presence, but it also searches for 
openings within this reflection to insert the virtual images of memory into the 
impending encounter.  This reflective activity that is always also a search for openings is 
the special office of perception for the living organism. 8   The understanding of 
perception that is presupposed by Newtonian physics and articulated by psychophysics 
foregrounds perception’s reflective dimension while ignoring its searching activity.   
With his concept of pure perception—a kind of perception that is not unlike 
those presupposed by physics and psychological materialism—Bergson has put memory 
out of play only long enough to persuade us of its necessity.  But this is not all.  The 
concept of pure perception also minimizes the vital role that concrete perception plays 
with regard to avoiding or fostering affection, which involves a movement that impacts 
the body itself.  Insofar as the very real experience of affection transforms what from 
the ideal standpoint of pure perception is merely one among many objective points 
within the image of matter into a center of action and vital concern, we have to wonder 
if it does not also provide both the orientation and the real impetus for concrete 
perception, whether to protect the organism from harm or to reward it with pleasure.  
Bergson never says as much, and we will return to this question in a moment.  In any 
case, it is certain that the sensation of movement is taken by the organism as nothing 
less than a call for action from the material world—a call for action that is always also a 
call to memory for assistance in preparing this action.   
                                                
7 Matter and Memory, p. 138/153 
8  My perception appears to follow all the vibratory detail of the so called sensitive nerves; and 
on the other hand I know that the rôle of their vibrations is solely to prepare the reaction of my 
body on neighboring bodies, to sketch out my virtual actions. Perception, therefore, consists in 
detaching, from the totality of objects, the possible action of my body upon them. Perception 
appears, then, as only a choice.”  Matter and Memory, p. 229/220 
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As the sensation of movement diminishes, concrete perception increasingly 
becomes the experience of the distinct multiplicity of inert objects and, for this reason, 
tends to find qualitative difference only in an attenuated form.  In this kind of 
perception, quality takes the aspect of an accidental feature that is subordinated, as it 
were, to the being of the object. 9   But this no more implies that the numerical 
multiplicity of objects should be accorded a genuine ontological priority than it does 
that quality is truly a subordinate moment of objectivity.    
It is enough that perception should find qualitative differences that inhere in 
extension in a “diluted” form, so that they would become for it “practically negligible.”10  
Primarily, what matters for perception is the way in which it marks out its objects as 
indifferent, harmful or helpful for the organism.  The dilution of qualitative difference 
performed in concrete perception reveals itself as the condition for calculation and 
control, representing the principle condition for action.  If perception concerned itself 
with qualitative differences too much, this would undermine its function for the 
organism, which is to hastily sum up its objects according to vital needs.   
Moreover, the tendency for the dilution of qualitative multiplicity that 
characterizes everyday perception goes together with a slackening of the tension 
between the present and the past, and issues in our habitual comportments vis-à-vis 
objective reality.  What this means is that, in everyday perception, durational 
consciousness has relaxed vis-à-vis the perceived object.  Because the object represents 
nothing troubling for the body, consciousness has halted its search for differences 
between its immediate experience and those of the past.  And as the tension of 
duration slackens, so also does novelty disappear:  objects are simply what they are.  
There is no vital need to interrogate them more deeply or to turn to memory for 
answers.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 This is perhaps best exemplified in the difference between hearing sounds and listening for 
words:  “How can the sounds perceived speak to memory, how can they choose, in the 
storehouse of auditory images, those which should come to rejoin them, unless they have been 
already separated, distinguished, - in short, perceived, - as syllables and as words?” Matter and 
Memory, p. 110/121 
10 Matter and Memory, p. 182/203 
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2. Force, Effort 
 
While Bergson concedes to physics that real movement is a feature of the 
material world, he hesitates to characterize these movements of matter in terms of force, 
and still less does he embrace a concept of absolute movement, due to the confused 
role that these concepts play in psychophysics and Newtonian physics.11  Indeed, the 
former appropriates these concepts from the latter, which holds that movement is 
merely a relative change of place within absolute space.  In this theory, motion and 
space are together conceived as absolutes.  While absolute motion is understood by 
recourse to impersonal forces, absolute space provides the location within which these 
impersonal forces exert themselves.  And even if movement is relativized among the 
objects that populate it, homogenous space remains for materialism the backdrop 
against which the moving objects offset themselves.  By uncritically appropriating this 
concept of force from physics, psychophysics merely takes over the same problems that 
define it. Only now, inasmuch as psychophysics attempts to account for the qualitative 
changes of consciousness by recourse to quantities of force, these problems are 
multiplied.  
In place of these concepts of impersonal force and absolute motion, Bergson 
suggests a radical redefinition of the extended world.  Movement, he says, is far from 
absolute.  First of all, we must not imagine that it inheres in reality itself independent of 
perception and affection; it only unfolds for consciousness as an indivisible act.  Only 
once the impersonal medium of homogenous space is thrown beneath material 
movement by the intellect does movement admit of divisibility.  Not only does physics 
break this movement into divisible parts, it also posits behind it profound causes which 
are invisible to consciousness.12  But these profound causes, Bergson suggests, are 
really just analogues of the feeling of effort that have been objectified and stripped of 
their qualitative dimension.  And while Newtonian physics merely substantializes and 
objectifies this subjective feeling of effort in its concept of the movement of impersonal 
forces, psychophysics places the body within a universe within which this falsely 
objectified substance exerts itself upon it, and explains the body’s feelings by recourse 
to these forces.   
                                                
11 Matter and Memory, p. 193/216 
12 Matter and Memory, p. 195/218 
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As we can see, ‘force’ is really just alienated or exteriorized effort—that is, this 
concept finds its original basis in a sensation of effortful movement has been 
momentarily divorced from the vital schema that memory provides.  Now, this 
sensation has been stripped of its inherent relation to the interiority of the subject, 
characterized as it is by quality alone, and outwardly-projected into the external world, 
which is supposed to feature quantities of force behind every apparent quality. In 
physics and psychophysics alike, the movement of the objective world is explained only 
by surreptitiously introducing into it an analogue of our feeling of effort.   
Nevertheless, far from being so many useless deceptions, those theories of 
matter that project impersonal forces into the indifferent, homogenous medium of 
space actually speak to the needs of the organism. The same distortion of the real that 
is in evidence in these theories represents the condition according to which reality 
admits of a higher order of calculation and control. Linguistic communication also 
depends upon such a leveling out and dilution of qualitative difference as that which we 
find in these theories. However, these theories of physics have effectively radicalized 
these distortions and exalted them with the name of truth.  Every form of materialism, 
Bergson says, “is an attempt to find the reality hidden beneath the…customary images 
which are entirely relative to our needs.”13 
In order to dislodge these misleading images, Bergson does not begin with 
assuming the truth of those concepts which aid in the effort to secure our needs.  
Rather, he proposes that we begin with what is useless—namely, the qualitative 
multiplicity of duration—and proceed from there to trace the movement of genesis 
according to which the useful comes to assume its position of primacy and eventually 
substitute itself for genuine truth.  Involving an “an intense and unusual effort” that at 
once takes us in a direction that runs contrary to the exigencies of useful action and, in 
doing so, reveals the qualitative multiplicity that lurks behind our conventional concepts, 
the method of intuition yields a vital framework within which to understand how 
quantity comes to replace quality, and how the power that our needs exert functions to 
determine our understanding of the real.14  With this method, Bergson has shown us 
how to put our needs out of play long enough to arrive at their sense, thus offering us a 
                                                
13 Matter and Memory, p. 200/226 
14 Matter and Memory, p. 187/209 
 199 
new, vital schema within which to understand our relations with the world and with 
ourselves.   
Let us review the critique of the psychophysical concept of force that we find in 
Time and Free Will:  if sensation is devoid of extensity, in what way can it be said to 
increase or diminish?  Insofar as the representation of a measurable cause is 
thoughtlessly introduced into an immeasurable effect, such an explanation involves a 
vicious circle.  And if extensity and intensity are indeed different in kind, the relation 
between them could not even be one of cause and effect—the sensation is merely 
distorted into an objective relation and thus conceals under the rubric of causality the 
pure unextended qualitative indeterminacy that is inherent to sensation.15  Furthermore, 
if pain and pleasure can be said to increase or diminish, the greater pain must contain 
the lesser, which condemns us to the absurd position that unextended sensations can 
be piled one upon another, almost in the manner of a child’s toy blocks. In this 
relationship of container and contained, the Bergson of Time and Free Will suggests 
that we discover the key to understanding what is wrong with the notion that intensities 
can be measured in terms of magnitudes—we have spatialized something that by its very 
nature does not inhere in space.   
However, is there not a place for the reintroduction of the common sense 
notion that pain and pleasure is subject to increases and decreases of intensity in the 
later conception of affective sensation?  How are we to understand the law-like 
regularity with which the image of the material world operates, or the way in which 
every action within this image produces an equal and opposite reaction that involves a 
precisely measurable transfer of energy from one to the other, if not by recourse to a 
concept of force?  In Matter and Memory, he tells us that affection measures the power 
of the body to absorb the organism’s contact with the material world.  What precisely 
does affection measure, what does it absorb, if not forceful movements?  If we concede 
to sensation an amount of extensity, must we not also concede that it is subject to the 
forces that move there, and thus also the common sense belief that pain is subject to 
diminution and increase?  How are we to understand the intensification of sensation 
which issues in pain?   
With Matter and Memory, the conception of sensation has changed. It is now 
held to be ‘vaguely’ or partially extended and localized.  In Chapter 3, Bergson makes 
                                                
15 Time and Free Will, p. 2/2 
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an even stronger claim than this:  “We must make up our minds to it:  sensation is, in 
its essence, extended and localized; it is a source of movement.  Pure memory, being 
inextensive and powerless, does not in any degree share the nature of sensation.”16  
Whereas in Chapter 1, sensation was held to be vaguely localized, in Chapter 3 
sensation is regarded as the mark of the present within perception, “the very materiality 
of our existence.”17  Nevertheless, the former position remains true from the standpoint 
of memory, which constantly finds fissures in the material world within which it can 
insert itself.  However extended sensation may be, it does not resolve itself into a kind 
of impenetrable or massive identity. Affection and perception, insofar as they endure, 
continue to offer to memory new points of purchase according to which they can then 
materialize themselves.  As such, sensation can still be characterized as nascent 
freedom.  
There is not, in man at least, a purely sensory-motor state, any more 
than there is in him an imaginative life without some slight activity 
beneath it.  Our psychical life, as we have said, oscillates normally 
between these two extremes.  On the one hand, the present sensory-
motor state delineates the present direction of memory, being nothing 
else, in fact than its actual and acting extremity; and on the other hand, 
this memory itself, with the totality of our past, is continually pressing 
forward, so as to insert the largest possible part of itself into the present 
action.18  
 
The present is the moment in which virtual memory is transfigured into matter, into 
something actually lived.  As memory comes to the aid of the body, it contracts itself 
into its other, and it momentarily loses its virtuality in the present lived experience.  
Nevertheless, the virtual is not a kind of finite reserve that is progressively used up in 
and by the present.  The total memory of the past always remains—it has merely been 
momentarily forgotten and driven back upon itself in the (sensation of) effort to secure 
the immediate exigencies of life.  The present, embodied self has selected from 
memory what is useful to it, and it leaves the rest to itself, “suspended in the void.”19  
Though memory actualizes itself in the present in one moment, it is recovered within 
the broader unity of memory in the next.  In this regard, there is no genuine 
fragmentation of memory.  It remains forever integral and intact.  It hangs together with 
                                                
16 Matter and Memory, p. 140/155 
17 Matter and Memory, p. 139/154 
18 Matter and Memory, p. 168/187 
19 Matter and Memory, p. 151/168 
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itself as a unity that always stretches from the deepest memory of pure qualitative 
multiplicity that characterizes embryonic life to that of the immediately recovered 
present which, in passing, has itself fallen back into the memories of the past.  
Sensation is simply the point of contact between the extended world and the virtual.  In 
one sense, it is immanently situated on the plane of extension.  In another, it is the tip 
of the cone that is memory itself.20 
Every psychophysical account of mental phenomenon has two fundamental 
metaphysical presuppositions: firstly, that the reality of present objects is always already 
formed as a distinct multiplicity, and secondly, that the organism has no unique 
ontological status of its own, being just one among other beings within the discrete 
multiplicity of this reality.  According to this account, sensation is nothing more than 
the simple encounter between the mechanisms of the organism and this already-formed 
multiplicity of objects. And memories, in this account, are nothing more the lasting 
traces of these encounters that are inscribed in the brain, which is regarded as a kind of 
storehouse of past sensations.  Thus, between sensation and memory psychophysics 
can find only a difference of degree, the former being the source of strong psychic 
states, the latter, as time goes by, increasingly weaker ones.  Matters are different for 
Bergson who, as we have seen, places sensation in the ambiguous position between a 
reality that operates according to strict causal laws, and what he calls in his first work the 
“fundamental self,” 21  comprised of memory, that is capable of introducing 
indeterminacy into this reality. While the “elementary vibrations” of the actual world 
represent the real content of sensation, in memory, in the moi fondamental, we find its 
virtual ground.22   Thus, sensation does not simply register pure presence for the 
organism; rather, together with perception, it continually receives into itself the past 
while at once suggesting what may come in the future.   
If sensation were not situated in this ambiguous position, if it were regarded to 
be a function of a totally extended being rather than that extremity of psychic life which 
actualizes itself in relation to material reality, we would have no problem reverting to 
the psychophysical understanding of the increase and diminution of pain in terms of 
container and contained such as that which is repudiated in Time and Free Will, since 
                                                
20 Matter and Memory, p. 152/181 
21 Bergson’s first articulation of this idea of the “fundamental self” can be found in Time and 
Free Will, p. 129/96.    
22 Matter and Memory, p. 138/153 
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we would find in sensation nothing that would complicate a relationship of pure 
extensities.  The greater pain would contain the smaller pain, the greater pleasure the 
smaller one, and so on, each being registers of forces that move in material reality.  
Furthermore, we could revert to an understanding of memory as mere impoverished 
presence, and forgetting could be understood as the expression of a diminishment of 
the force that characterizes the present moment.   According to this theory, if there is a 
schism that opens up between the present and the past, this is not because, as Bergson 
asserts, the present is the site of lived experience which requires forgetting with regard 
to those memories that are not useful for it, but only because the force of the living 
present diminishes as it recedes into the past.  To this theory of memory and sensation 
the Bergson of Matter and Memory concedes that it is truly the real movement of 
elementary vibrations that characterizes the sensation of the present.  But however 
much these movements may play a role in affection, he holds that they play no such 
role in memory as such.  For him, the roles are inverted—while material movement 
provides its source, memory becomes the condition of sensation’s sense.  As the 
ground against which sensation finds its sense, memory provides the “vital schema” 
according to which sensation becomes what it is for the enduring organism).23  But what 
happens when these objects appear to us as threats to the integrity of the body?  As the 
threatening object approaches, both the tension of memory and that of the nervous 
system increase.  With regard to the nervous system, some motor movement will be 
necessary; it will be called upon to coordinate a reaction.  With regard to memory, the 
vital differences between the present situation and those of the past must be detected.  
Therefore, consciousness must do one of two things: it must either urgently search for 
memory images that will assist in answering the question of what sort of movement 
might prove effective in evading or overpowering the approaching threat, or it must give 
itself over to the already-formed, habitual motor mechanisms with which similar threats 
have been thwarted in the past, trusting that these mechanisms will secure the organism 
against the present threat and carry it forward into the future.   But even if it simply 
places its trust in these ready-made habits to deal with the threat, first it must be assured 
be that the encounter is not dramatically different from those that it has successfully 
managed in the past, and so even in this instance, it must turn to memory images.  
Whatever the case may be, tension increases.   
                                                
23 Hyppolite, J. "Various Aspects of Memory in Bergson". in L. Lawlor, The Challenge of 
Bergsonism. New York: Continuum. p. 117 
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3. The Tensions of Body and Memory 
 
What precisely is this tension?  Are there really two, independent kinds of 
tension, that of the nervous system and that of memory, as our description might 
suggest?  Or is this a single tension that manifests as a kind of contraction of the 
duration that stretches between them? These questions can be answered by tracing the 
inverse movement of perception and affection, which corresponds to the closure of the 
distance between the organism and a dangerous object, such as a lion on the veld.  
Recall that the distances by which perception marks out its objects are just intervals 
within which the organism might modify its relation to them.  As this distance closes 
between the organism and the threatening object, so also do these intervals within 
which memory images can insert themselves.  But even before the distance closes, the 
dangerous object already stands out from its surroundings within perception.  Indeed, 
what separates it from the surrounding objects is precisely the manner in which it may, 
under certain circumstances, come to represent a vital threat.  In other words, together 
with the perception of the lion, even when it remains only at a distance that can be seen 
through binoculars, there already emerges a moderate feeling of fear, which explains 
why this object stands out so distinctly from its others and exerts the enchanting power 
that it does.  However, as long as the beast remains remote, the affective tension 
remains relatively low, and perception continues along its normal course.  But as the 
distance closes, as we sense this threat moving toward us, stalking us as it does a beast 
of prey, perception begins to give itself over to affection, and contraction becomes 
constriction.   
In this moment of peril, it is as if all of the activity of thought contracts into one 
unsettling question:  Am I ready for this?—a question that reflects the gathering tensions 
of the impending moment of encounter.  Such, it seems, is the nature of panic.  Panic 
is the affect before the event of contact.  It is the moment when memory and 
movement begin to collapse confusedly into one another under the constricting tension 
of the demand to act.  Next, as this tension overpowers the demand for action, panic 
gives over to a feeling of helplessness before the total novelty of the present situation; a 
helplessness that, in having given up on finding the appropriate response, evokes the 
powerlessness of the past.  Really, what the tension of panic indicates is the all-too-rapid 
closure of the window within which a response to the present threat might be 
 204 
formulated and, consequently, an increasing inability to coordinate memory images 
with the demands of the present.  Nevertheless, the moment of closure does not 
necessarily imply the disappearance or total retreat of the profound self into the 
unconscious.  In such a moment, having been so overpowered by the abundance of 
difference between one’s habitual involvements with matter and what unfolds in the 
event, some may indeed ‘blackout’ and loose consciousness.  Still others will remain 
vigilantly awake and watchful in spite of their helplessness.  In fact, the impending event 
may bring the profound self to the fore even more.  In this case, the profound self of 
memory stands before the event as before its own fate.  Everything that I have been, am 
or ever will be appears to be at risk.  Perhaps this explains the commonness with which 
those who have had near-death experiences say that, before the moment of impact, 
their entire life passed before their eyes.  In the total helplessness before the event one 
has given up on action, and this resignation to the inevitable enables pure memory to 
flood into consciousness as water through a ruptured dike.24 
The affect of panic follows from a confrontation with an impending event that is 
so abundant with novelty that memory struggles to find a point of purchase.  A moment 
ago, we observed that a dilution of qualitative difference evinced in perception is the 
condition for calculation and control.  But this encounter with a strange and dangerous 
beast is like none before experienced.  In it, we find an inversion of the conditions for 
practical action—precisely the intensification of qualitative difference within extension 
which characterizes affection generally.25  The presentation of an overabundance of 
qualitative difference diminishes the possibilities for calculation, and ultimately 
generates the sense of helplessness.  In this encounter, we can sense a triple failure:  
Firstly, the search for intervals within this experience according to which one might gain 
some measure of control over it is utterly in vain.  The distance appears to be closing 
                                                
24 Matter and Memory, p. 155/172 
25 “What is an affection?...The more the distance diminishes between these bodies and our 
own, the more the possible action tends to transform itself into a real action, the call for action 
becoming more urgent in the measure and proportion that the distance diminishes. And when 
this distance is nil, that is to say when the body to be perceived is our own body, it is a real and 
no longer a virtual action that our perception sketches out. Such is, precisely, the nature of pain, 
an actual effort of the damaged part to set things to rights, an effort that is local, isolated, and 
thereby condemned to failure, in an organism which can no longer act except as a whole. Pain 
is therefore in the place where it is felt, as the object is at the place where it is perceived. 
Between the affection felt and the image perceived there is this difference, that the affection is 
within our body, the image outside our body. And that is why the surface of our body, the 
common limit of this and of other bodies, is given to us in the form both of sensations and of 
an image.” Matter and Memory, p. 233/262 
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too quickly for one to search for helpful images, which implies that consciousness’ 
essays into memory on behalf of bodily movement themselves occupy a certain 
duration.  Secondly, even if the distance did not close so quickly, the body itself is ill 
equipped to deal with the threat, lacking both in the habitual motor-mechanisms and 
the strength with which to thwart it.  And finally, there appears for the superficial self an 
insuperable disproportion between the past and the present which threatens to break 
the progressive movement into the future—that is, there is nothing within my memory 
that might come to my aid in such an encounter.  The only way in which memory 
corresponds with the event is that it evokes the pure difference and qualitative 
multiplicity that characterizes the depths of the profound self. The degree of 
disproportion between the past and the present is a measure of the strangeness of the 
experience.  Everyday experience, far from being marked by this strangeness, rather 
reveals itself in familiarity:  “The consciousness of a well-regulated motor 
accompaniment, of an organized motor reaction, is here the foundation of the sense of 
familiarity.  At the basis of recognition there would thus be a motor order.  To 
recognize a common object is mainly to know how to use it.”26  Or, to put it slightly 
differently, to recognize a common object is to know how to manage or neutralize it.  
But in our example, there is no motor order appropriate to the threat.  As it 
approaches, what was formerly recognized in perception as a lion now transforms into a 
pure monstrosity, something that is no longer even recognized as such.  
What we have described here is a moment in which memory in its totality 
doubles in confusion over bodily movement.  Each finding the other unready to receive 
it, bodily movement and memory helplessly pass one other by without merging in 
synthesis.  While the profound self senses that the opening through which it might 
carry itself forward into the future may be closing once and for all, the superficial self, 
in sensing the loss of its own past, which has until now remained patiently in wait to 
come to its aid, is seized with the vertigo of the pure present.  This amounts to a 
rupture in the tension between memory and the body, issuing finally in the very duality 
of tensions with which we began our discussion.  The profound self is given over to 
dreaming in the precise moment in which the body is in so much danger.  (“As it 
happened, my whole life passed before my eyes!”)  And yet nervous tension has 
increased to such a degree that there is no possibility for memory to insert itself into the 
                                                
26 Matter and Memory, p. 93/101 
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present.  The disturbances at the periphery are too extreme, vibrating with such 
intensity that they have obstructed every point of entry.   Because action is now futile, 
memory crosses the threshold of consciousness, which now hangs over the event like a 
ghost, at once watching as the bodily condition of its enduring existence undergoes 
conflagration and confronting everything that it has ever been. Those who have 
survived traumatic encounters such as the one that we have just described have often 
remarked that, in the heat of the event, they felt as though they detached from their 
own body and underwent what has been called an ‘out-of-body experience.’  Can we 
not explain this by the way that, because of the rupture between them, the profound 
self, having risen to the level of consciousness, must stand idly by and merely witness 
the movement according to which the superficial self is drawn down into the pure 
causality and iron logic of the image of matter?  As consciousness finds itself 
instantaneously exiled from the movement of the body, it finds refuge in the unity of 
memory.  In this regard, notwithstanding ‘pure perception’, which exhibits the pure 
present only in principle, this sort of bodily movement actually brings us closer to the 
present than anything else.   
We have to wonder whether just such a disproportion as this doesn’t provide 
the basis for a Bergsonian conception of trauma.  What would be remembered from 
the traumatic encounter is precisely this radical disproportion between memory and the 
sensory-motor functions, in which the latter can find nothing in the former that might 
come to its aid.  After such a trauma has been endured, subsequent situations that 
evoke the memory of this disproportion would issue in the same paralyzing feelings of 
panic and helplessness that characterized the original event.  Such an explanation may 
provide a new basis for understanding post-traumatic stress disorder.   
 
4. The Ecstatic Doubling of Memory and Body 
 
Whereas the affection of bodily effort and pain are defined by a real contact 
between the organism and object, perception is defined by the distance between 
organism and object—a distance that really a measure of the interval within which the 
organism may turn to memory for its answer to the approaching object.  Bergson’s 
paradigmatic example of perception, then, is not that of a disinterested observation of 
some inert or harmless object, but rather, a deeply interested encounter between the 
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organism and something that holds threats or promises for it in the immediate future—
that is, an object that might issue in affection.   
To Bergson’s paradigmatic example we can oppose that of physics, which takes 
an apparently disinterested observation of some harmless object or relations between 
objects to exemplify the true perceptual relation between organism and object, and it is 
this disinterestedness that will provide the basis of scientific objectivity.  Once again, the 
specter of homogenous space can be divined beneath this disinterested perception of 
the object, spreading itself out in every direction as the absolute setting within which 
impersonal forces meet one another.  But as soon as the distance between the object 
and the organism is understood as an interval for choosing ones response, it 
straightaway looses the aspect of an absolute that is devoid of subjective quality.  ‘Space’ 
becomes rather a site of vital encounter, imbued with all of the fearful or hopeful 
possibilities that such an encounter might hold for the organism.   
On this basis, we can assert that perception actually aims at preventing the 
confused collapse of material movement and memory which issues in the ‘impurity’ of 
affection.  Concrete perception is also marked by an alloy of bodily sensation and 
memory image.  Nevertheless, the free coordination and alignment of bodily 
disposition with memory images in response to the call to action from the extended 
world amounts to a success on behalf of perception. But, once again, such a free 
response requires time within which the memory image can be coordinated with bodily 
movement in the perception.  Moreover, there must be something within memory that 
can come to its aid.  And finally, the body must already possess motor-mechanisms that 
might be capable of thwarting the threat.  It is doubtless true that, as Bergson says, 
“there is no perception which is not prolonged into movement.”27  But in this ecstatic 
doubling of memory over the body such as that of the traumatic encounter, we find an 
example precisely of a failure of perception, which is now prolonged into a movement 
that has been alienated instantaneously from the vital schema that memory provides.  
This sensation of movement is one in which memory can offer no assistance.  Insofar 
as the possibility of assistance from memory represents the condition of freedom, such 
a sensation can only be said to indicate a moment in which this freedom 
instantaneously breaks down—that is, a moment in which the body is captured by 
necessity.  Here, it must entirely follow in the direction of nature and endure the 
                                                
27 Matter and Memory, p. 94/101 
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impact.  The body, this “pointed end” that is the “ever advancing boundary between 
the future and the past,” is for an instant held fast by the present.  As such, it no longer 
functions as a conductor “interposed between the objects which influence it and those 
on which it acts,” but rather only helplessly receives into itself the influence of the 
hostile object.28  
These considerations raise the question of the unique status of the present in 
Bergson’s philosophy.  What have we just described if not a movement within the 
present that has remained indifferent to the synthesizing activity of consciousness?  And 
how can we square this with what Bergson has told us about durational consciousness—
namely, that it can only but pass through the present as a moment of transition, without 
ever engaging with the present qua itself except in relation to a past of which it is a 
contraction or a future of which it is an anticipation.  Unless the present exhibits this 
easy-flowing transitional character intermediate between the past and the future such as 
that which is exhibited in normal sensation, the primary condition of freedom remains 
unfulfilled.  But must we conclude from this that the present does not exist? Deleuze 
appears to think as much, claiming that “the present is not…The past, on the other 
hand,…has not ceased to be…it IS, in the full sense of the word: it is identical with being 
in itself.”29  But does not a moment of radical necessity such as the one that we have 
attempted to describe provide us with a glimpse of the present as such?   Is this not a 
moment of an intransigent present that instantaneously sticks out like a thorn in the 
side of duration?   
Rudolf Bernet appears to strike the right balance when, against this claim of 
Deleuze that the present possesses no existence, he suggests that, even if this present is 
never registered except as transition between past and future for intensional 
consciousness, there is indeed a present for corporeal perception. The extremity of 
organic life that perceives the vibratory movements of the material world—namely, the 
“central telephonic exchange” that is the brain—must itself be situated on the plane of 
matter and, as such, it must exist as a moment of the image of material presence.30  “If 
a pure present does not exist for consciousness and yet exists nonetheless, this can only 
be for the perceiving body, or more precisely, for the brain that receives and transmits a 
present excitation.  The conclusion to be drawn is that, in Bergson, there is only a 
                                                
28 Matter and Memory, p. 78/82 
29 Deleuze, 1991, Bergsonism, p. 55 
30 Matter and Memory, p. 30/34 
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present for corporeal perception and that, moreover, such a ‘pure’ material perception 
has nothing in common with intensional consciousness.”31  Bernet is no doubt correct 
in opposing Deleuze on this point.  The latter’s claim that “the present is not” neglects 
the critical shift that Bergson made between Time and Free Will and Matter and 
Memory, in which matter is accorded a genuine existence of its own.  In Bergsonism, 
though it would appear to concern itself chiefly with Matter and Memory, the 
‘fundamental self’ of the earlier work seems to reappear under the rubric of the pure 
past as the only thing that genuinely exists.  In this way, Deleuze has reintroduced the 
reductionary monism of Bergson’s early work whereby matter and the present possess 
no ontological status of their own, each being reduced to a pure past which 
progressively unfurls itself toward the future, always only passing beyond a material 
present that merely exists in principle.  In Professor Bernet’s view, Deleuze has 
“show[n] all too little interest in the dynamic conjunction, so important for Bergson, 
between the present and the past…Rather than speaking of the inexistence of the 
present, it would seem preferable to draw attention to the fact that, for Bergson, the 
evanescence of the present is ballasted by the weight of the past that not only saves the 
present from foundering in nothingness but that also gives it a dimension of depth.”32 
With our example, we have stumbled upon an instance in which this dynamic 
conjunction is disturbed.  But even if this is so, we can see that it only provides an 
example of an instantaneous disjunction between the past and the present.  The 
intensification of affection has momentarily immobilized the influence of the past upon 
the present, and yet the past remains.  The organism that falters in the present looses 
touch with its own past, which, as we have seen, provides the reserve that it must 
continually draw upon in order to freely recompose itself in relation to an indefinite 
future.  Using the language of Bernet, what our example reveals is a moment when an 
instance of the present appears to lose its “ballast” and run amok.  Nevertheless, what is 
revealed is nothing like a hitherto-concealed originary presence such as that 
presupposed by physics, but rather a moment of disruptive presence that outstrips the 
influences of both recollection-memory and its habitual derivatives.  If such an 
encounter revealed the existence of an originary presence, this would threaten to 
overturn the ontological primacy of memory that is the condition of the subject’s free 
                                                
31 Bernet, R. (2005). “A Present Folded Back on the Past.” Research in Phenomenology (35).  
32 Bernet, R., p. 70 
 210 
response, and deliver us over to a metaphysics of presence which understands memory 
to be the effect of diluted or weakened presence.  Perception, in Bergson’s view, is far 
from a mere transparency of consciousness which grants immediate access to a form of 
present givenness.33  If perception concerns itself with the present at all, this is only in 
the sense that it aims at preventing this present from becoming disruptive, averting 
those movements within it which might cause consciousness to founder in the present 
and hinder the smooth-flowing transition from past to future.  The stronger the 
affection, the more the disruptions which it registers threaten to invert and confuse the 
vital order between the memory of the past and the present material movement, thus 
obstructing the free projection of the future and diminishing the subject’s sense of 
meaning.  Memory must be allowed to come to the aid of the body, and this means that 
the latter’s movements must be freely selected.   
In the moment of helplessness which we have tried to describe, one finds that 
one’s exteriority and interiority loose their vital correlation.  The bodily I is 
instantaneously depersonalized, and yet the “dead weight” of the past continues to lean 
upon matter, now spreading itself out confusedly over the event itself rather than 
contracting into coordinated bodily movement.34  The center of indetermination that is 
one’s embodied point of view dissolves into a swarming of forces, none of which offer 
to memory a point of purchase.  We may ask whether an event such as this represents 
a culmination of anxiety before death, and whether this isn’t just what affection foretells. 
As we have seen, among the central functions of perception is precisely to prevent the 
confusion and impurity of affection. Is the confusion of affection a herald of death for 
the organism?  May we not say that this effort is at least in some measure motivated by 
an urgency to prevent the positive movement of conscious life from sinking into 
nothingness?  Does affection really indicate the beginning of a movement by which 
consciousness is reduced to nothingness—a nothingness which the fatal event threatens 
to bring about? This is truly a potentially deadly situation.  But what would such a death 
involve?35 
                                                
33 Bernet, p. 71 
34 Matter and Memory, p. 145/160 
35 In one sense, our example appears to provide yet another example of what Levinas has 
called in Existence and Existents “existence without a world,” an existence that is—at least for an 
instant—extracted from its reference to an inside which provides both the structure and the 
sense that forms the basis of a world. For Levinas, it is the experience of insomnia that provides 
us with a glimpse at a moment in which we are confronted with existence in its nakedness.  But, 
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5. Force, Revisited 
 
A moment ago, we examined Bergson’s repudiation of the psychophysical 
concept of impersonal force.  We saw that this concept can only be understood by 
analogy with a feeling of effort that has both been denuded of its qualitative character 
and projected into homogenous space.  ‘Force,’ it was said, is really just the 
objectivization and substantialization of this feeling of effort.  But, we also noted that 
this involves a fundamental distortion of effort whereby it is stripped of its inherent 
relation to the subject—a subject which is, we must recall, comprised essentially of 
qualitative differences that stretch from the unextended depths of memory to the 
pointed end of psychic life, the extended body.  The true origin of the psychophysical 
notion of impersonal force is thus radically personal.  Moreover, bodily effort, which 
genuinely exhibits qualitative difference, is abruptly transfigured into a difference of 
quantity.  Force is really movement or effort that has been alienated from the vital 
schemas of memory.  In this regard, insofar as sense only arises through the vital 
schemas of memory and the concept of force is that of something that is supposed to 
inhere in the real independent of the vital schema that memory provides, 
‘psychophysical force’ appears to be a senseless concept.   
Certainly, psychophysics has the order of things wrong.  We do not see how 
force can be made into a substance that inheres in nature independent of the subject.  
Nor must we concede that sensation can only be understood by recourse to the priority 
of forces, or that sensation somehow magically translates impersonal quantities of force 
into the qualitative differences experienced by the subject.  Bergson’s case that memory 
is the condition upon which sensation finds its sense remains compelling.   And, as we 
have seen, the way that memory comes forward to meet with the movement of the body 
in the mode of concrete perception, offering to perceptual consciousness those images 
which most closely fit with the present so that this present can be subtly bent toward a 
                                                                                                                                      
unlike our example, in which there is a genuine threat to the organism, the horror of insomnia 
has nothing to do with any threats that are concealed by the darkness.  And this is what makes it 
possible for Levinas to make the assertion that the horror of insomnia is in no way an anxiety 
about death:  “In horror, a subject is stripped of its subjectivity, of his power to have private 
existence.  The subject is depersonalized.  ‘Nausea’, as a feeling for existence, is not yet a 
depersonalization; but horror turns the subjectivity of the subject, his particularity qua entity, 
inside out. It is a participation in the il y a, in the il y a which returns in the heart of every 
negation, in the il y a that has ‘no exits.’  It is, if we may say so, the impossibility of death, the 
universality of existence even in annihilation.”  (Levinas 1987, 56) 
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future which it does not contain—in these ways memory also represents the condition of 
freedom.  Memory, as Bergson understands it, is thus understood both as the condition 
of freedom and of sense. From this it follows that the power to give meaning to life goes 
intimately together with the power to act freely upon matter.  Without this capacity for 
introducing some measure of indeterminacy into the present, man looses his power to 
determine his own future.   
In the light of these observations, it can be seen that “vortices and lines of force 
are never, to the mind of the physicist, more than convenient figures for illustrating his 
calculations.” 36   Against the backdrop of the demand for action that determines 
perception, we may begin to realize why these symbols are more expedient than others.  
Only now, after they have been purified of the radicalizations and distortions according 
to which they have been transformed into scientific or metaphysical truths, perhaps 
they may be reintroduced as critical tools.   
Could we, working with [the notions of vortices and lines of force], get 
back to experience, if the notions to which they correspond did not at 
least point out the direction in which we may seek for a representation 
of the real?  Now the direction which they indicate is obvious; they show 
us, pervading concrete extensity, modifications, perturbations, changes 
of tension or of energy and nothing else.37 
 
Between these changes of tension and energy that we encounter in the external world 
and those that we experience in our own feeling of effort, there is no difference in kind.  
The tendency to place quantity on one side and quality on the other follows only from 
a radical inversion of the genuine order of things.  That is, we have found in external 
movement the source of our own movement, and not the other way around.  Moreover, 
we have thrown beneath external movement an indifferent, homogeneous medium.  
And because we have forgotten that we are responsible for the intellectual act that has 
been performed in view of transforming what is inherently qualitative into manageable, 
practicable quantities, we have elevated this medium to the level of a metaphysical truth, 
and we come to believe we live among the impersonal forces that move there.  When 
viewed with the right eyes, we can see that real movements actually present quality 
itself—qualities that are “vibrating internally, and beating time for its own existence 
                                                
36 Matter and Memory, p. 201/226 
37 Matter and Memory, p. 201/226 
 213 
through an often incalculable number of moments.”38  If there is such a thing as force 
in the material world, it is a force that is shot through with quality.  
Nevertheless, perhaps there is something of this concept of force that can be 
salvaged and, with it, the common sense claim that pain is subject to increase and 
diminution. But what would a Bergsonian concept of force entail?  We already saw the 
way that both physics and psychophysics strip movement of its inherent relation to the 
subject.  We also saw that force, as materialism understands it, is really just alienated 
movement.  How do matters change when the essential relation between movement 
and memory is restored?  Affection in its extreme form is marked by the closure of the 
intervals within which memory can insert itself.  It involves a movement that has been 
alienated instantaneously from the vital schema that memory provides, issuing finally in 
the ecstatic doubling of memory over the body that we have already examined.   Does 
this not imply that the term ‘force’ can be applied to affection?  Force, in this rendering 
of the term, would characterize a movement by which the body is tending to be 
deprived of its freedom.  An increase of force would actually correspond with a 
decrease in the body’s power to act as a conductor between the objects which influence 
it and those on which it acts.  It would involve a process by which memory is 
progressively alienated from the body.  And what is this if not, once again, a form of 
alienated effort or movement?  Force closes the body off from memory.  And because 
the body’s connection with memory is what assures that the past might assist in the 
effort to shape the future, it measures the movement by which the body is progressively 
rendered over to the pure present.   Therefore, rather than being reduced to the status 
of a ‘senseless concept,’ force supplies a concept for the movement by which 
experience is increasingly dispossessed of its sense by the perturbations and heightened 
degrees of tension that characterize affection.   
                                                
38 Matter and Memory, p. 202/227 
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9  
 
Life and Death in the Philosophy  
of Henri Bergson 
 
 
 
 
There is never absolute birth nor complete death, in the strictest sense, 
consisting in the separation of the soul from the body.  What we call 
births are developments and growths, while what we call deaths are 
envelopments and diminutions.   
 
—G.W. Leibniz, 1714 
 
 
 
You are dust, and to dust you shall return. 
 
—Genesis, c 800 BC 
 
 
 
 
 
The notion that there is an undying divine force at the heart of existence is one 
that resonates deeply within Bergsonian philosophy.  Indeed, this notion is perhaps 
Bergson’s most basic intuition.  It provides the basis for his rejection of mechanistic 
physics in Matter and Memory.  In Creative Evolution, it supplies the basic insight into 
the evolutionary movement of biological life, and so it also provides the basis for his 
rejection of the mechanistic theories of the neo-Darwinians.  The very creative drive 
that can be discovered within ourselves can also be seen to operate more generally 
within nature as an élan vital. Whereas these works are merely applications and 
revisions of this basic insight regarding the undying creative force at the heart of 
existence in the domains of physics and biology, Time and Free Will is the work in 
which this intuition finds its first articulation.   
Late in life, Bergson would avow his affinity for Catholicism, refusing to convert 
only in order to demonstrate his solidarity with the Jews:   
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My reflections have led me closer and closer to Catholicism, in which I 
see the complete fulfillment of Judaism.  I would have become a convert, 
had I not foreseen for years a formidable wave of anti-Semitism about to 
break upon the world.  I wanted to remain among those who tomorrow 
were to be persecuted. (From the February 8, 1937 entry of Bergson’s 
diary) 
 
Those who wish to find parallels between Bergson’s thinking and Christian theology 
have only turn to his early work, Time and Free Will, where he not only accords to the 
invisible creative movement of duration an ontological priority, but even goes so far as 
to reduce the extended body almost to the status of an illusion that derives more from a 
representational order that aims at securing the needs of life than from concrete reality 
itself.  That is to say, even extensity itself in moments assumes the aspect of a mere 
shadow of the unextended qualitative multiplicity of durational becoming. With the 
intuition of unextended duration within ourselves we are afforded a kind of immediate 
access to the creative movement of life.  And still more validation for the affinity of 
Bergsonism with Christian thought can be found in the assertion that the necessity for 
acting upon the demands of embodied existence are really what obscure the flow of 
duration, thus inducing us to fall into habits and representations that further estrange us 
from the divine movement of creative becoming.   Is the purpose of reflecting on 
prelapsarian duration not that of the meditation upon this divine creative movement?  
Is this not a kind of meditation that becomes for the Christian thinker an end in itself 
and almost a kind of prayer?   
Time and Free Will could even be understood to offer us a glimpse of the 
divine creativity at the heart of pain, and the Christian thinker might find new insight 
into the nature of Christ’s Passion.  In our experience of intensive sensation, rather 
than quantitative increases of force Bergson suggests that what we really find is an 
unfolding of qualitative becoming that corresponds with the creative movement at the 
core of reality.   And if we are inclined to identify the unfamiliar sensations of 
becoming as painful, it is only because of the way that we have become habituated to 
certain sensations over others, and have thus lost our feeling for divine creativity.  The 
arc of normal experience over time reflects this tendency for the loss of divine creativity.  
Unless it is countered by the effort of intuition to recover the creative fullness of 
duration that resides deep in the self, what was originally a richness of qualitative 
difference will invariably, with age, harden and congeal into differences of mere 
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quantity.  And now, rather than being understood as a host of qualitative differences 
that becomes with the creative unfolding of duration, the body is represented merely as 
one pre-constituted being among others, each of which presenting a potential threat to 
the other.    
Together with the inurement to habit in sensation there also follows a tightening 
of the grip of representations upon thought, issuing finally in a mental and physical 
inflexibility that amounts to the diminishment of our feeling for creativity.  Whereas 
habit and representation (insofar as these representations have lost the dynamism of 
intuition) mark a tendency for descent toward extension, the creative unfolding of 
qualitative multiplicity that is to be found in the fullness of duration marks a movement 
of divine ascent.   Christ’s readiness to suffer for man is thus really a sign of His ascent, 
and it could be said to reveal the deepest intuition of this undying divine creativity.  
Perhaps it is just this intuition that sets Him apart from his contemporaries who, 
because of the grip that the prevailing beliefs and cultural habits of the time exerted 
upon them, found themselves incapable of freeing themselves from the worn-out, 
decadent order of their age.   
However, by categorizing Bergson merely as a ‘Christian thinker’ we would 
have not only to neglect important aspects of his account of consciousness, but also the 
function of the method of intuition with regard to reinitiating man to his forgotten 
freedom within the world. It is true that consciousness is not totally exhausted by its 
functional orientation toward the exigencies of embodied life—that it may also “turn 
toward the useless,” go “counter to the natural bent of the intellect,” and thereby 
become aware of the deepest condition of its creativity that is exemplified in durational 
becoming—but this does not imply that the reflection upon duration is an end in itself.1  
Rather, as Bergson tells us in Time and Free Will, the method of intuition aims to 
restore the original ‘dynamic unity’ of psychic life that is lost as the representational 
order becomes ascendant.2  However much we may be condemned to lose it again 
when action demands the renewal of a rational calculation that treats differences of 
quality as differences of quantity, this method momentarily restores dynamism to an 
organism whose vitality has been weighed down under the accretions of habit and 
representation.  It is in the wake of the intuition of the duration at the heart of concrete 
                                                
1 Creative Evolution, p. 25/29 
2 Time and Free Will, p. 239/191 
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reality, in the movement back to our useful, active involvement with the external world 
that the fullness of freedom and creativity is really in evidence.   
Those looking for the consolations of the afterlife in Bergson’s philosophy will 
find themselves wanting. This is a freedom which is never a freedom from the 
challenges of the world such as that which is promised by the Christian afterlife, but a 
freedom that is always exercised very much within the world as a movement of passing 
through the present on the way toward a future of one’s own.  This observation will 
remain important as we turn more fully toward addressing the question of death, which 
will be the principle aim of this chapter.   
And so, with Matter and Memory, Bergson considers more deeply what it 
means to be within the world in this way.  He seems to realize that reducing extensity to 
a moment of the durational subject, as he tends to do in Time and Free Will, renders it 
more difficult to explain the very real influence that extended bodies have in 
determining the organism as a needful being to begin with.  The organism is fragile, and 
it must act in order to secure its survival.  In this light, pain is viewed not only in terms 
of the qualitative multiplicity that is to be found at its core, but it is rightly understood as 
the sign of a danger to the genuinely embodied organism.  It is proof of the real 
externality of the extended world and to the fact that, at least to some extent, man 
indeed is exposed to the physical forces that move there—forces which promise 
destruction for the organism if they are not answered with reactions.  How else can we 
explain the demands of action if not by reference to an extended externality that is just 
as real as the subject?  And so the extended world, rather than being a mere function of 
its representations, is now held to stand apart in some measure from the creative 
subject, as a real obstacle to its continued survival and creativity. 
With this we have arrived at the question that will guide our inquires in this 
chapter—a question that may be framed along the following lines:  Do the threats to the 
organism that are registered in pain announce the danger of the reduction of the 
organism to nothingness?  Does organic destruction imply the annihilation of 
consciousness?  Or does consciousness persist in some way in spite of in spite of dying 
and thus that Bergson’s philosophy is, as Levinas has claimed in Time and its Other, a 
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“philosophy without death?”3  If so, does this imply that consciousness exists in some 
way independent of the body? 
These questions will be examined along two lines within this essay.  We will 
consider the meaning of death from the standpoint of the subject, attempting to 
determine where within experience the specter of death appears, either in witnessing 
the death of the other or in the experience of a pain that indicates the danger of organic 
perishing.  But even if we detect the specter of death within the experience of pain, it 
remains to be seen whether it announces the annihilation of consciousness or whether 
it only concerns the embodied existence of the subject.   In order to answer the latter 
question, it will be necessary to go beyond a consideration of the individual subject and 
examine the meaning of death from the evolutionary standpoint.  Whereas Time and 
Free Will and Matter and Memory will supply the framework for our examination 
from the standpoint of the subject, Creative Evolution will provide the framework for 
interpreting the meaning of death from an evolutionary standpoint.   
 
1. A Typology of Dying 
 
In The Challenge of Bergsonism, Leonard Lawlor asks the question of whether 
Bergson’s philosophy “measures up…to the standard that Heidegger has set for 
ontology,” in spite of the fact that Heidegger himself has rejected Bergsonism as a mere 
“reversal” of the Aristotelian conception of time.4  This standard of course concerns 
the question of Being, and whether this question has been asked authentically in terms 
of the interpretation of time, which provides the “possible horizon for any 
understanding whatsoever of Being.”5  Heidegger undertakes the “destruction” of the 
tradition of metaphysics, which, in his view, has involved a thoughtless privileging of 
presence of a form of givenness to consciousness and thus forecloses upon 
approaching the question of Being in terms of time.   
Lawlor is right to defend Bergson against the claim.  The charge that Bergson 
merely reverses Aristotelianism suggests a paltry understanding of his philosophy, and 
                                                
3 Levinas, E. (1987). Time and the Other. (R. A. Cohen, Trans.) Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press. p. 80 
4 Lawlor, L. (2003). The Challenge of Bergsonism. New York: Continuum. p. 28 
5 Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. (J. M. Robinson, Trans.) San Francisco: Harper, p. 
19 
—(1967). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, p. 1 
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betrays a failure to comprehend what is really unique in his thinking; namely, the 
concepts of memory and duration.  A deeper understanding of these concepts also 
indicates that in no way can we reduce Bergsonism to the legacy of the metaphysics of 
presence that Heidegger seeks to destroy.  While we do find a description of presence-
to-consciousness in Bergson’s philosophy, this is only in the mode of concrete 
perception, which aims at meeting the demands of the external world.  However, this is 
only a specific mode of consciousness, and by no means exhausts its possibilities.  
Consciousness may also turn back toward the unextended virtual ground of its activity.  
Whereas in Time and Free Will it is the qualitative multiplicity of duration itself that 
provided the basis for reacting differently, in Matter and Memory it is the memory of 
the pure past that opens up virtual differences within the actual world and provides the 
virtual limit of duration.  This memory of the pure past is that of an absolute field of 
raw qualitative difference which may be selectively divided according to the needs and 
demands of the embodied organism.  Thus, in Matter and Memory, it is pure memory 
that represents the ground of novelty.   
To remember pure difference involves the rare and difficult effort of driving 
consciousness in a direction that is contrary both to habit and the demands of action, 
resisting these habits and demands long enough to realize that the world might become 
something other than what it presently is.  Thus, the turn to memory involves a 
“relaxation or perversion of our attention to life.”6  In proportion to the organism’s 
tendency for mistaking itself for its own habitual comportments and representations—
that is, for mistaking itself for its own present reflection—this organism will also exhibit 
resistance to returning to the pure, undifferentiated qualitative multiplicity of pure 
memory.  Also, if it exposed to threats from the external world, it must remain involved 
with the present in order to defend itself against them, going only as far into the depths 
of memory as is necessary to find answers to these threats.  
The true measure of an organism’s vitality is thus its ability to bend 
consciousness in the direction of the pure past without thereby entirely compromising 
the organic structures upon which its individual life depends.  It must be able to return 
from its essay into the depths of memory with something useful for action, thus 
exhibiting a capacity for reordering its actual organizational structures according to 
virtualities that promise a deeper involvement with life.  With the shift in perspective 
                                                
6 1910 Preface to Matière et mémoire, p. ii 
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between Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory, duration is now understood as 
the tension between the pure past and the present demands of the genuinely external, 
extended world.  That is, it is understood as a tension between the two positivities that 
together constitute the ideal limits of consciousness.  While it could be said that the 
perceptual configurations of actual life approach but never entirely reach one limit, 
remembering approaches and only rarely reaches the other.  Becoming thus occurs in 
function of the shuttling of consciousness between these two limits.  
As the extended world makes demands of the organism, consciousness must 
contract itself into sensory-motor movements and thereby transform itself into present 
actions within extension that reflect those with which it is confronted, both in the sense 
of mirroring them within itself, and of giving back movements which bear a likeness 
with those by which it is beset within extension, rather like the Leibnizian monad.  But 
it may also absorb some measure of these movements that originate from the external 
world and hold itself back from immediate reactions long enough to come up with 
alternatives to its own reflexes.  The capacity for the endurance of pain also suggests an 
ability to hold oneself back from reacting, and in this sense we might say that it is a 
measure of just how free the individual consciousness is from its material conditions.  
The religious martyr takes this capacity for enduring pain to its absolute limit—that is to 
say, he is the one who demonstrates that one can even die for one’s convictions, 
absorbing every agony that the world has to give in the name of his vision for the future.  
The fabric out of which this vision for the future is cut is precisely the pure, unextended 
qualitative multiplicity of pure memory.  Only on this basis does man intuit that life can 
be other than what it presently is.7    
However, even in its ordinary practical orientation, concrete perception also 
involves memory, but it restricts itself only to those more immediately helpful memory 
images that may come to the aid of everyday action.  These are memory images that 
surround the material objects of vital concern almost in the manner of a halo, as virtual 
alternatives for action.  And so, already within concrete perception, in this halo of 
virtualities that surround the object, we find an indistinct mist of images that lead us 
beyond the present.  Already there we find a ‘line of flight’ (ligne de fuite) out of the 
                                                
7 There is some evidence to suggest that Bergson holds the position that the higher the 
organism, the more it must be capable of the absorption of external aggression.  This opens up 
the striking comparison with Nietzsche, who argues that the creative master is characterized 
precisely by his own capacity not only for suffering, but also for returning from this suffering 
with new orders for life.   
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present, which, if followed all the way, will lead us beyond the turn of experience 
toward the pure past.  This halo of indetermination appears first of all as a function of 
the distances between the organism and the object of vital concern.  This distance in 
space is really an interval of duration within which to imagine virtual actions which 
might be performed vis-à-vis the object, and provides the occasion for turning toward 
memory for an answer to the external world’s demands. But, as the martyr 
demonstrates, even in the imminence of contact with the object upon the bodily 
periphery there remains a reserve of duration within which alternatives may be 
advanced; namely, that reserve which is opened up by our capacity for absorbing 
painful encroachments of movement upon the periphery of the body.  Of course, the 
painful interval is limited by the durability of the organism, since extreme aggressions 
from the external world will punch through the periphery and result in the destruction 
of what Bergson calls the “central telephonic exchange” that is the nervous system, and 
thus in death.8   
Whether these comments will suffice to absolve Bergson of the charge that his 
philosophy is another iteration of the metaphysics of presence, we leave this to the 
Heidegger scholars to decide.  Whatever the case may be, these discussions have 
served to bring us closer to our own question of whether Bergson’s thought is, as 
Levinas has put it, a “philosophy without death.”  On this account Leonard Lawlor is of 
a decidedly different opinion than Levinas, claiming rather that “the experience of pure 
memory must be an experience of death.”9  In his view, because the turn toward 
memory is a turn away from the demands of the present—a turn that always involves 
turning away from actual life—this must also mean that opening oneself up to memory 
amounts to opening oneself up to death.  In his essay, “A Present Folded Back on the 
Past,” Rudolf Bernet rejects this interpretation, siding instead with Levinas. According 
to Bernet, Lawlor’s interpretation of Bergson has introduced something akin to the 
Freudian hypothesis of a death drive into every living organism—a move that is, in his 
view, entirely alien to Bergsonian thought.10   
In the remainder of this work, we will seek something of a rapprochement 
between these two apparently contradictory positions, following our own path to 
understanding them.  While we certainly do not wish to make Bergson into a kind of 
                                                
8 Matter and Memory, p. 30/34 
9 Lawlor, 2003, p. 59 
10 Bernet, 2005, p. 75 
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proto-Heideggerian thinker, there may be something within Heidegger’s thought to 
may help us in our effort to frame our discussion.  Indeed, this effort to understand 
death will necessitate the undertaking of what Heidegger calls in Being and Time a 
“typology of dying…[which is] a characterization of the conditions under which a 
demise is ‘Experienced’ and the ways in which it is ‘Experienced’.”11  Moreover, we 
may find some orientation in Heidegger’s question of whether “the expression ‘death’ 
[has merely] a biological signification or one that is existential-ontological,” and availing 
ourselves of the Heideggerian distinction between perishing, which always only 
concerns the destruction of the embodied organism, and dying, which concerns the 
collapse of consciousness into nothingness, or its annihilation.  In view of parsing out 
this distinction, a deeper examination of the nature of perception is in order.   
In the everyday engagements of perception we do find a concern with the effort 
both to secure the needs of life and to avoid its mortal dangers, and this function of 
neutralizing threats is as important for the organism as that of knowing how to use the 
objects with which it is presented.  As important as this function is, perception 
nonetheless exhibits another and perhaps more primary dimension—that is, to care for 
the conditions of the dynamic conjunction between memory and the present 
movement, and thus for preserving the organism’s ecstatic relation with the present.  In 
this sense, using the language of Heidegger, we might say that perception exhibits both 
an existentiell (existenziell) and an existential (existenzial) dimension.12  The former 
concerns the ontical durability of the organism, the latter the maintenance of the 
durational continuity between the past and the future.  We might also say that, 
corresponding to this distinction, perception is characterized at once by its fear of 
dangerous objects and its anxiety about maintaining itself for the future.   
Thus, in view of bodily durability and the durational continuity of the subject, 
consciousness must in some sense “hover in anxiety.”  But what would such an anxiety 
really disclose?  It is obvious that, from a purely ontical standpoint, perception 
concerns itself with preventing the body from perishing.  But if it is the case that 
perception also exhibits this ontological dimension, that it carefully maintains the 
conditions for the dynamic conjunction between present sensory-motor mechanisms 
and memory images, may we also assert that perception only concerns itself with the 
                                                
11Being and Time, §49 
12Sein und Zeit, 1967, §3 
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threat of the destruction of the body in view of the more profound threat of the 
reduction of consciousness to nothingness?  And if perception aims at preventing the 
confused disjunction between movement and memory that manifests as affection, it 
would seem that consciousness must have already “caught sight” of this disjunction, 
much like the nothing in Heidegger’s thought.13  That is to say, the perceptual function 
would in some way be motivated by the organism’s anxiety about this disjunction, a 
disjunction that must have already exposed itself to consciousness in the form of 
affection.  
We do not wish to make too much of this comparison between the specific 
concepts of Heidegger and Bergson, but it nevertheless provides us with the 
opportunity to raise the question of whether Bergsonian perception conceals a hidden 
negativity at its core or is oriented in some way toward preventing the organism from 
falling fully under its sway.  We will see that an understanding of Bergson’s concept of 
affection will provide one of the keys to answering this question of whether 
consciousness is threatened with nothingness.   
 
2. The Death of the Other 
 
Among the ways in which we might have an experience with death is that of 
encountering the death of the other. The sight of the other’s dead body often stirs in us 
an upheaval of feelings that have been put to rest in normal perception.  What explains 
the fascination and horror of the sight of a mammal’s decomposing, worm-eaten body 
exerts upon us if not the way that it presents itself as an inevitability for us?  What was 
once a source of the warmth of life and a site of agile, harmonized movement is now 
reduced to this lifeless thing that shamefully lies in the dirt.  Where before this body 
was a unified center of coordinated effort and vitality, it is now undergoing 
decomposition and succumbing to the indifference of matter.   
This decompositional movement is always also a process of decentralization.  
The only life that remains here is that of the frenzied multitude of the maggots’ 
movements—a swarming, mindless multiplicity that feeds greedily at the core of what 
before was a graceful, moving unity.  However, it is not merely the appearance of 
                                                
13 “Wie soll aber ein Verneinbares und Zu-verneinendes als ein Nichhaftes erblickt werden 
können, es sei denn so, daß alles Denken als soches auf das Nicht schon vorblickt?” 
(Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik? 1931, 21)  
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spatial decentralization that explains our morbid fascination, but the way in which the 
body of this once spontaneous, vibrant animal no longer maintains itself in tension with 
its environment.  The higher the animal, the more it must have preserved this tension 
within itself and stood out as irreducible to its surroundings, as a center of spontaneity 
and a source of tension not only for itself but for those other higher organisms with 
which it shared its environment.  This dimension of our fascination does not pertain to 
anything essentially spatial, but more deeply to the loss of the duration that was specific 
to this organism.  Together, the process of decentralization and the loss of durational 
tension represent the irreversible loss of this individual instance of organic order into 
the oblivion of materiality.  
While we feel a kind of sympathy with the living animal, we feel no such 
sympathy with the decomposing body.  Rather, if we feel any sympathy at all, it is with 
what this animal formerly was.  There is a sense that something has been lost.  We feel 
elegiac, mournful about this loss, and perhaps repelled by what has been left behind. 
Where before there was the undeniable presence, now there seems only to be an 
absence.  Of course this absence is not at the level of materiality, but at that of life.  
Indeed, the decomposing body is abundant in materiality—perhaps even too abundant.  
What it really lacks is a living order.  Even if the body is that of an animal that died 
peacefully only a moment ago, still the unity of its body is a shadow of its former unity.  
Here, the essence of this unity that is the living organism really makes itself felt in its 
absence.  More than the sum of its parts, the living body cannot be reduced to the 
merely material unity of the corporeal body.  The unity of the living body is rather a 
unity of action and effort.  In this regard, whereas the dead body is merely an object, 
the living organism is as much an act as it is a thing, which is why Bergson can say in 
Creative Evolution that, “we are, to a certain extent, what we do.”14  This is why the 
organism exhibits itself as an indivisible movement of life rather than a mere composite 
of mechanical parts.   
Where once there was order now there is disorder.  And where before we 
found a kind of life with which we could sympathize, now we find only an absence and 
a lack.  But where, between this transition from living organic unity to decomposing 
body, may we find nothingness?  This body has not slipped out of being, but has 
merely changed forms; apparently passing from a state of order to one of disorder.  
                                                
14 Creative Evolution, 2005, p. 6/7 
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This disorder is not nothing.  Indeed, it is not even ‘disorder’ except in the light of the 
expectations of the subject.  That is, though the body of the decomposing animal 
exhibits no living order with which we can sympathize, this does not imply that it is 
entirely devoid of order, let alone living order.  In fact, this body is actually teeming 
with life—only it is a form of life that feeds on decay.  Thus, if we carefully examine the 
matter at hand, we find that one reality has merely been substituted for another.  It is 
for this reason that Bergson makes the claim in Creative Evolution that “annihilation 
signifies before anything else substitution.”15  “We are immersed” says Bergson, “in 
realities and cannot pass out of them; only, if the present reality is not the one we are 
seeking, we speak of the absence of the sought-for reality wherever we find the 
presence of another.”16 
What is absent or ‘negated’ in my perception, having been filtered out in 
accordance with my interests, is preserved in memory as the forgotten remainder of the 
selections of perception. However, in its most immediate activity even concrete 
perception does not itself involve an operation of negation so much one of marking out 
the present from the differences of pure memory.  It creates the present by means of a 
“contraction” of the past, which in its purity, is pure difference.  Nevertheless, concrete 
perception has a tendency to further solidify into habits and representations.  More 
precisely, as we become habituated to the limitations which perception imposes upon 
memory in view of action, these limitations further congeal into representations that are 
now mistaken for the real.  And now, because concrete perception has largely given 
over to a representational order, these differences reassert themselves in experience 
and take the aspect of negativities.   
Detaching ourselves from the bias of experience toward action, we can see that 
the ‘lack’ or ‘negativity’ that we have encountered in the dead body of the other is only 
relative to our interests (or, more precisely, to a sympathy that is based upon a shared 
interest in life).  When viewed in the correct light, a ‘negativity’ such as this is actually 
an evocation of the positive differences of pure memory, however much these 
differences have retreated from a consciousness that looks exclusively to action. The 
immense difference between what I have become accustomed to when I have seen 
animal life (the lively flow of movement and vitality) and what I now find (the body 
                                                
15 Creative Evolution, p. 233/283 
16 Creative Evolution, p. 225/273 
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reduced to an inert mass) throws me back upon the hidden past which one can only 
find within the depths of myself; namely, the pure past of qualitative multiplicity out of 
which not only my life, but the life of the other, has been carved.   
This experience of the death of the other reveals one of the central concerns of 
perception; namely, the prevention of the annihilation of my own body. But, again, we 
must be careful about our terms.  Here, what concerns us is not so much annihilation, 
but destruction of the body understood the site of a specific organic compositional 
order that supplies the location for the coordination of movement and memory.  
According to Bergson’s view in Matter and Memory, just as memory preserves itself 
irrespective of whether it remains virtual or is actualized, the image of extended matter 
endures irrespective of whether it is organized into living organic centers or remains 
unorganized as inert materiality.  Thus, what is under threat is not the image of matter 
as a whole or even the particular materiality upon which organic life has organized itself, 
but the specific manner according to which this organism has marked itself out as an 
organizational center within nature. The organism is the site of the inscription of 
memory upon matter, where memory has transfigured itself into an aggregate of 
habitual sensory-motor mechanisms according to which it can maintain itself as a center.  
Death, in this sense, only implies the leveling out of the organizational center, and is 
comparable to Heidegger’s notion of ‘perishing,’ which is really more of a purely 
biological concept than an existential-ontological one.  This is the erasure of the 
actualized memory inscriptions, the inscriptions of memory upon matter.  Thus, 
perishing marks the retreat of memory into unactualized virtuality and the return of the 
organic body to the massivity of matter.  It is the instant in which the individual 
organism has not only been totally decentered, but also has been rendered incapable of 
ever recovering itself as a center again.   
To summarize, the encounter with the death of the other amounts to witnessing 
the decentralization of what was formerly a center of organic life and movement.  But 
more than this, in the death of an other organism we find the loss of its capacity to 
maintain itself in tension with its environment.  This is nothing more than the loss of 
the duration that is specific to this being.   Now there is little that separates dead 
organism from what was formerly its environment.  No longer can it adjust itself to 
external demands by means of sensory-motor movement.  Not only has it lost its habits, 
it has also seems to have lost whatever future was secured through the deployment of 
 227 
these habits.  Nevertheless, the materiality of the organism remains, but it has merely 
changed forms.  Organized materiality has now given over to disorganized materiality.  
But again, this materiality appears as ‘disorganized’ only by reference to the 
expectations of the witness.  If this witness finds nothing here with which we can 
sympathize, this is not necessarily because it has lost duration altogether, but because 
this duration is too remote from our own.  That is, the duration of the dead organism 
has fallen back into what from our standpoint characterizes the duration of materiality, 
which forms a kind of backdrop against which the duration that is specific to higher life 
sets itself apart. If there remains some measure of spontaneity here, it is infinitesimal 
and eludes our senses entirely.  
 
3. My Own Death 
 
Now that we have examined the experience of the death of the other, let us now 
turn to the possibility of the experience of death within oneself, which Lawlor identifies 
with that of pure memory.   The key to understanding his claim rests with the nature of 
affection, which Bergson identifies as a “specialized perception” in Matter and 
Memory.17  Defining affection in this way implies that if we are to arrive at a deeper 
understanding of affection we must first understand perception.  Our course to arriving 
at this understanding will involve an examination the developmental process according 
to which perception elaborates itself from infancy to maturity.  This will yield insight 
not only with regard to how memory and movement are coordinated, but also how the 
organism first marks itself out as a center within space.  Furthermore, it will help us to 
understand that, while perception involves the dynamic conjunction of movement and 
memory, affection amounts to the confused disjunction between them in which 
potentially threatening movements within matter which are entirely unfamiliar and for 
which the organism has no answer evokes the profound difference of pure memory.18  
We will see that the development of perception is motivated to some degree by an 
experience of this disjunction of affection which announces the threat of impending 
destruction for the organism—the very same in which Lawlor discovers the specter of 
death.   
                                                
17 Matter and Memory, p. 57/58 
18 See p. 190 – 192 of Chapter 8 for more on this.   
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Together with learning how to use the objects of perception, the child also 
learns how to avoid its threats.  Some measure of his understanding with regard to how 
to manage and avoid threats can be attributed to the role that the parents have played in 
informing the child through language, but it is likely that an even larger measure derives 
from immediate experience.  For example, it is often not enough to merely explain to 
the child that touching the burner on the stove will result in injury.  These terms have 
yet to obtain a vital reference for the child—that is, the child must have some memory 
of ‘hurting yourself’ in order to understand that these words refer to something that is 
to be avoided, an encounter which will inevitably come to be represented as a negative 
experience.  Indeed, such a negative experience is probably responsible for 
underscoring the original division of the child’s own body from those of others, thus 
reinforcing the sense that the periphery of the body represents a kind of limit between 
himself and the external world.  Furthermore, it may be that these experiences serve to 
center the body within extension.   
The body of the infant is no less a part of the image of matter than the adult’s, 
but the former must learn to distinguish his own body from those of his surroundings—
a process which is intimately related to the progressive development of motor functions.  
Each of these developments would also appear to correspond with the initial projection 
of the homogenous medium of space and the child’s awareness that he is present as a 
center within it.  While we do not wish to go so far as to posit a causal relation, it is 
clear that there is at least a strong correlation between the overwhelming multiplicity 
and heterogeneity of childhood experience, the development of perception and, finally, 
the projection of homogenous space as the abstract locale within which representations 
inhere.   
In Time and Free Will, Bergson asserts that that the projection of space 
probably represents a kind of “reaction against heterogeneity.”  What is the character of 
this heterogeneity?  In this work, this reaction is thought to occur against “the very 
ground of experience,” here understood in terms of the unextended qualitative 
multiplicity of pure duration.19  In other words, the representations of quantitative 
difference and of the homogenous medium of space not only provides a framework 
within which action becomes possible; it also delivers the organism from the 
overwhelming heterogeneity of pure duration.  However, while it may be true that the 
                                                
19 Time and Free Will, p. 97/72 
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act by which space is projected beneath what originally exhibits itself as heterogeneous 
does represent a kind of reactivity, is this reactivity really aroused by the heterogeneity 
of pure duration as Bergson suggests in Time and Free Will?  Isn’t it more likely that 
this original reactive moment unfolds vis-à-vis the heterogeneity of affection, which is, as 
he asserts in Matter and Memory, an impure confusion of unextended memory and 
genuinely extended movement?  
With Matter and Memory, Bergson declares that the body is genuinely situated 
upon the plane of matter, and this claim would seem to provide us with the resources 
for a deeper explanation of the reaction.  With this work, Bergson establishes that 
concrete perception enables the organism to more or less freely overlay memory 
images with sensory-motor functions, thus directing the organism toward a future that is 
entirely its own.  By contrast, the confusion and “impurity” of affection prevents the 
organism from acting freely.20  Likewise, the projection of the homogenous medium of 
space further provides a useful schema that makes it possible to avoid the confused 
collapse of memory and matter that issues in affection.  Now we can understand the 
source of the reactivity—which was conceived in Time and Free Will as a purely 
unextended heterogeneity of pure duration—in terms of the confused impurity of 
alienated bodily movement and the whirlwind of impotent memory images that 
characterizes affection.  
It is true that concrete perception, like affection, also exhibits an alloy of 
memory and movement and that it is also, in the strictest sense, ‘impure.’  But 
perception is separated from affection by the way that, whereas perception involves a 
harmonization of the tension of memory with that of the sensory-motor functions, in 
affection the tension of the body tends to outpace that of memory, creating some 
measure of dissonance between them.  The reaction against heterogeneity, in this case, 
would first of all represent a reaction against just this dissonant impurity.  In childhood 
affection, consciousness has already caught sight of what threatens its sense of freedom 
and meaning.  This original glimpse of the helplessness of affection drives 
consciousness to seek after the freedom that issues from the harmony of concrete 
perception.  
For the infant child, in the time before he has constructed motor mechanisms 
or learned to coordinate memory images with them so that they may be improved in 
                                                
20 Matter and Memory, p. 58/59 
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view of action, the world hangs too close.  There is almost no form of sensation that is 
not also potential source of agitation.  The smallest disturbance or change of 
environment can drive the child into hysterics.  Whereas most animals come out of the 
womb already equipped with some ready-made (instinctual) motor capacities, the 
human infant has no such inborn motor facilities.  This period is characterized by 
helplessness if for no other reason that that the child has no recourse to his affects 
other than those provided by his parents.  This means that, whereas the animal, by 
virtue of his inborn capacities for coordinated movement, arrives on the scene already 
as a center, the infant child must rely upon his parents to treat his body as a center.  
The process of transforming the body into a center corresponds with that of building 
up motor mechanisms on the bodily field of immediacy that is originally a host of 
affective difference.  Thus, the perceptual order is really just the product of past efforts 
to build up an aggregate of sensory-motor mechanisms within the body that reflexively 
maintain it as a center, both by securing necessities and fending off threats.  
The task of the perceptual function is first of all one of separating out the 
elements of movement and memory, and then with maintaining this separation except 
in moments when they are brought together selectively in the subject’s own way to 
create a present in accordance with its freedom.  Together with the transformation of 
his own body into a center, as the child develops a facility for habitual sensory-motor 
movement and for overlaying memory images with these movements, so also does his 
capacity for managing the affects progress.  And finally, there also emerges a 
corresponding capacity for representation, in which the child takes his own body as a 
central point that is surrounded by space on all sides that is populated with beings. 
With this achievement, the child, who was formerly little more than a mere animal, is 
now capable not only of the coordination of movement and memory in concrete 
perception, but also of further diminishing his affects by escaping into representation.  
Now he has crossed the threshold into the cultural world of man. 
If the child’s development continues along a normal course, presumably this 
will culminate in a well-balanced perceptual function that features a fitness between his 
memories of the past and present movement, which will assure that he of a capable of a 
vigorous, healthy life. In the following long passage, Bergson has this to say about such 
a life:   
It is from the present that the appeal to which memory responds comes, 
and it is from the sensory-motor elements of present action that a 
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memory borrows the warmth which gives it life.  Is it not by the 
constancy of this agreement, by the precision with which these two 
complementary memories insert themselves each into the other, that we 
recognize a ‘well-balanced’ mind, that is to say, in fact, a man nicely 
adapted to life?  The characteristic of the man of action is the 
promptitude with which he summons to the help of a given situation all 
the memories which have reference to it…To live only in the present, to 
respond to a stimulus by the immediate reaction which prolongs it, is the 
mark of the lower animals: the man who proceeds in this way is a man 
of impulse.  But he who lives in the past for the mere pleasure of living 
there, and in whom recollections emerge into the light of consciousness 
without any advantage for the present situation, is hardly better fitted for 
action:  here we have no man of impulse, but a dreamer. Between these 
two extremes lives the happy disposition of a memory docile enough to 
follow with precision all the outlines of the present situation, but 
energetic enough to resist all other appeal.  Good sense, or practical 
sense, is probably nothing but this.21 
 
The man who is nicely adapted to life strikes a balance between his (self-)involvement 
with the past and his immersion in the present.  He does not forsake the present in 
favor of idle reveries or allow himself to be captivated by his memories.  And he acts 
according to the demands of the present without abandoning himself entirely to it.  
These are the characteristics of a man who is nicely adapted to life.  
However, if this man had not had the good fortune of having a manageable life, 
if he had been visited by frequent menaces in his childhood and had lived a life that 
only promised more of the same, perhaps he would have compensated himself in his 
moments of repose by giving himself over to dreaming—a tendency which would have 
no doubt further inhibited his efforts to adapt to life or to achieve balance within it. At 
another level, the presence of such menaces could also swiftly reduce this man to little 
more than a ‘lower animal,’ since he would be repeatedly compelled by this menace to 
merely respond to stimulus with immediate reactions.  In any case, he would find 
himself caught in a kind of downward spiral.  Seized in one moment by the urge to 
dream, in the next, as the menace reasserts itself, he would be subject to powerful 
affections.  As each tendency bolsters the other, this life would soon lose its center of 
gravity and spin off into madness or despair.   
With regard to our ill-fated man, if his life is ‘diminished,’ it would seem that 
this is less in the sense that it is haunted by nothingness than that it is wanting for the 
balance that characterizes the healthy, well-adjusted life; a balance that is secured in 
                                                
21 Matter and Memory, p. 153/170
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normal perception.  And if this life is ‘too much,’ it would seem that this only pertains 
to the frequency with which this man is given to disturbing affects.  In other words, it is 
because he is subject to too much impurity and confusion in perception (the very same 
that characterizes childhood) that he feels that life itself has become too much.  It is as 
if the external world has become too present, looms too near, and barely leaves him 
with the space (interval) within which to adjust himself to its ever-renewed, all-too-
pressing demands.   
Let us summarize our conclusions so far.  Our discussions appear to have 
brought us closer to an answer to the question of whether affection announces the 
threat of nothingness to the organism.  If it were the case that perception aims at 
preventing the confused collapse of memory and movement and this collapse also 
threatens consciousness with its annihilation, then indeed we would be justified in 
asserting that perception involves a reaction against nothingness.  But if perception 
seeks to inhibit this collapse and yet it does not also imply the annihilation of 
consciousness, then perception would involve no such reaction against the threat of 
annihilation, and the reactive tendencies of perception would have to be explained in a 
different way. It should be clear from our discussion that Matter and Memory locates 
durational consciousness always somewhere between the positivities of extended 
movement and memory. While an excessive preoccupation of consciousness with 
either the representations of the present or with memories of the past may amount to a 
diminishment of vitality, this does not imply death in the sense of a passing of 
consciousness over to nothingness.   
Nevertheless, powerful affections do have implications for the life of the 
individual organism, which is to say, they probably announce the threat of death in the 
sense of organic perishing. Extreme affections involve a confused impurity of 
movement and memory, and correspond with the flooding of consciousness with the 
multiplicity of pure memory in a kind of return of the developed organism to the 
primordial helpless of the infant child.  As we have seen, this primordial helplessness of 
the infant characterizes the moment before the development in concrete perception of 
sensory-motor habits.  The development of habits at once provide answers to the 
movements of the external world and offer themselves as points of purchase for 
memory images which might serve to improve one’s response to these movements. 
With the presence of an extreme threat, insofar as one is ill equipped to deal with it in 
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terms of one’s motor reactions and thus has no response for it, one is brought before a 
situation that is unlike anything that concrete perception has hitherto been confronted 
with in adult life.  Because it differs so radically from one’s normal experience, it 
evokes the profound difference that characterizes pure memory, and thus inundates 
consciousness with differential multiplicity with the force of a flood, thus rendering it 
incapable of finding its grip.  This testifies to the fact that this experience of pure 
memory indeed does herald the death of the organism.  
Thus, Lawlor is in a sense correct in his claim that the experience of memory is 
the experience of death.  At the level of its materiality, the living organism is nothing 
more than an accumulation of the contractions of duration that are sensory-motor 
mechanisms, and it maintains itself is a center of action by means of these mechanisms.  
Insofar as these mechanisms are not equal to the task of thwarting the threat, the latter 
raises the possibility that the organism will be decentered, reduced to inert materiality, 
and thus lose the durational tension with its environment that has been won by the 
organism’s former efforts.  However, this amounts only to the destruction of the body 
understood the site of a specific organic compositional order and the erasure of the 
actualized memory inscriptions of the nervous system that together with pure memory 
ensure that the individual organism will have a future that is irreducible to its past.  
When Bergson says, in “The Soul and the Body,” that because memory survives the 
destruction of parts of the brain, it is probable that the soul survives for a time after the 
destruction of the body,22 all he means is that, by virtue of the way that pure memory 
remains in some way oriented toward actualization, it continues for a moment to haunt 
those centers where it has found purchase in the past in the manner of a “ghost.”23  
 
4. Death from the Evolutionary Standpoint 
 
Our examinations have revealed that the elaboration of normal perception 
follows from a reaction against what from the standpoint of the well-balanced, fully 
developed perceptual function amounts to the confused mingling of the pure 
positivities of movement and memory.   We also saw how affection comes to be 
identified as a negativity for the organism, and that the emergence of the 
                                                
22 Bergson, H. (1920). Mind-Energy. (H. W. Carr, Trans.) London: Greenwood Press. p. 65 
23 Matter and Memory, p. 145/161 
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representational order is yet a further articulation of the reactive tendency which issued 
in the developmental push toward concrete perception.   
It is clear that the conditions for the development of concrete perception must 
already be in place in the infant’s immature consciousness.  The undeveloped 
consciousness must already be somehow suspended within the positivities of pure 
memory and movement.  The infant is always already a nascent center of organic 
movement, endowed by nature with nervous reflexes that cause both its attraction the 
life-sustaining necessities of food, water and warmth and its aversion to painful stimuli.   
These reflexive endowments are the last vestiges of instincts that characterize lower 
animals, and they make it possible for the child to begin to center himself within the 
plane of extension and eventually to begin to merge memory images with movement, 
thereby increasing by degrees the range of his freedom. What separates the newborn 
organism with its undeveloped perceptual capacity from mere matter in movement is 
that whereas the former possesses an inborn or instinctual capacity for movement, the 
latter does not and always only changes under the influence of an external force. 
Nevertheless, the movements of the newborn are apparently not yet freely synthesized 
with memory, but approximate in many ways a complex machine with an internal 
principle of durability and survival.  Certainly, if organic life never surpassed this 
primitive, merely reflexive relationship with its environment then the mechanistic 
psychophysical account would remain somewhat more compelling.  Consciousness 
could more easily be understood as an epiphenomenon of mechanical forces acting 
within and upon the body, and freedom could be brushed aside as merely illusory.   
If the newborn is already a nascent center and is endowed with these internally 
motivated mechanisms then, like the sensory-motor coordination that characterizes 
mature perception, these inborn mechanisms must themselves be the product of a 
movement of genesis.  Of course, the individual organism cannot have been 
responsible for building up these mechanisms—they arrive on the scene ready-made as 
vestiges of instinctual endowments within the structure or the organism itself which are 
to be found in lower life forms.  How then explain their genesis?   
To answer this question we must turn to evolutionary biology.  Darwin argues 
that their origin corresponds with the accumulation of useful mutations over time.  
These mutations determine the fitness of the organism to its environment, and whether 
the organism which possesses them will be able to survive long enough to propagate.  
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Whereas organisms which have undergone harmful mutations perish quickly and are 
eliminated as candidates for reproduction, those which have undergone beneficial 
mutations vis-à-vis their environment live longer and outnumber their inferiors.  
Mutation also supplies the basis for the development of novel reflexive or instinctive 
mechanisms which, together with the development of stronger, faster or more durable 
corporeal structures, provides an explanation of the inborn, instinctual capacities for 
movement which can be found in the young organism.                                                            
In Creative Evolution, Bergson repudiates this view of evolution.  While he 
does not go so far as finalism in the elimination of all accidental variation in the 
development of life, he also does not accept the neo-Darwinian account of 
development that asserts that highly-evolved organisms are the result of nothing more 
than a proliferation of mutually complimentary accidents.  Life itself must involve an 
internal push toward creative development, which he calls the élan vital.  And in 
Bergson’s view, the evolutionary push that characterizes the élan vital does not unfold 
at the level of the individual organism which, upon developing a new, superior capacity 
for managing its relations with its environment, then transmits these acquired habits to 
its offspring, as Lamarck argued.  No, the push must be still deeper than even the 
individual organism.  The individual organism is merely the product of an evolutionary 
movement that arcs toward the production of species that are endowed with the means 
for realizing higher degrees of freedom from material conditions, an arc that culminates 
in the emergence of the human being.   
In Bergson’s view, the primary agent of evolutionary development is 
consciousness.  While consciousness in the mode of concrete perception only finds its 
conditions in the organic body, consciousness-as-such must be understood as the origin 
of the organic structures that are to be found there.  The individual consciousness then 
uses these organic structures that have been created by consciousness-as-such in view of 
its own purposes.  This is to say that consciousness is not merely to be found among 
the particular effects of life, but more profoundly provides its universal cause.  If 
accidents persist in the expressions of life, this is precisely because of the ever-renewed 
compromise that consciousness must make with material reality.  Real occasions for 
creative activity can be found nowhere but within this extended reality, and this activity 
always only recruits that which in itself exhibits a tendency for inertia into a movement 
that follows in some measure the rhythm of life.   
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In this regard, the broad movement of organic evolution parallels the 
development of the individual human life from its birth to its death.  Individual 
development is merely a redoubling of this original tendency which is first to be found 
in evolutionary development more generally.  “Organic evolution resembles the 
evolution of [the individual] consciousness, in which the past presses against the present 
and causes the upspringing of a new form of consciousness, incommensurable with its 
antecedents.”24 
We have already seen how this process works for the individual organism in 
terms of the way that memory finds intervals within the movements of the body within 
which to insert itself.  In Creative Evolution, Bergson describes how this unfolds in the 
general evolutionary development of life—a development that will issue finally in the 
emergence of an individual organism that is capable of a synthesis of concrete 
perception that provides the conditions for yet a further development of freedom, only 
now at the individual level.  Just as the development of concrete perceptions leaves in 
its wake deposits of sensory-motor habits which abbreviate what was originally the 
differential multiplicity of the real, so also does the élan vital leave in its wake deposits 
of its own activity, which are nothing less than the diversity of species that populate the 
natural world.   
Species-life is to the élan vital what habit is to concrete perception.  Each is the 
result of a contraction of differential multiplicity into a repetition of activity that itself 
provides the vehicle of transition toward an indeterminate future.  Nevertheless, both 
the élan-vital and concrete perception must also find within movement opportunities 
for introducing indeterminacy and for bending material repetition toward the 
production of novelty.  What can this mean, except that both are specific modes of 
consciousness?  The former mode of consciousness must have already been in place in 
order for the latter to emerge.  Thus, the élan-vital establishes the general conditions at 
the level of species-life for the emergence of the individual consciousness.  Only slowly, 
over the course of eons, does it build up the organic groundwork upon which the 
perception of the individual organism will do its work.   
The orientation of the lower animal’s life is strictly dictated by the intensity of its 
inherited instinctual dispositions and the inflexible physical endowments that go 
intimately together with these dispositions.  To the extent that the lower animal 
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possesses its own consciousness, this consciousness inhabits the smallest margin 
between these instinctive dispositions and their respective bodily endowments, both of 
which remain oriented from birth toward immediate action.  From birth until death, 
animal perception remains inseparably tethered to the rigidly specific functionality of its 
bodily endowments, effectively rendering any alteration of these functions impossible.  
Furthermore, instinct provides an insuperable barrier between the individual 
organism’s perceptual consciousness and consciousness as such.  It may not transcend 
its own instinctual disposition and take a recollective view of their origin.  It may not 
decompose these instincts in the way that man may decompose his habit-memories to 
reveal the differences concealed beneath.  And because it is restricted to merely acting 
out its instincts and action always involves a foreclosure of the virtual, neither may it go 
back toward the virtual ground of this activity in pure memory.  This amounts to saying 
that it may not sympathize with the broader movement of life itself, but is rather 
compelled by nature to remain narrow in its view of things and to sympathize only with 
the specific occasions for its own instinctive activity within its environment.   
Instinct is therefore almost of the order of an unbreakable habit—unbreakable 
precisely because it has been ‘hardwired’ into the structure of the organism by 
evolution.  If this ‘habit’ is to be ‘broken,’ it does not fall to the perceptual 
consciousness of the individual animal to recover the hidden differences at the heart of 
a merely habitual composite.  It must be done by an effort of the élan vital itself at the 
level of species-life.  Even if these ‘instinct-habits’ admitted of some measure of 
plasticity, still the lower animal would lack the corporeal endowments for reinventing 
itself in a radical way.  If the insect could be said to possess something like an 
imagination, certainly its range could never extend so far as to imagine what it might be 
like to possess human hands.25  If anything, this imagination is probably restricted to 
infinitesimal modifications in attitude vis-à-vis those objects of vital concern that are 
specific to this form of life.  This inborn intimacy between the bodily structure and the 
                                                
25 Whereas it is difficult to conceive of the insect imagining himself to be a man, it is less 
difficult to imagine a man becoming an insect.  Kafka’s Metamorphosis, which imagines a 
transformation in the opposite direction, is really a presentation of the stupefactions of 
retrogression.  It imagines the dreadfulness of a consciousness that has become so narrowly 
wrapped up in itself that even the spontaneous transformation of its corporeal structures is 
received more as an inconvenience than as a horror.  Gregor is more troubled by the fact that 
he has slept through his alarm than that he has transformed into an insect, revealing the 
disturbing narrowness of a consciousness that has restricted itself only to the simple demands of 
work and family life. Kafka, F. (2009). The Metamorphosis and Other Stories. (J. Crick, 
Trans.) Oxford: Oxford World Classics. 
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structure of the instincts indicates the smallest margin of creative play that is available to 
the narrow consciousness of lower animals such as insects.   
By contrast, higher animals exhibit a greater margin of play.  The higher the 
animal, the higher also is the degree of play between its physical endowments and the 
instinctual structures of behavior. The degree of tension between instinct and 
endowment corresponds with its ability to create new means of preserving itself against 
the threats that await it within its environment—that is, it corresponds precisely to its 
indeterminacy and its freedom:   
The role of life is to insert some indetermination into matter.  
Indeterminate, i.e. unforeseeable, are the forms it creates in the course 
of evolution.  More and more indeterminate also, more and more free, 
is the activity to which these forms serve as vehicle.26 
 
What is unique to human life is the way that its organic body always arrives on the 
scene already abundant with the promise of the virtual.  This form of life is no longer 
situated merely among the deposited results of creative consciousness.   Now we are 
confronted with a species that can break down the composites of habit into their 
constitutive differences and freely engender creativity; not, of course, at the level of 
evolution, but at the level of the individual life. With this form of life, the promise of 
the virtual is no longer restricted to the efforts of the élan-vital, which undertakes its 
creative work with imperceptible slowness in the movement of evolution. 
Now, as the barriers of instinct fall away, this promise insinuates itself into 
individual perception, thus creating the opportunity for the individual to manufacture 
novel technologies to augment what at first blush appears as a poverty of physical 
endowments.  But this apparent physical poverty is really a sign of virtual richness.  
Where in lesser forms of life there may have been frightful claws with which to level the 
beast of prey, in man there are hands with which to wield the spear, the hammer, the 
pen—and a thousand other technologies which may be availed with a view not only to 
securing the necessities of embodied life, but also of pressing beyond this present 
embodied life toward an indeterminate future.27  Now, the margin of creative play 
extends vastly further than those which were to be found among lesser animals. 
Whereas the perceptual consciousness of lesser animals ranges only between the ready-
made products of evolution—namely, the rigidly functional physical endowments on the 
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27 Creative Evolution, p. 113/140 
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one side and an instinct for using them on the other—with humans, perceptual 
consciousness may (in principle) range between the immanently changeable habitual 
sensory-motor movements of the present and a pure memory of the original differential 
multiplicity out of which these habits have been cut.  And not only does this memory 
touch the fabric out of which one’s own individual habits have been cut, it may, in an 
act of the deepest sympathy, approach the virtual fabric out of which life itself has been 
cut.  
By contrast, what we have called ‘habit-instincts’ present insuperable barriers for 
the remembrance of this original multiplicity.  This is because they are not produced 
within the individual animal but are rather produced for it as the results of 
transindividual efforts of the élan vital.  The process of breaking a habit—a process 
which is only to be found among the human species—involves passing unobstructed in 
one’s own consciousness back toward this original multiplicity of life.  That is, it 
involves the remembrance of both an original differential field undivided by habit and 
the successive moments within which the habit has taken hold.  Instinct implies a ready-
made division of the differential field which, in the animal that is unfettered by instinct, 
pure memory opens up.   
How far into the past does the memory of man extend?  Does it begin with 
embryonic life, or does it extend further than this, into an impersonal, trans-individual 
past which predates even the emergence of the embryo?  If lower animals by nature 
possess the indelible memory of what we have called ‘habit-instincts,’ a kind of 
inherited contraction of memory that has been built up over the course of eons by the 
élan vital, is it not also possible that man might remember the original multiplicity out 
of which these instincts have been carved?  Just as the lower animal ‘remembers’ 
instincts that predate its own life, so also might man remember a past that exceeds that 
of his individual natural life.  And would not such a memory provide the condition for 
sympathizing with the movement of life itself?  This must be the deepest, purest of 
memories of life’s first stirrings; a memory of the original moment of pre-individual life 
in which it found what was the smallest and at the same time the most propitious of 
intervals within which to carry its promise into the future.   
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5. Conclusion 
 
Only now do we approach an answer to the question of whether consciousness 
survives the death of the individual’s body.  My individual life, together with the 
freedom and indeterminacy that characterizes this life, is but the result of a conscious 
push that must have originated with the beginnings of the universe itself.  It thus 
transcends my individuality, which is really just a moment in this push toward freedom.  
If memory haunts materiality from the start, then there is no materiality that is not 
already in some small measure subject to durational becoming.  Inert matter is not 
dead, but merely marks the extremity of a tendency of life:  matter is the most dormant 
kind of life—it is life waiting for its opportunity to wake up.  Organic perishing does not 
thus imply the death of consciousness as such, but the return of this particular life to 
dormancy and diminished novelty.  The fear of death really follows more from a fear 
of losing one’s individuality and uniqueness of character—always related intimately to 
my own mode of action and thus to my habits—than it does from a fear of nothingness 
itself.  
With lower animals, this uniqueness is largely limited to the level of the species-
life, which has merely inherited a novelty that has been produced by the efforts of the 
élan vital. With human beings, we are confronted with a form of life that is itself 
capable of the production of uniqueness.  It is as if the élan vital has succeeded in 
transferring its power of creativity to one of its products.  However, it has not so much 
transferred its power in ready-made form, but its memory.  It is really this memory that 
is the source of the individual organism’s power, and to the degree that this memory is 
not visited by the organism’s consciousness, the organism is condemned to mistake 
itself for its present form and thus to empty repetition.  Not being limited by instinctive 
programming, the human being finds itself capable of consciously remembering the 
original differential multiplicity out of which life itself has been carved.   Whereas the 
lower animal’s consciousness is caught between its instinct-habits and its limited 
physiological endowments, human consciousness must only put aside the demands of 
action long enough to reach back toward to this original difference of pure memory—
the very same difference upon which the élan vital does its work.  In putting aside 
action, the human being may touch the ground of creativity and realize that, in the 
future, life can and must be other than what it presently is.    
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At length, we have arrived at the rapprochement between the positions of that 
we Bernet and Lawlor that we sought.  While Lawlor is correct in his assertion that the 
experience of memory is the experience of individual death in the sense of organic 
perishing, Bernet is likewise correct in claiming with Levinas that Bergson’s is a 
“philosophy without death,” if by this he means that a life-force always haunts matter 
even in its most modest of forms, searching for the smallest of intervals within which to 
insert differences and thereby introduce some measure of indeterminacy into the 
universe.   
Earlier, in our discussion of infantile consciousness, we veered rather nearly 
toward the notion that the subject of memory was at one time present in the original 
confused multiplicity of embryonic life.  But, with our discussion of the role of memory 
in evolutionary development, we have arrived at a still deeper source of memory; 
namely that of the élan vital, which guides the creative movement of life from its earliest 
beginnings.   With this, we caught a glimpse of a memory that predates the individual, 
and provides the virtual reservoir from which life draws its power of creative becoming. 
And, finally, we have found ourselves once again confronted with the question of 
whether there is an original moment of memory—in this case, in the first moment of 
life’s stirrings within the material universe.  What could such an original moment be if 
not one in which there was no difference between the present and the past—i.e. a pure 
present.  If we accept the notion that underlying pure memory there must be a single 
moment that provides its original source as a kind of primordial experience of an 
original multiplicitous present then, however deeply the image of a pure present might 
be buried under the pure past, we would in the final account find ourselves delivered 
back over to a metaphysics of presence which Heidegger seeks to destroy.  
Furthermore, we could scarcely avoid understanding this moment of a pure present as 
that of a merely material, quantitative multiplicity, and the emergence of life as a mere 
accident of circumstance.  With this, we would be confronted once again with the same 
problems that Matter and Memory sought to overcome; namely, those that follow from 
privileging quantity over quality, space over time, and the reduction of the life of man to 
a mere movement of material forces.   
No, we must be careful to avoid this surreptitious reintroduction of a 
metaphysics of presence.  Memory must have haunted matter from the beginning.  And 
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this also means that the universe is also itself a kind of life, and that there is no instance 
of matter which is not capable of some small measure of the spontaneity of life.  
 
[It is] to the totality of the material universe that we ought to compare 
the living thing…Like the universe as a whole, like each conscious being 
taken separately, the organism which lives is a thing that endures.28 
 
Insofar as the universe endures, it too must be kind of life.  From its immemorial 
beginnings, it must have always been haunted by a difference between the past and the 
present that is the condition for the emergence of an indeterminate future.  Without 
this original difference, there could have been no organic life, which is the product of a 
creative effort of the élan vital that has exploited this differential tension between past 
and present in order to engender new forms.  Moreover, to assert that there was an 
original moment of pure presence would amount also to avowing that death predates 
life, that life emerges from death, and that the positivity of life emerges from the 
nothingness of matter—a conclusion which is utterly alien to Bergsonian philosophy. 
Like every living organism, man is dust, and to dust he is destined to return.  
Nevertheless, the force of life haunts even the dust.  
 
 
                                                
28 Creative Evolution, p. 13/15 
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